Gulf States and the Strait of Hormuz
Gulf states have been working for years to develop alternative routes for oil exports, and the longer the strait remains closed, the greater the economic and political incentives to reduce reliance on it. Some estimates suggest that certain Gulf states could significantly reduce their dependence on the strait in the coming years.
In other words, while Iran may be able to use Hormuz to disrupt the global economy today, it risks pushing the world to invest more heavily in bypassing this chokepoint tomorrow.
Recent Iranian-Omani communications regarding the creation of a temporary navigational corridor within the Strait of Hormuz reveal that the solution under discussion is not necessarily a full opening of the strait from the outset, but rather a gradual opening, governed by specific security and navigational arrangements.
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This detail is very important. If Iran agrees to a temporary corridor, it does not necessarily abandon the Hormuz card; rather, it may transform it from a military card into a bargaining chip. In other words, Iran’s message could be: “We will not close the strait forever, but we will not open it for free.” This explains why talks about an agreement have not yet turned into a final announcement. The question is: Has the war ended?
The most accurate answer is: No, but it may have shifted from open warfare to a war of wills. Current reports speak of a halt in large-scale direct air strikes compared to previous phases, but the conflict has not ended. The Hormuz crisis persists, US sanctions continue to escalate, and Tehran and Washington continue to exchange messages and threats. Meanwhile, Tehran still links the reopening of the strait to the end of the war and the fulfillment of its conditions.
This means we are facing a partial ceasefire, not a final settlement of the war. The difference between the two is significant.
Trump may declare that Iran has backed down and that the United States has succeeded in imposing its conditions, but a declaration is one thing, and reality is another.
If the war ends without a clear agreement on the nuclear file, the problem will resurface. If the Strait of Hormuz is opened without long-term arrangements, the crisis could recur.
If Washington relies solely on sanctions, past experiences indicate that sanctions alone do not necessarily guarantee Iran’s surrender, and may instead push it to seek new economic and political workarounds.
If the United States returns to airstrikes, it risks reigniting the war at a moment when markets and allied states are more eager for stability.
Therefore, Trump appears to face two costly options: an incomplete deal that may be considered a formal victory, or a new war whose costs may outweigh its benefits.
And what does Iran want?
Iran, in turn, is not in a position to achieve a traditional military victory, but it is not necessarily in a position of complete defeat.
This is a key point for understanding the next phase.
A Saudi writer
