A Review of the Historical Roots of Regional Power Struggles

In 1501, Ismail ibn Haydar ibn Safi al-Din Ardabili, known as “Ismail Safavi,” founded the Safavid State and declared Twelver Shi’ism as the official state religion from the city of Tabriz. From that time onward, the region entered a new phase of political and military competition between two major regional powers: the Ottoman Empire in the west and the Safavid State in the east.

Then came the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514 between Sultan Selim I and Shah Ismail Safavi, which marked a turning point in the balance of power and revealed the extent of the rivalry over Anatolia, border regions, and centers of regional influence.

The conflict did not end with this battle; wars and confrontations continued for decades, leading to the long war between 1578 and 1590, and fighting resumed at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

The result was that the Ottoman Empire was forced to keep its military and financial resources deployed on a wide eastern front, while simultaneously facing conflicts with European powers, led by the Habsburgs.

These fronts exhausted the Ottoman Empire financially and militarily, and generated internal disturbances, including the Celali rebellions in Anatolia, which were supported by Shah Ismail Safavi.

These wars and rebellions contributed to slowing the Ottoman advance into the heart of Europe, such as the Siege of Vienna. Many European historians did not hesitate to acknowledge that the Safavids saved Europe from complete fall to the Ottomans.

The Ottoman-Safavid conflict was not primarily sectarian overall, although the sectarian factor was strongly present. This has been exploited by the enemies of the Islamic nation to this day, who found tools to execute their plans. This factor was not separate from strategic, political, and economic interests.

The Treaty of Zuhab in 1639 between the Ottoman and Safavid states serves as evidence that politics and interests were capable of imposing compromises, despite the persistence of sectarian differences. States may differ in creed, but they negotiate when their interests require it, and they may draw closer despite their differences.

The purpose of invoking the Safavid State today is not to revive sectarian disputes or hostility toward the friendly Iranian people, with whom we share extensive, long-standing relations, nor to assign responsibility for past history, but rather to analyze the historical roots of the competition for influence in the region.

Today, despite differences in time, systems, and international circumstances, contemporary Iranian politics raises similar questions regarding regional influence from Iraq to Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and about the use of ideological and political ties to build a network of allies and armed militias.

Therefore, what the region awaits in terms of change does not concern the regime, which is an internal Iranian matter, but rather a change in the philosophy and behavior of relations with neighbors—from exporting influence to respecting sovereignty, and from managing conflicts to building stability. Will Tehran’s view of neighboring Arab countries change? Will the policy of interfering in the internal affairs of states recede? Will good-neighborliness and respect for sovereignty become the basis of foreign policy? Will state resources be redirected toward development and stability instead of expanding arenas of conflict and influence? These are the indicators by which any change should be measured, and by which any success of future agreements should be judged. Without them, the region will remain in a state of persistent instability.