The Iranian Nuclear Program: From a Negotiating Chip to a Doctrine of Survival
Pause
In the years following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, hundreds of thousands of Iranians left their country, fleeing the atmosphere of repression, trials, and executions, or in search of freedom, creativity, and openness. Among them were scientists, intellectuals, academics, businessmen, and artists, alongside large numbers of those who rejected the new regime’s domestic and foreign orientations.
Over time, influential Iranian communities formed across the globe, continuing to follow with great interest developments in their homeland. In the Spanish city of Marbella, where I spend part of my summer vacation, circumstances have brought me into contact over the years with several members of this diaspora. Our annual meetings have become an occasion for dialogue and exchanging views on the future of Iran and the region.
Breaking News
Water
Newsletter
In our most recent meeting a few days ago, the situation in the Arabian Gulf and the future of the Iranian regime dominated the discussion. Notably, the attendees expressed considerable sympathy for the Arab Gulf states, viewing them as having paid a heavy price for conflicts in which they were not directly involved, yet found themselves at the heart of their security and economic repercussions.
Among the topics we discussed was a political hypothesis worth pondering, even if it remains within the realm of theoretical possibility. It posits the potential for a grand bargain between the regime, seeking to ensure its survival, and U.S. President Donald Trump, known for his belief in deal-making logic. Under such an arrangement, Iran would abandon its nuclear program in exchange for a status granting it broader influence in the Strait of Hormuz, or an exceptional role in its security arrangements.
Such a hypothesis may appear attractive to some parties, particularly if the goal is to end the region’s protracted state of conflict. Historically, control over the strait has been one of the strategic ambitions of Iran’s decision-making circles, both before and after the revolution, given its exceptional importance to global energy and trade flows.
However, the crucial question is not whether such a deal could be offered, but whether the Iranian regime could accept it in the first place.
Politics
National Assembly Coverage
Newspapers
In my view, after extensive discussions with my Iranian friends, the answer leans toward the negative. The nuclear program is no longer merely a scientific project or a political bargaining chip that can be traded for other gains. Instead, over more than four decades, it has become one of the pillars of the regime’s own legitimacy.
The state has invested enormous financial resources in this project, endured harsh economic sanctions, forfeited development opportunities, and lost some of its most prominent scientists, who were assassinated in recent years. The nuclear program has become embedded in political discourse and popular mobilization, symbolizing independence, sovereignty, and scientific progress.
How, then, can the regime justify to the Iranian people, should it abandon the program, all the sacrifices made? How would it answer questions regarding the billions spent, the years lost, the sanctions that crippled the economy, and the blood shed in defense of a project ultimately surrendered?
When I asked some of my friends about the true objective of the program, if it was not to acquire nuclear weapons, their response was clear: The Iranian leadership views possession of nuclear capability as the ultimate guarantee of the regime’s survival, the protection of its regional project, and the enhancement of Iran’s status as a major power in the region.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with this view, the fact remains that the regime has, over many years, succeeded in imbuing the nuclear program with symbolic, political, and religious dimensions. In official discourse, the project has been linked to concepts of independence and national dignity, while certain milestones have been surrounded by clear religious symbolism, reinforcing in the collective consciousness that the program is not merely a technical undertaking, but an issue with ideological and national significance.
This is where the real dilemma lies. The longer the project endures, the higher the political and psychological cost of backing down, until the regime has become hostage to it.
For this reason, it appears that any lasting settlement with Iran will not be merely a technical agreement on centrifuges or enrichment levels, but will require a deeper reckoning with the nature of the relationship between the regime and its nuclear project, as both have come, in the eyes of many observers, to form part of a single equation that is difficult to disentangle.
The future may well hold the answer to the larger question: Can Iran redefine its strategic priorities under its current system, or will any fundamental shift on this file remain contingent first and foremost on internal transformations determined by the Iranians themselves?
Only time will bring the answer, but it is certain that the nuclear program is no longer just a negotiating file; it has become one of the key lenses through which to understand the nature of the Iranian regime and the future of the entire region.
Former Bahraini Minister of Labour and Social Affairs
