Netanyahu Faces Defeat... Can Israel Break Free from His Political Approach?

- Netanyahu’s political acumen... Survival as a doctrine

- He has often succeeded in making any alternative governing arrangements difficult to sustain

- Institutional transformation in Israel remains contentious

- Will Eizenkot accept that Israeli security requires a negotiated political settlement with the Palestinians?

Benjamin Netanyahu may be nearing the end of his current term as Prime Minister of Israel, but one should not confuse his political career with the “political doctrine” he spent decades building. President Isaac Herzog’s decision to formally task Gadi Eizenkot with forming the next government represents a major political defeat for Netanyahu.

The challenge facing Eizenkot now is to translate parliamentary support aimed at replacing Netanyahu into a resilient administration capable of withstanding its internal ideological contradictions. Alongside this direct struggle, a more important question emerges: Can Israel break free from the political and strategic system that Netanyahu helped entrench, or will his successors continue to govern within the boundaries of that system?

Netanyahu can be said to be the most durable political figure in Israeli history; he has dominated the political landscape for three decades, recovered from electoral defeats, survived corruption allegations and criminal proceedings, rebuilt his alliances after periods of political isolation, and repeatedly convinced competing ideological currents that his leadership was indispensable.

His exceptional political genius lies not only in winning elections, but in his ability to understand the weaknesses, ambitions, and mutual suspicions of his opponents. Even in cases where he failed to secure a clear parliamentary majority, he often succeeded in making any alternative governing arrangements difficult to sustain.

Underestimating Netanyahu merely because he might lose power is a serious error; his political weight is not measured solely by his presence in the office of Prime Minister, but must also be assessed through the ideological visions, security priorities, and institutional relationships that have become entrenched in Israeli politics during his long tenure.

His departure may end a government, but it does not necessarily mark the end of “Netanyahuism” (Netanyahuism), especially if his successors maintain the strategic foundations and political structures that enabled him to exercise power.

Netanyahu’s longevity in the political landscape cannot be explained solely by his electoral popularity or the availability of favorable political conditions; his most prominent political skill lies in his ability to turn his weaknesses into assets. He recognizes that Israeli politics suffers from ideological, religious, ethnic, and institutional divisions; rather than constantly seeking to transcend these divisions, Netanyahu often exploited them to build governing coalitions and prevent the emergence of sustainable alternatives. His opponents frequently shared the goal of ousting him, yet differed fundamentally on what should follow, allowing him to exploit the contradictions in their priorities.

The short-lived government formed by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid in 2021 revealed both his vulnerabilities and his resilience; he was removed from office after 12 consecutive years as Prime Minister, but the coalition that replaced him included parties with contradictory positions on religion, land, security, and the political rights of Palestinians.

The collapse of that coalition paved the way for Netanyahu’s return in December 2022. That experience gains particular significance today, as Netanyahu recognizes that an opposition united around the goal of ousting him may fragment once it faces the practical responsibilities of governance.

Netanyahu’s tactical acumen is clearly evident when he identifies contradictions that his opponents are unable to resolve. Despite failing to secure the first mandate to form a government, he is actively seeking to delineate the political boundaries within which Eizenkot can operate; he promotes the notion that reliance on Arab parties is unacceptable, while simultaneously calling for the formation of a national unity government, thereby attempting to influence the composition of an administration that may not have him at its helm.

Here lies the great paradox: despite losing his parliamentary majority, Netanyahu continues, through his own initiatives, to challenge the legitimacy of political alliances that could lead to his removal from office. His ability to exert influence—even in the absence of formal control over the government—demonstrates his political flexibility, while also revealing the difficulties his opponents face in breaking free from the political framework he helped entrench.

“Netanyahuism” is not a formally codified political doctrine; rather, it is a combination of strategic assumptions and governing practices that have crystallized across various stages of Netanyahu’s professional career.

Its most impactful core tenet is the belief that Israel can maintain its security and regional superiority without needing to resolve the Palestinian issue through the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. Netanyahu has long argued that military strength, intelligence superiority, economic development, and diplomatic normalization are sufficient to ensure Israel’s security, even if the Palestinian conflict remains without a political settlement.

The attack led by Hamas on October 7, 2023, exposed the fragility of the assumption that the conflict could be contained indefinitely. It also raised fundamental questions about the intelligence and security assessments underpinning Netanyahu’s approach.

However, the failure of the “managing the conflict” strategy did not necessarily give rise to a radical alternative within the political establishment; on the contrary, the subsequent wars reinforced another pillar of Netanyahu’s doctrine: the conviction that the excessive use of military force, the execution of preemptive operations, and the systematic weakening of adversaries are indispensable elements of Israel’s security.

This approach has garnered support beyond Netanyahu’s immediate political allies. Should a government be formed under Eizenkot’s leadership, it would inherit a security establishment accustomed to enjoying broad operational military freedom across the region.

Eizenkot, a former chief of staff, represents a political alternative to Netanyahu, but he does not necessarily represent a comprehensive rejection of the strategic assumptions underlying Israel’s military posturing in the region. Replacing political leadership does not automatically translate into changes in strategic institutions, operational priorities, or prevailing security doctrines, especially when these elements enjoy broad support that transcends partisan divisions.

One of the greatest errors in analyzing Netanyahu’s persona is attributing every development in Israeli society to his personal ambitions. Netanyahu did not invent religious nationalism, the settlement movement, opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state, nor the long-standing tension between Jewish national identity and democratic equality.

These forces existed prior to his rise as Israel’s preeminent political figure. His achievement lay in recognizing the growing influence of these forces, consolidating alliances among them, and translating their political aspirations into governmental power, thereby enabling movements that previously had limited influence to gain increasing significance in national decision-making.

