Iraq After the US Withdrawal... A Test of Sovereignty and Stability

A pause

With the completion of the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq at the end of last month, a curtain fell on a phase of US military presence that began with the 2003 invasion and witnessed several key milestones, most notably the return of forces in 2014 to support Iraq in confronting the "ISIS" (Daesh) group. The withdrawal was completed in accordance with an agreement announced between Baghdad and Washington in 2024, under which cooperation between the two countries will continue in training and information exchange.

The departure of US forces brings joy to the peoples and governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as they are keen for Iraq to enjoy sovereignty and stability, and to possess its own national decision-making autonomy. However, welcoming this development does not negate the need to view what follows with realism; the withdrawal marks the end of a foreign military presence and the beginning of a test of Iraq’s ability to protect its security and unity, and to safeguard its institutions from internal divisions and external interventions.

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Sovereignty is not measured merely by the departure of foreign troops, but by the state’s ability to extend its authority over its entire territory, monopolize decisions on peace and war, and restrict weapons to the hands of its legitimate institutions. The question is: Can the government fill any potential security and political vacuum, and turn the end of the coalition’s military mission into an opportunity to build a stronger, more independent state?

Here, the file of armed factions emerges as unresolved in tandem with the withdrawal; the deadline for addressing it has been extended to June of next year, after the government faced difficulties in persuading factions to hand over their weapons or fully submit them to state authority. This file will be a difficult test for Baghdad, as it is no longer possible to use the US presence as an excuse to retain weapons outside the actual control of official institutions. The sensitivity of this challenge is heightened because some factions maintain close ties with Iran, and observers view them as an extension of Iranian influence in Iraq. This is not about a specific component or sect, but a national principle: no armed organization should become a parallel force to the state, or a tool for imposing external choices. Restoring sovereignty will be incomplete if it paves the way for another form of external influence, or for armed forces that compete with state institutions. Iraq faces a challenge in managing its relations with Washington and Tehran, amid their current competition in the Iraqi landscape. Baghdad is required to protect the independence of its decision-making, and establish balanced relations with both sides, without allowing its territory to become a battleground for settling scores or advancing regional conflicts. This requires a strong state and institutions that enjoy citizens’ trust, and a national vision that transcends cross-border loyalties.

As for the Kurdistan Region, it views the post-withdrawal phase with concern, following missile and drone attacks it suffered during regional confrontations, and its reliance on certain aspects of US military support, including protection and support systems.

The ability of the federal government to ensure the security of the region, protect its population, and safeguard its facilities remains questionable, making it imperative to address its concerns within the framework of the constitution and national partnership; Iraq’s stability will not be complete if any part of it feels abandoned to face dangers alone.

Furthermore, the threat of ISIS cells has not disappeared, despite the group losing control of the territories it once seized. The organization may exploit security gaps, contested areas, or regions with weak government presence, particularly in Kirkuk, Diyala, and Anbar. Therefore, it is necessary to develop Iraqi intelligence and security capabilities, enhance coordination between federal and regional institutions, and utilize available forms of international cooperation to combat terrorism.

At this stage, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries should extend a hand of partnership to Iraq through economic, investment, and developmental cooperation, alongside political and security coordination, thereby enhancing its stability and its ties with the Arab region. Iraq’s stability is a shared Arab and Gulf interest, and any turmoil within it will not remain confined within its borders.

Although the US military presence has ended, the major questions now begin: Will Baghdad succeed in asserting state authority, protecting Kurdistan, confronting remnants of “ISIS,” and safeguarding its decisions from external interference? The real bet is not on what has left Iraq, but on what the Iraqi state will build in its aftermath. The hope is that this phase marks the beginning of firm sovereignty and lasting stability, rather than a new vacuum contested by various powers and armed factions.

Former Bahraini Minister of Labour and Social Affairs