Why is Washington negotiating with Tehran while the Gulf pays the price?
The Strait of Hormuz crisis presents a strategic paradox worth examining: while Gulf states are the parties most closely linked to the security of the strait and the stability of navigation within it, the principal communications and negotiations regarding its future are concentrated between the United States and Iran.
This question gains further importance amid the continued disruption of navigation, with the reopening of the strait tied to the negotiation track between Washington and Tehran.
It is true that the United States is an international power concerned with energy security and freedom of navigation, and that Tehran’s calculations are linked to its confrontation with Washington. However, Gulf states are not merely passive recipients of the outcomes of these negotiations.
They are the direct stakeholders in Gulf security and the most exposed to the economic and security repercussions of any closure or threat to the strait. The crisis has already impacted Gulf economies, energy exports, and supply chains.
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From this perspective, there is a need to pose a deeper question: Why should Gulf security itself not be part of the direct negotiation process with Iran?
The intention is not for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to replace the United States, nor to abandon existing security partnerships, but rather to shift from a position of being affected by international arrangements to one of participating in shaping them.
The Strait of Hormuz could serve as the starting point for building more sustainable regional security arrangements based on clear principles: freedom of navigation, non-targeting of critical infrastructure, non-use of Gulf states’ territories for hostile acts against Iran, establishment of direct military communication channels, and the creation of a regional mechanism to prevent escalation and miscalculation.
There are already indications that a new security architecture for the strait, bringing together GCC states and Iran, could be considered, rather than leaving the management of its crises hostage to understandings among major powers.
The real challenge for Gulf states is not only how to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, but who will have the right to shape the rules of security there after the crisis ends?
If Iran believes that Gulf security should not be exclusively American, and Gulf states do not want it to be exclusively Iranian, then the most realistic option is for Gulf security to become regional, with the littoral states participating in its formulation, while maintaining international guarantees for freedom of navigation.
Here, the Hormuz crisis could transform from merely a navigational crisis into a historical opportunity to rebuild the Gulf security architecture on the basis: no security for the Gulf without its states, and no stability in the Gulf without viable regional security arrangements.
$ Political and military expert
