Peace is not made by normalization
In searching the history of Arab normalization with Israel for something simple, I looked for: Where were the popular movements that preceded the decision and called for it? Where were the demonstrations demanding the opening of embassies? Where were the trade unions that pressured for the establishment of relations? Where were the political groups that built their popularity on the slogan of normalization? Where were the civil society demands that sought to crown their efforts with a relationship with Israel?
It is difficult to find a single, clear Arab model in which normalization came from the street to the state. The trajectory, for the most part, was the opposite: from the top down.
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States, of course, have their own calculations, which are not always identical, nor fully disclosed. The motive may be security-related, economic, aimed at building a regional alliance, improving the country’s standing in Washington, or driven by other accounts that may not be publicly stated and are not easily characterized.
All of these are calculations well known in international relations. But the problem begins when we confuse the reasons that drive a state to normalize relations with the reasons that might lead society to accept it. The former can be numerous, while the latter cannot be manufactured simply by signing an agreement.
Egypt signed in 1979, and Jordan in 1994. Yet, after decades, signing the treaty appears far easier than manufacturing public acceptance of it.
The irony is that Jordan’s King Abdullah II, 32 years after the peace treaty, stood before the United Nations this week to describe Israeli government policies in extremely harsh terms, warning that its expansionist tendencies have become a “regional threat,” while simultaneously reaffirming his country’s commitment to just peace.
Here lies the lesson...
Any state can change its policy, open an embassy, operate flights, and sign agreements. Foreign policy is crafted by states, but political decisions do not hold the key to people’s minds, nor the power to change convictions.
The wider the gap between a state’s political calculations and the level of societal acceptance, the more complex it becomes to transform a formal agreement into a stable, normalized relationship.
Therefore, the issue is not: who will normalize next, and when? The more important question is: Can governments manufacture popular acceptance for a peace that their societies did not demand, and which large segments may still reject?
History to date presents a paradox that is difficult to ignore: States can sign agreements in an instant, but public acceptance is not created by signatures.
