When Vandalism Becomes the Last Manifestation of Power
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Expansionist authoritarian regimes often begin with successes that grant them a false sense of permanent capability. However, when they reach the peak of their momentum, they enter a countdown phase, and their adventures become factors that accelerate their downfall. The Nazi regime in Germany is a glaring example of this; it achieved wide victories before ending up destroying its own country and falling.
The ruling regime in Iran does not appear to be an exception to this rule, as its capacity for disruption and sabotage has surpassed its ability to build and develop.
It can disrupt navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, but it cannot manage the strait in a stable manner. It can influence energy markets and threaten the exports of regional countries, but it is unable to secure a stable economy for its people. It can target Gulf facilities, directly or through its proxies, but it cannot protect its economy and currency from collapse.
The recent attack, launched from Iraqi territory, on facilities along the Saudi "East-West" oil pipeline, and the resulting temporary halt, is an example of this equation: the ability to disrupt without possessing an alternative, and inflicting damage on others without achieving a real gain for Iran or its people.
More dangerously, this policy is destroying the bridges of future coexistence between Iran and its neighborhood. Countries may transcend their political differences, but they do not easily forget those who targeted their security, facilities, economy, and citizens' lives. Coexistence with Iran, in terms of land and people, is a geographical and historical necessity, and a shared interest, provided that a regime exists that respects good neighborliness and state sovereignty.
The Iranian protests, which erupted in December 2025 against the backdrop of the economic crisis, and then raised slogans demanding the overthrow of the regime, revealed the depth of the internal crisis. The regime managed to suppress them violently, but repression does not address the causes of anger, nor does it restore trust to a people exhausted by crises. Unless these causes change, the postponed protest will remain prone to erupting again.
Since 1979, the Iranian regime has lived in near-constant confrontation with its neighborhood and the international community. It was drained by the Iran-Iraq War, then by sanctions, isolation, and external expansionist adventures, leading to recent confrontations that weakened its military, nuclear, and defensive facilities, and toppled several of its leaders.
At the same time, its regional proxies have begun to lose much of their strength in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza, while its proxies in Iraq and Yemen face increasing pressure. This reveals the failure of the "export of revolution" strategy, as influence that is not based on the acceptance of peoples and the stability of states must inevitably erode.
All of this coincides with the collapse of the currency, rising inflation and unemployment, widening poverty, growing public frustration, as well as turmoil in leadership structures. When a crisis of legitimacy combines with economic exhaustion, political division, and the loss of allies, the regime's survival becomes more difficult, although the timing of its downfall remains uncertain.
Gulf countries should prepare for any future transformation with rationality, not a spirit of revenge. If a new regime emerges in Tehran, it will inherit an exhausted state and a people who have paid a heavy price. It would be wise to extend a hand to the new Iran and encourage it to return to the principles of good neighborliness, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference.
The fall of the regime, if it occurs, should not be the fall of Iran, but the beginning of its salvation. The region does not need a weak or divided Iran, but a stable, peaceful, and prosperous one. That is the true victory: transforming the capacity from destroying bridges to building them, and from exporting crises to creating peace.
Former Bahraini Minister of Labor and Social Development
