Nuclear Weapons: Between Double Standards and the Risk of Proliferation
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“Why does the world remain silent over Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, while denying the same to Iran? Is this not a double standard? And is Iran targeted simply because it is a Muslim country?”
These are questions raised by readers and observers, deserving of an answer that goes beyond emotion and examines the issue within its legal, political, and security framework.
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the United States and the Soviet Union came close to a nuclear confrontation, revealed the magnitude of the threat to humanity if more states possessed such weapons. After years of negotiations, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.
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The treaty defined nuclear-weapon states for its purposes as those that had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967: the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France. Other state parties to the treaty undertake not to manufacture or seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and their peaceful nuclear activities are subject to safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In return, the treaty recognizes the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and calls for serious negotiations on disarmament. However, the slow progress in dismantling the arsenals of major powers and disparities in commitments have remained among the primary reasons for criticism directed at the treaty.
The double standard in applying non-proliferation principles cannot be denied. Israel has not joined the treaty, nor has it officially acknowledged possessing nuclear weapons or denied doing so. Specialized sources estimate its arsenal at around 90 warheads. This ambiguity, coupled with the absence of effective international pressure, undermines confidence in the international system and reinforces the perception that rules are not applied equally to all. States in the region have the right to demand transparency and oversight of all nuclear programs, and to call for a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East and a region free of all weapons of mass destruction.
However, acknowledging a double standard does not make adding a new nuclear weapon to the region a solution. Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons does not automatically grant Iran or any other state the right to possess them. Similarly, the call for non-proliferation does not absolve Israel of its responsibilities. A consistent position requires rejecting the monopoly on security, while pressuring all parties to adhere to a serious and fair oversight system.
The Iranian case holds particular significance because Iran is a party to the NPT and is obligated not to seek nuclear weapons and to subject its activities to required safeguards. Outstanding issues in its cooperation with the IAEA have repeatedly raised international concern. Tehran denies that its program is directed toward weaponization; however, dispelling doubts requires full cooperation with the Agency and enabling verification, not merely affirming intentions.
As for the claim that opposition to Iran’s program stems from it being a Muslim country, facts do not support this. North Korea, which is not a Muslim country, faced international condemnation and sanctions after withdrawing from the treaty and conducting a nuclear test in 2006. Pakistan, a Muslim country, became a nuclear power outside the treaty framework amid its rivalry with India, which conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Yet this precedent cannot justify repeating the experience in the Middle East; nuclear competition in South Asia itself remains a constant source of danger.
The most dangerous consequence of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons could be that other states conclude their security can only be ensured by possessing similar weapons. This could open the door to a regional arms race involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and others, even if these countries have not yet decided to acquire such weapons. As the circle of proliferation expands, the risks of miscalculation and escalation that becomes difficult to contain increase.
Therefore, countries in the region, major powers, and international organizations should double their diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, and make verification and compliance the foundation of any understanding. At the same time, Israel’s arsenal must be taken seriously, and there should be a push toward a regional system that excludes no one from transparency and accountability. The justice of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is only complete when it also includes Israel, with the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East, rather than a region characterized by multiple arsenals and risks. Former Bahraini Minister of Labour and Social Affairs
