Half a century later... What have Arab Shiites gained?
Pause
Nearly half a century after the Iranian Revolution, the developments unfolding in Iran and the region seem to be prompting a quiet reassessment of a political experience whose repercussions have extended to several Arab countries, reshaping many of their internal balances.
The question that imposes itself today is not who won and who lost in a particular political or military round, but rather what the actual outcome has been for the project that raised the banner of defending the oppressed and supporting Shia communities in the region.
The Iranian people themselves, overwhelmingly the majority, are today paying the price for policies that have plunged the country into a long vortex of isolation, sanctions, and military confrontations, while draining its resources on projects beyond its borders. Meanwhile, ordinary Iranians have faced escalating economic and living pressures, with poverty expanding and development opportunities receding.
Daily Newspapers
Today’s News Summary
Security and Judiciary News
From this arises another question, no less important: What have Arab Shias gained, whose sectarian identity has been linked to a regional political project led by Tehran?
Reviewing this experience apart from slogans yields a painful answer. These policies have not led to the prosperity of the societies they claimed to protect, nor to the enhancement of their stability. On the contrary, in many cases, they have become an additional factor in weakening the nation-state and deepening internal divisions.
It suffices to look at Iran’s own reality. If the project was fundamentally established in the name of defending Shias, then the first to reap its benefits should have been Iran’s Shia community. Yet the economic and social reality there reflects profound challenges, while certain nationalities and minorities continue to suffer from chronic developmental and political problems, with Arab Shias in Iran at the forefront.
In Lebanon, the Shia environment has paid a heavy price due to Hezbollah’s involvement in a regional project that transcended state boundaries. The result has been widespread destruction and massive human and economic losses, affecting local communities before anyone else.
In Syria, one of the key pillars of the “Wilayat al-Faqih” (Guardianship of the Jurist) project ended with the fall of the Assad regime, after years of war that drained lives and resources. This confirms that cross-border ideological projects may succeed in imposing temporary influence, but they fail to build lasting stability.
As for Iraq, despite its vast resources and potential, it continues to face complex challenges related to services, development, political division, and the proliferation of weapons outside state control. These conditions have not delivered the security and prosperity that Iraqi citizens—whether Shia, Sunni, or Kurdish—had hoped for.
Even in arenas that were not originally Shia, such as the experience of Hamas or the Houthi movement in Yemen, it becomes evident that Iranian support was part of a regional expansion project, more than a project to improve the lives of the “oppressed” or defend the national interests of those peoples.
Perhaps the most striking paradox is that the number of Arab Shias who have lost their lives in the wars and conflicts that have erupted since 1979 far exceeds what they suffered during long historical periods, including the Iran-Iraq War, which claimed hundreds of thousands of Arab victims, most of whom were Iraqi Shia soldiers.
Since its inception, the Iranian regime has pursued a cross-border project based on leveraging sectarian identity to build political and military influence, then transforming it into institutions, organizations, and loyalties that transcend the nation-state. This can be described as the “institutionalization of the Shia issue”—that is, moving it from its religious and social sphere into an organized political and security space.
The result was that Shia communities in several Arab countries, against the will of their majority, became a security issue in the eyes of many states. This development harmed Arab Shias themselves, as well as others, because the overwhelming majority of them seek only a stable life, equal citizenship, and a better future for their children within their own homelands.
Arab Shias have always been, and remain, an integral part of the national fabric in their countries, and they have never needed political guardianship from outside their homeland’s borders. Those who were swept up by slogans in earlier stages discovered, as time passed, that protecting rights is not achieved through cross-border loyalties, but through a capable and entrenched nation-state.
The future of Arab Shias, as well as the defense of citizens’ rights—Shias, Sunnis, and all other components of society—is shaped by consolidating the nation-state, respecting the rule of law, and upholding constitutional institutions. It does not come through affiliation with cross-border regional projects. The stronger the nation-state becomes, the greater the ability of all its citizens to enjoy their rights and freedoms on an equal footing.
Former Bahraini Minister of Labour and Social Development