The transformation undergone by the Likud party serves as a model illustrating this process; under Netanyahu, loyalty to his leadership became a cornerstone of the party’s political identity. At the same time, his alliances with religious nationalist parties helped shift political positions that were previously marginal to the core of the ruling coalition.

The participation of National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir—who was previously convicted of inciting racism and supporting a terrorist organization—and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who advocates for expanding Israeli control over the occupied West Bank, demonstrates the shifting boundaries of acceptable political partnership and the extent of influence these currents have gained over government policy.

Netanyahu did not create these ideological movements, but he granted them access to government power and opportunities to influence state policies. This relationship was not unidirectional; his political survival increasingly depended on his coalition partners, whose demands also constrained the freedom of his own movement.

The March 2025 law that changed the judicial appointments system, and the July 2026 law that affected the status of the Attorney General, are prominent examples of this. Netanyahu’s supporters defend these reforms as a correction of excessive judicial intervention, while opponents view them as attempts to weaken institutional independence and concentrate power within the ruling coalition.

Nevertheless, Netanyahu did not achieve absolute control over these institutions. The Supreme Court continued to exercise significant authority, including its overturning of the government’s attempt to dismiss Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara in December 2025.

This resistance shows that institutional transformation in Israel remains contentious. The Eisenkot government may seek to repeal the legislation, restore cooperation between the executive and judicial branches, and reduce political confrontation with independent oversight bodies. However, rebuilding institutions requires parliamentary support, legal procedures, and willingness across various electoral sectors to accept shared rules.

Thus, the institutional legacy of the prime minister’s approach is not merely a set of laws that can be repealed; it also concerns public trust in the legitimacy of institutions when they conflict with the desires of elected politicians. If political movements regard adverse judicial decisions as inherently illegitimate, a change in government may not restore institutional confidence.

Consequently, Eisenkot will inherit not only legal disputes, but a deeper disagreement over the distribution of power within the Israeli state and the mechanisms through which political power should be constrained.

The clearest test for the Eisenkot government will be its approach to the Palestinian issue and Israel’s regional conflicts. Eisenkot has rejected the establishment of a Palestinian state under his leadership. Therefore, his political stance does not represent a fundamental departure from one of Netanyahu’s central strategic commitments.

However, the Eisenkot government can bring about significant changes in institutional accountability, diplomatic conduct, and the management of military operations, demonstrating that the continuity of strategic objectives does not necessarily require identical policies or methods.

The Eisenkot government may impose greater discipline on coalition partners, alter relations with the judiciary, conduct an independent investigation into the failures of October 7, 2023, and adopt a less confrontational approach toward European governments and Washington.

It can also reconsider certain policies in the occupied West Bank and seek different arrangements for the Gaza Strip. These changes should not be overlooked, as improvements in institutional accountability, diplomatic relations, and the treatment of Palestinians can yield tangible outcomes even without reaching a comprehensive political settlement.

However, the fundamental strategic question will remain unanswered. Will Eisenkot accept that Israeli security requires a negotiated political settlement with the Palestinians, or will he attempt to manage the conflict through a more disciplined version of the current military and security framework? The same question applies to Iran and Lebanon, as a government led by a former chief of staff will not necessarily abandon operations aimed at weakening Hezbollah, constraining Iranian military capabilities, or preserving Israel’s freedom of action beyond its borders.

The Eisenkot government may pursue these policies with different diplomatic calculations, operational priorities, or escalation thresholds. These differences may have significant consequences without constituting a new strategic doctrine.

For Israel’s regional adversaries, the arrival of a new prime minister will require a careful assessment of actual policy changes, rather than assumptions based on Netanyahu’s departure. Distinguishing between a change in political leadership and a transformation of national strategy will become crucial if Eisenkot succeeds in forming a government whose coalition partners differ on major domestic issues but share largely similar security priorities.

Netanyahu’s political future remains uncertain; the Likud party may ultimately face pressure to produce a new leadership that surpasses him, while the criminal charges against him continue to exert influence on both personal and political levels.

The failures associated with the events of October 7 also continue to cast a shadow over his record. If the Eisenkot government manages to survive, it may deprive Netanyahu of the instability he relied upon for his previous return to power, demonstrating that his exceptional political resilience does not guarantee his inevitable comeback.

If Israel continues to reject the establishment of a Palestinian state, maintains a large-scale military presence outside its internationally recognized borders, and relies primarily on coercive military superiority to manage regional conflicts, then the fundamental pillars of Netanyahu’s strategic approach will remain in place.

This continuity will not necessarily stem from personal loyalty to Netanyahu, but may reflect how deeply rooted his assumptions are in the broader Israeli political culture—a culture reinforced by ideological movements, security institutions, and electoral bases that will continue to exert influence even after his departure.

For Netanyahu, the upcoming transition may represent a defeat, but it does not necessarily signify the end of his political career. He has previously demonstrated that losing the office of prime minister does not necessarily mean the end of his ability to shape the country’s political future.

If the coalition government led by Eisenkot proves unstable, Netanyahu may once again seek to exploit his opponents’ divisions as an opportunity to return. However, a more significant possibility exists: even if Netanyahu never returns to power, subsequent Israeli governments may continue to implement much of the political doctrine associated with his name.

This achievement will likely be his most enduring political legacy, and perhaps the greatest obstacle for those who believe that simply removing him from the scene would fundamentally transform Israel. Thus, the upcoming conflict is not merely between Netanyahu and Eizenkot; it is a struggle between the possibility of changing Israel’s political leadership and the far more complex task of altering the assumptions that have guided the country’s policies for decades. His exceptional political acumen may enable him to stage a comeback, but even if his career ends with him in the opposition, the doctrine he helped entrench may continue to shape Israeli policy for a long time after he leaves the stage.