The danger is before us... Will we see it?
A few weeks ago, I reconnected with a foreign friend who had participated in a specialized discussion panel. The discussion focused on the shape of the region that would emerge in the wake of the “Mecca Agreement” between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, as well as the nature of military and economic capabilities, and the future of the broader security architecture.
During the same period, specialized circles were monitoring the transfer of some lessons from the drone war in Ukraine to Yemen.
At the beginning of this September, I received a military report prepared by specialized researchers. This is routine for anyone who maintains continuous contact with research centers; knowledge in today’s world spreads like pollen in the air, crossing borders at a remarkable speed. What may appear to one party as highly sensitive information might be available for circulation in open-source materials, for those who know where to look, how to read, and with whom to engage.
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Time and Calendars
The report noted the emergence of “FPV” drones among the Houthis, including a commercial model modified to operate via fiber-optic guidance, thereby reducing the effectiveness of traditional electronic jamming systems against them. It described this development as a trend toward the “Ukrainization” of the drone war in Yemen, meaning the transfer of certain experiences and technologies that emerged in the Ukrainian war to the Yemeni theater.
Information Alone Is Not Enough
With the Houthi threat to Saudi Arabia resuming its direct nature, the issue is no longer a technical debate detached from reality. What occupies my mind here is a broader question: How can we ensure that new knowledge, regardless of its source, reaches the widest possible circle of our national cadres capable of evaluating it and linking it to the state’s needs?
Through my limited observation of specialized international meetings, I have noticed a recurring Omani presence at many of these research and security forums, alongside varying Gulf participation. Naturally, these partial observations do not allow me to judge the full scope of what Gulf state institutions are doing, as much military work remains behind closed doors.
However, can we expand the presence of our expertise further within international knowledge networks, so that they benefit from it and contribute to it, while transferring what suits our needs back home? Even a strong institution loses nothing by widening its windows to knowledge.
This issue extends beyond the military sphere.
Who Is Ahead of Us at the Negotiating Table?
On September 9, the UK House of Commons Defense Committee launched a comprehensive inquiry into the future of British defense in the Gulf: deployment, readiness, defense partnerships, and lessons learned from the 2026 crises. Importantly, it is accepting evidence and opinions until November 4 next year. In other words, Britain is not waiting for the future; its institutions are now discussing how to deal with it.
In contrast, the region itself is moving forward. The “Mecca Agreement” did not stop at the signing moment; institutional mechanisms for political and defense cooperation, defense industries, and technological development have already begun to form around it.
Gears Do Not Operate in Isolation
Here I return to the analogy of a mechanical clock.
A modern state does not operate on a single gear, no matter how high its quality. The military is one gear, the diplomat is another, and the investor, researcher, academic, economist, technologist, and media professional are other gears. True strength does not lie in possessing the best gear, but in the ability of all gears to catch motion from one another and operate in harmony.
This is why we need a new generation of statesmen and stateswomen—what I call the “Swiss Army Knife of Statesmen”: the multi-tool statesman. Just as the Swiss Army knife integrates various tools into a single device, we need figures who do not replace specialists, nor claim to know everything, but possess a breadth of knowledge and skills that enable them to understand the languages of different disciplines, engage with their practitioners, connect institutions and individuals, and ultimately translate knowledge into decision-making.
I am not passing judgment on what state institutions are currently doing; much of it is beyond my knowledge, nor should it be expected of me. Rather, I am issuing a call to broaden the circle of participation and to leverage every additional window into knowledge.
Do we have the necessary competencies?
The question worth asking is this: Are we opening the door to enough of our best talents, allowing them access to the rooms where threats and opportunities that may prove crucial tomorrow are discussed?
In a world where alliances and threats evolve faster than government procedures, merely receiving information is no longer sufficient.
In the end, the difference between a state that chases events and one that prepares for them may come down to this simple distinction: Who was present in the rooms where discussions took place, and who waited until those discussions became news to be read like everyone else?
