Rubio: Hezbollah destroyed the state, parties engaged in Lebanon-Israel peace talks

At the heart of the first American assessment of the Lebanese reality following the November 3 defeat, and the endorsement by Secretary of State Marco Rubio of a verification mechanism within experimental zones as the only available alternative to the end of the UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon at the end of the year, came his affirmation that “the United States remains engaged in peace talks between Lebanon and Israel, and wants the Israeli withdrawal to continue,” while stressing that “we are dealing with the Lebanese government, and Hezbollah has destroyed the state.” These developments have outlined a new phase, the contours of which are difficult to foresee: whether it will open a window for Beirut to consolidate its sovereignty and complete the withdrawal, or place it before a more complex equation whose headline is managing the conflict rather than ending it.

While Rubio was in Paris seeking, alongside President Emmanuel Macron on the sidelines of the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting, an international formula to monitor the implementation of understandings in the experimental zones defined by the trilateral “Framework Agreement” between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States, it became clear that the alternative to UNIFIL does not necessarily have to be a military mission like the one previously carried out by the Blue Helmets (...), but could instead be civilian. Meanwhile, Lebanon faced a question that goes beyond the form of the upcoming mechanism to its nature: Will it serve as a bridge toward a complete Israeli withdrawal, or will it remain a verification framework contingent on progress in the file of disarming Hezbollah, while Israel retains its field leverage cards? And if Washington, which continues to declare its support for the Lebanese government, is prepared to translate this support into actual pressure on Israel, or if the priority of the phase will remain preventing the collapse of the understandings without guaranteeing their completion.

This ambiguity cannot be separated from the regional operational theater, where Lebanon finds itself at the intersection of two highly sensitive tracks: the US-Iranian confrontation, which has itself entered a phase of recalculations following the harsh electoral defeat suffered by the Republicans, and the Israeli transitional phase taking shape amid the reordering of power and security priorities. Between these two tracks, Lebanon fears becoming a hostage to understandings that do not necessarily guarantee its neutrality, or to Israeli military calculations that the existing US umbrella alone cannot contain.

According to informed sources, Donald Trump’s loss of control over Congress, with both chambers transferring to the Democrats on January 3, 2027, has placed the Republican president in a more difficult phase in managing his domestic agenda, without automatically diminishing his powers in foreign policy or military decision-making. However, it raises questions about the time margin available to him to attempt securing a breakthrough on the Iranian file, whether through a limited settlement or a resumption of escalation, before his decisions become more vulnerable to confrontation and scrutiny within Washington.

According to these circles, the Lebanese risk does not lie solely in the repercussions of a potential resumption of war, should “Statico” demonstrate the futility of its iron blockade pressure, but also in the possibility that the US-Iranian confrontation ends without a comprehensive settlement of ballistic missile files and Iranian regional influence. A settlement limited to the nuclear program or the security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz may ease direct pressure on Tehran, but it does not necessarily mean dismantling its influence network or resolving the future of Hezbollah’s arsenal. Lebanon could then face a harsh paradox: a de-escalation in the confrontation between Washington and Tehran on one hand, and the continuation of the Israeli confrontation on its soil on the other, without the Lebanese state having yet acquired the necessary tools to end this open clash.

If Washington chooses to return to military strikes, the nature of the operation, its objectives, and the Iranian response will determine the extent of the risk transferred to Lebanon. A limited strike aimed at pushing Tehran to negotiate is not equivalent to a campaign aimed at regime change. Moreover, any Hezbollah involvement in a broader regional confrontation could place Lebanon in a war whose scope and constraints exceed what Lebanese front calculations alone can accommodate.

From this perspective, informed circles point out that Lebanon is not merely awaiting the outcome of the US-Iranian confrontation, but also whether its conclusion will re-establish American controls over Israeli behavior or grant Israel a wider margin to impose field facts in the south. This occurs at a moment when the reshaping of the Israeli political scene coincides with a potential US retreat toward domestic priorities, placing the Lebanese state before a test of its ability to prevent the transition of this regional shift into a long-term security reality, for which the small country pays the price as the American umbrella that regulated the pace of the Israeli confrontation shrinks.

Conversely, other circles believe that Trump’s defeat in the midterm elections may have weakened his domestic political capacity, but this does not necessarily mean he will become less assertive externally; rather, it may push him to attempt to achieve a strategic accomplishment before the new Congress takes office on January 3. At the same time, Israel may have a time window to exploit to redraw facts in Lebanon before the boundaries of the next US political phase become clear.

From this standpoint, these circles interpreted Rubio’s comments from France and his hint at a potential role for Paris in the post-UNIFIL phase as an expression of Washington’s desire to establish Lebanon as a “separate case” from any settlement with Iran, and to address Hezbollah’s influence through the Lebanese state and the “Framework Agreement” mechanism, rather than necessarily waiting for a resolution of the confrontation with Tehran.

Thus, Rubio’s remarks, which also delineate the boundaries of “old-new Israel”’s operations, coupled with the assignment of Gadi Eizenkot to form the new Israeli government, appear to imply a multi-dimensional framework aimed at entrenching the removal of Lebanon from Iran’s insistence on “representing” it in its negotiations, consolidating engagement with its government and compelling it to fulfill its commitments regarding Hezbollah’s arsenal, raising the cost of continuing the party’s military and political influence within state institutions, and attempting to push the process aimed at creating a new reality in the south through experimental zones and the deployment of the Lebanese army, simultaneously with establishing an alternative international mechanism to UNIFIL that ensures the continued monitoring of the implementation of arrangements.

While French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot announced a “consensus” on avoiding a security vacuum in southern Lebanon as the departure of UNIFIL approaches, and amid anticipation of a visit by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz next week to discuss ideas and proposals under consideration regarding the status of the south after the “Blue Helmets,” a comment attributed by Lebanese media to a US State Department official was significant. The official stated that “a discourse that mischaracterizes Lebanon’s problems does not contribute to restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty, neither now nor in the future,” emphasizing that “we still expect the Lebanese Army to continue taking documented steps to verify the disarmament of Hezbollah and dismantle its infrastructure.”

The source stressed that “we expect further aid to be provided as the army demonstrates tangible and measurable progress in implementing the commitments Lebanon has undertaken under the Tripartite Framework,” noting that “the United States is the main supporter of the Lebanese Army, having provided over $3 billion in security assistance since 2006, including $190 million to the army last year.”

It was no coincidence that Washington’s delineation of the next phase in its approach to Lebanon, during the transitional period both domestically and regarding Iran, coincided with reports that Lebanese sources received communications from various entities in recent hours, notifying relevant parties of specific names to be included in upcoming US sanctions lists.

According to Al-Jadeed TV, “the pace of news regarding anticipated sanctions has accelerated in recent weeks following the crisis involving Lebanese consul in Detroit, Ibrahim Sharara, and the US message came literally as follows: ‘we raised a red flag.’” Notably, however, most of the leaked and proposed names for upcoming sanctions do not belong to Hezbollah, nor are they linked to suspicious financial activities. The list of names proposed for sanctions includes security officials who previously participated in social events hosted by the party.

According to these reports, “US sanctions may extend to some politicians, including figures who do not even belong to the Shia milieu, sending direct messages related to their stances and positioning.” The names proposed for sanctions “include close associates of the first and second presidencies, former ministers, and MPs who oppose the Framework Agreement and understandings with Israel, and the inclusion of some sensitive positions in the sanctions will place the Lebanese state in a very precarious position.”