Egypt and Ethiopia: Between Dialogue and Military Confrontation
The water dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia is not a recent development; rather, it stems from the deep political and legal history of the Nile River Basin, with roots extending back to the era of 19th-century colonial competition. During that period, initial attempts were made to regulate and allocate water flow through a series of agreements that later became the core point of contention between Cairo and Addis Ababa.
The first step occurred in 1891 through an agreement signed between Britain and Italy, in which Italy pledged not to construct any works or facilities on Ethiopia’s Awash River that would affect the flow of its waters into the Nile. This document became the foundational basis for Egyptian policy in asserting its water rights. It was followed in 1902 by a pivotal agreement between Britain and Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II, which explicitly stipulated that no structures could be built on the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat River without the consent of the British government and Sudanese authorities. Egypt continues to uphold this agreement as a binding legal justification, whereas Ethiopia rejects it, arguing that it was formulated under colonial pressure and constraints.
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Water polarization intensified further in 1959 following the signing of a bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan, which established the current water-sharing formula. Under this arrangement, Cairo’s share was set at 55.5 billion cubic meters annually, while Khartoum received 18.5 billion cubic meters. Addis Ababa rejected this division outright, viewing it as a disregard for its developmental rights to utilize water resources originating from its own territory.
Plans for the construction of the Ethiopian dam remained frozen for many years due to stern warnings from the Egyptian administration during the presidency of former President Hosni Mubarak, who regarded water issues as a red line and a direct threat to national security requiring a decisive response. This prompted Addis Ababa to pause and wait until 2011, when it took advantage of the political and security instability following the Arab Spring events to officially launch construction of the “Renaissance Dam” (Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam), placing the region before a new reality in which it controlled water flow outlets.
Tensions are rising unprecedentedly today, given Cairo’s rejection of unilateral projects and statements by the Ethiopian Minister of Water regarding the intention to build two additional dams. This places Nile Basin countries before an existential challenge, requiring an urgent diplomatic solution to prevent a slide into military confrontation that would drain the resources of the peoples involved. This makes Arab mediation and regional initiatives extending between Riyadh and Doha the optimal choice and the last historical opportunity to defuse the crisis and conclude a balanced agreement that guarantees water rights for all and saves the region from an unjustified conflict.
A Kuwaiti writer
