The Iraqi decision must be independent
In politics, events are not read by their headlines, but by what precedes them and what follows. History does not repeat itself literally, but it often repeats its tools, its heroes, and its pretexts, making tragedy appear as a new version of an old scene.
In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, a precedent in Arab-Arab relations that changed the face of the region for decades. Scholars continue to debate the nature of American positions at the time, but the outcome was one: the world found itself facing a major war, followed by a suffocating economic embargo that lasted more than thirteen years, exhausting the Iraqi state and burdening its people, before the Iraq file became an international security issue.
After years of embargo, the 2003 war came under multiple banners, the most prominent being the possession of weapons of mass destruction, the fight against terrorism, and the reshaping of the Middle East. After the fall of Baghdad, Iraq continued to pay heavy prices in terms of its security, stability, economy, and social cohesion.
Washington believed it was crafting a new political model in Iraq, one that would be a strategic ally and a cornerstone for its regional project. However, the experience did not go as planned. A political system emerged that faced widespread criticism due to corruption and mismanagement, with public funds increasingly viewed by many as a battleground for networks of influence and interests. State institutions receded in the face of competing power centers, and the system’s capacity to fulfill the aspirations of Iraqis diminished.
Today, after years of major transformations in the Middle East, the United States faces a more complex reality. Its regional project has undergone severe tests, the balance of power has shifted, and the ability of its allies to impose stable equations in multiple arenas has declined.
Iraq, which was intended to be a story of political success, has become, in the eyes of many, a model of state crisis rather than state-building.
From this arises the question that forcefully imposes itself: Can the scene repeat itself? Can Iraq be pushed once again into a regional confrontation, giving rise to a major crisis that opens the door to new interventions, perhaps using pretexts to redraw Iraq’s political landscape anew?
No one has a definitive answer, but history teaches us that wars do not always begin with an official decision; they are often born from miscalculation, media escalation, mutual provocations, and conflicting calculations. When the fires ignite, finding justifications becomes easier than finding solutions. The most dangerous scenario for Iraq today is becoming once again a battleground for settling regional and international scores, or being lured into a conflict that does not serve its people’s interests or its state’s future. States that do not learn from their history may find themselves living the same tragedy under new names and different slogans.
Iraqis have paid enormous prices in blood, destruction, embargo, occupation, and division. Therefore, political wisdom dictates that Iraqi decisions must be independent, and doors must be closed to any project seeking to turn Iraq into fuel for others’ battles.
The real question is not whether major powers can reproduce the scenario, but whether Iraqis possess the awareness, unity, and will to prevent its repetition.
History shows no mercy to those who fail to learn its lessons, and nations that forget the chapters of their tragedies may find themselves writing them anew.
An Iraqi writer
