The theory of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist is taking its last breaths

A Pause

Ideologies, theories, and doctrines that are not grounded in established rational principles, nor responsive to societal transformations and the demands of the times, are often tied to their founder. They derive their strength from his presence, the firmness of his personality, and his leadership capabilities. When the founder disappears, their luster begins to fade, and their contradictions and weaknesses are revealed. History is replete with such experiences; perhaps the fate of Leninist communism after the departure of its founders is one of the most prominent examples.

It seems that the theory of “Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist” (Velayat-e Faqih) will not deviate from this rule. Imam Khomeini re-engineered its original version and publicly presented it in 1970 through lectures delivered in Najaf, which were later compiled into the book “Islamic Government.” He subsequently established a new political system in Iran following the fall of the Shah’s regime in 1979.

Exploring International Organizations

Analyzing Military Conflicts

Organizing Seasonal Events

Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist was not entirely Khomeini’s invention. Some Shia jurists were familiar with it in limited forms concerning the guardianship of minors, endowments, and certain public interests. However, he expanded it into a comprehensive political guardianship, which evolved in the Iranian system into “Absolute Guardianship,” granting the jurist authority that practically supersedes elected constitutional institutions.

The success of the Iranian Revolution added exceptional luster to the theory. The Iran-Iraq War then pushed Iranians, regardless of their positions on the regime or the theory, to rally behind their leadership in defense of their homeland. The revolution also found a suitable environment amid the tyranny of the Shah’s regime, the disillusionment following the 1967 defeat, and the escalating conflict between the Western and Soviet blocs.

However, the theory faced strong objections from Shia jurists and religious authorities, both inside and outside Iran, particularly in the Najaf marja’iyya. The objection was not to the jurist’s role in guiding society, but to transforming religious authority into an absolute political power, concentrating supreme authority in the state, military, security, judiciary, and foreign policy in the hands of a single individual.

Through its Iranian application, Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist shifted Shia doctrine from the realm of faith and jurisprudence to a transnational political project based on the politicization and militarization of sectarian identity under the slogan of “exporting the revolution.” From this project emerged armed groups parallel to national state institutions, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, some factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.

After Khomeini’s death in 1989, Ali Khamenei assumed leadership of the system. Although his jurisprudential status was debated, he compensated for this by building a cohesive security, military, and economic network, placing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps at the heart of the system. Under his tenure, the policy of external proxies expanded, and Iranian influence solidified in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

However, this expansion contained the seeds of its own decline; it drained Iran’s resources, aroused the fears of Arab states, and linked the conditions of Arab Shia to a regional project that did not serve their national interests. Then came the military repercussions following “Al-Aqsa Flood,” the fall of the Syrian regime, and the decline of Hezbollah’s influence, leading to a contraction of the geopolitical sphere that Tehran had long boasted of controlling.

The assassination of Ali Khamenei on February 28 last year, along with several members of his family and top Iranian leaders, created a serious vacuum at the center of the system. Days later, the Assembly of Experts announced the selection of his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as the new Supreme Leader, amid indications of pressure exerted by the Revolutionary Guard to accelerate succession and prevent the disintegration of the system.

Yet the choice of the son as his father’s successor revealed a glaring contradiction in a system originally founded on the abolition of monarchy and the rejection of hereditary power. Moreover, Mojtaba lacks the jurisprudential standing, leadership experience, and popular presence that Khomeini possessed, as well as the influence his father accumulated over decades.

Since his appointment, Mojtaba has not appeared in public, although official messages and directives have been issued in his name. Regardless of the reasons for his absence, he has paved the way for the Revolutionary Guard to become the most prominent force in state administration and decision-making.

Thus, the current landscape encapsulates a crisis within the theory itself: an invisible Supreme Leader, religious institutions providing formal legitimacy, and a military force controlling the levers of power—effectively marking a shift from the rule of the jurist by the Guard to the rule of the Guard in the name of the jurist.

The theory of absolute guardianship of the jurist (velayat-e faqih) has entered a phase of decline, although its final collapse may not be imminent or easy. Here, Arab Shiites face a historical responsibility: to return to the Najaf school of thought, to prioritize national loyalty over transnational affiliations, and to decouple doctrine from armed force.

Doctrine is safeguarded by conviction, and the homeland by the state. However, the combination of religious sanctity with military coercion, alongside the interests of a regional project, has proven incapable of protecting a sect or building a state.

Former Bahraini Minister of Labor and Social Affairs