From a Lifeline for the Global Economy to a Life Raft for a Collapsing Regime: The Strait of Hormuz
The strategic passage has become the price of ending the war between the US and Iran, not its cause... and the debate surrounding it is no longer about the principle of negotiation.
Gulf states are directly concerned with the outcomes of this equation... for continued tension in the Strait of Hormuz means a permanent threat to energy, trade, ports, and investment.
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One cannot read the "Hormuz" arrangements in isolation from broader regional transformations, including the Mecca defense agreement and the building of a regional deterrent that denies the Mullahs the ability to blackmail.
The Mullah regime is not negotiating for the freedom of "Hormuz," but rather for its own salvation from a war it cannot afford to continue, and for a peace that reveals its weakness before its own people.
The regime does not fear Washington, but rather the Iranian domestic front. It knows that any agreement that does not solve the bread crisis, stop executions, or end corruption will not hold.
Those who monitor the factional struggle in Tehran understand that the question is no longer: Will the Strait of Hormuz be opened?... but: At what price, under what narrative, and for the benefit of which faction?
The strait has become a mirror of a crisis within a regime that wants to sell de-escalation as a victory, turning the fear of war into a card for survival and ending the confrontation without appearing to suffer defeat.
Special - "Al-Siyasa"
In the current crisis, the Strait of Hormuz is no longer just a vital maritime passage through which energy flows to global markets. Rather, in the calculations of the ruling Mullah regime in Iran, the strait has transformed into a major political card and an internal arena for factional struggle, centered on a more sensitive question: How can the confrontation with the United States be ended without appearing as defeat or retreat?
While the debate appears superficially to revolve around technical arrangements with the Sultanate of Oman, new routes for ship passage, and ensuring navigation security, the issue at its core is no longer merely technical or maritime. The strait has become part of a broader political and security equation concerning Tehran’s conditions for ending the confrontation, lifting the siege, easing sanctions, and securing gains that allow the regime to market any understanding as a victory rather than a concession. This is evident in Iranian newspapers and state-affiliated media, which acknowledge that the debate is no longer about the principle of negotiation, but about the price of negotiation. A significant part of Tehran’s decision-making center recognizes that continued open confrontation is economically and socially costly, and that a prolonged war could turn into an internal threat to the regime itself. Therefore, this faction seeks to convert what it calls "field gains" in Hormuz into political leverage at the negotiating table. However, another faction within the regime fears that any opening of the strait or any de-escalation of its freedom would result in the loss of the last card of pressure. This current views "Hormuz" as the card that forced Washington, Western capitals, and Gulf capitals to take Tehran’s demands seriously. Consequently, abandoning it before extracting a high price would be read domestically and internationally as a sign of weakness.
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From this, one can understand the apparent contradiction in the regime’s rhetoric. On the one hand, its officials claim that talks with Oman have reached advanced stages regarding navigation channels. On the other, they insist that any technical understanding with Muscat does not necessarily imply reopening the strait or returning to the previous status quo. This formulation precisely reveals Tehran’s mindset: while agreement on the map is possible, the political decision to reopen the passage remains conditional on what Washington offers. Notably, the Supreme National Security Council, or “Shenam” as it is abbreviated within the system, has set high-bar conditions for reopening the strait. These conditions go beyond navigation; they include halting threats, ending what the regime calls aggression against Iran and its allies in the region, lifting the naval blockade, withdrawing US forces from Iran’s vicinity, paying war reparations, removing sanctions, and releasing frozen assets. This means Hormuz is no longer merely a maritime transit file, but has become a comprehensive bargaining basket.
This escalation in demands does not necessarily mean the regime expects all of them to be accepted. In negotiating politics, raising the bar initially allows for later concessions in exchange for specific gains. However, the internal message is no less important than the external one. The regime wants to tell its public and its hardline base that any future understanding will not be a retreat, but rather the extraction of a price from the United States. Here lies the core of the internal conflict: the crisis-management wing seeks to end or at least de-escalate the confrontation without losing the narrative of “resilience,” while the escalation wing wants to keep “Hormuz” open to tension, as a continuous leverage card. Between these two poles, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, and the new decision-making center attempt to manage a difficult balance: no free opening of the strait, nor an open-ended continuation of naval warfare that would detonate the economy and public sentiment. The appointment of Mohsen Rezaei as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council fits into this context. The presence of a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander in this role, who is close to Mojtaba Khamenei, means that the Hormuz file is no longer left solely to diplomacy or to the battlefield. The regime wants a figure capable of addressing the military establishment, the government, and the Khamenei household, and managing negotiations from a security rather than purely diplomatic position.
Therefore, the “Hormuz” battle is also a struggle over narratives of victory and defeat within the system. Newspapers close to the IRGC or the hardline current seek to present the strait as a drawn sword in the regime’s hand—a weapon that cannot be relinquished. Meanwhile, other outlets speak of the necessity of converting this weapon into political gains. Between these two narratives, one question emerges: Will Hormuz become a way out of the war, or an entry point into a new round of it?
For the United States, the equation also appears complex. Washington needs the resumption of energy flows and stable navigation, but it does not want to appear as having capitulated to Tehran’s demands. Thus, it attempts to separate technical arrangements for navigation from political recognition of what the Mullah regime claims is its “right” to impose new rules on the strait. However, Washington’s need to de-escalate tensions and stabilize energy prices makes “Hormuz” a real pressure card in Tehran’s hands, at least for the time being.
As for the Gulf states, they are directly concerned with the outcomes of this equation. Continued tension in the Strait of Hormuz means a persistent threat to energy, trade, ports, investment, and regional stability. Therefore, the “Hormuz” arrangements cannot be read in isolation from broader transformations in the region, including the Mecca defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, and efforts to build a new regional deterrent that reduces the Iranian regime’s ability to use geography and militias as leverage for extortion. However, the most critical point is that the regime does not use “Hormuz” solely against the outside world; it also employs it to manage its domestic crisis. When facing a suffocating cost-of-living crisis, inflation, social anger, and fear that protests may evolve into organized action, the regime needs a “battle” narrative to postpone internal questions. At the same time, it knows that prolonging the confrontation will increase pressure on society and potentially open the door to a wider explosion.
From this perspective, the most realistic equation involves rejecting two options that grant the regime a chance to survive: an external war that provides it with an excuse for repression and mobilization, and a freebie compromise that allows it to catch its breath and reproduce its influence. The third path is to combine coordinated political and economic pressure with support for the Iranian people’s right to change, without allowing the regime to turn Hormuz, militias, or energy into tools of permanent extortion. Ultimately, what the regime fears is not only the US fleet or international pressure, but the Iranian domestic sphere. It knows that any agreement that fails to resolve the bread crisis, halt executions, end corruption, or restore trust between society and the state will not suffice. It also knows that any continuation of war will exacerbate its economic weakness and expose the limits of its slogans.
Therefore, the Strait of Hormuz today is not merely a maritime passage; it is a mirror reflecting a crisis of a regime that wants to sell de-escalation as victory, to transform fear of war into a survival card, and to make regional security hostage to its internal conflicts. The bottom line is that Hormuz has become not only the cause of war, but also the price of ending it. Those who observe the power struggle among factions in Tehran understand that the real question is no longer whether the regime will open the strait, but at what cost, under what narrative, and in the interest of which faction within the power structure? In a word, the ruling regime in Iran is not negotiating over Hormuz alone; it is negotiating a way to save itself from a war it cannot afford to continue, and from a peace it fears will expose its weakness to its own people.
