Double Political Tsunami Redefines the Rules of the Game in Israel

An analysis of the intersection of political shocks in Israel and the United States and their impact on the future of bilateral relations and peace negotiations.
Translated by Alqyas from Al-Rai — Original source
- Eizenkot does not rule out forming an expanded government after the dissolution of the “Likud” alliance with the Haredim
- Netanyahu will not separate from Ben Gvir and Smotrich, nor will he operate under Eizenkot’s leadership
The region has not witnessed such a complex intersection of politics with such strategic impact in recent decades. In less than a week, the regional and international political landscape received two consecutive shocks: the first in Israel, where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu failed to secure a parliamentary majority, plunging the occupation state into a “parliamentary paralysis tunnel,” and the second in the United States, where Republicans led by President Donald Trump suffered a crushing defeat in the midterm elections, losing control of both chambers of Congress to the Democrats.
This intersection, which Israeli historian and politician Michael Oren describes in his article in “Israel Hayom” as a “strategic tsunami” and a “shocking and painful period” for bilateral relations, opens the door to complex scenarios regarding the possibility of advancing the negotiation file, ending the war on the Gaza Strip, and stopping the violence and crimes of settlers in the West Bank.
How will a paralyzed Israeli government deal with a vindictive new American Democratic administration on files that were already extremely complex?
According to analysts, this internal political paralysis makes it almost impossible for any Israeli government to take bold steps toward negotiations or make concessions, particularly regarding the Palestinian issue, such as ending the war on Gaza or adopting the “two-state solution,” because any such decision would mean the immediate collapse of the coalition.
On the American side, the blow was harsher. According to the results of the midterm elections held on November 3, 2026, Democrats achieved an unprecedented landslide victory, gaining control of the Senate (54 seats versus 44 for Republicans) and the House of Representatives with a comfortable majority. This victory, described by the “New York Times” as a “blue tsunami” and a “harsh rejection” of Trump’s policies, carries direct repercussions for Israel.
The main reason for this defeat, as Vice President JD Vance himself acknowledges, is the “war on Iran,” which was described as an “electoral disaster.”
However, Oren reveals in his article another dimension even more dangerous for Israel: the Democratic electoral broadcast, which received more than 5 million views, began blaming American support for Israel for the deterioration of the standard of living for Americans in the middle class, asking, “How can Americans buy eggs and bananas for their children while their tax money goes to finance the Israeli war machine?”
Furthermore, the election of Abdul Siddiq as the first Muslim in the US Senate is an indicator of a demographic and political shift in Washington that will be more critical of Israel’s policies. Siddiq clearly stated that “Palestinian children should grow up in their fathers’ and grandfathers’ land, without being killed with our tax money.”
The most dangerous point in Oren’s analysis is his warning that the shift in American sentiment will not be limited to military aid (which amounts to $4 billion annually, which Trump suddenly announced would be halted), but will extend to “the exchange of intelligence and the development of combat means.” The new American administration (or the new Democratic Congress) will not give Israel a “blank check” as was the case previously.
Orn notes that US forums he has spoken with “without exception” responded that “as long as Netanyahu and the current government remain in power, the prospect of reform is zero.” They even called on Israel to take “immediate and firm steps” against the “extra-legal” violence (referring to crimes and violations by settlers) and against unarmed Palestinians in the West Bank, and to return to declaring its commitment to peace, the two-state solution, and the necessity of establishing a Palestinian state, as well as to honoring agreements signed with the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The decision came after consultations Herzog held with parliamentary factions, which showed that Eizenkot received recommendations from 67 Knesset members, compared to 46 who recommended Netanyahu, while the Yehudut HaTorah party (7 seats) abstained from recommending any candidate.
Under the law, Eizenkot will have a 28-day deadline to form a government, with the possibility of extending it by an additional 14 days by presidential decree.
The 67 recommendations Eizenkot received include the votes of the two Arab lists, but these lists are not part of the expected governing coalition; they support it only from outside. This is where the core dilemma lies: Eizenkot seeks to form a “minority government” comprising 48 MKs from the four parties in his camp (Yesh Atid, Yisrael Beiteinu, the Democrats, and Israel Beiteinu), based on the abstention of the Joint List, the Unified Arab List, and Yehudut HaTorah from voting, thereby allowing the government to be formed without securing the support of 61 MKs.
However, this scenario faces a firm rejection from Avigdor Lieberman, head of Yisrael Beiteinu, who announced that his party would vote against any minority government, warning that “a minority government will not last long, and in the end, Netanyahu will return with 70 seats for another four years.”
Lieberman set three decisive red lines: ending the Netanyahu era, avoiding further elections, and not forming a government that relies on the abstention of Arab parties.
In contrast, Lieberman is pushing for a coalition with a majority of 61 MKs, bringing together the parties of Eizenkot’s camp with Yehudut HaTorah and Shas, after he expressed unprecedented flexibility on the issue of the conscription law.
In a lengthy post, Lieberman renewed his refusal to participate in a government that relies on the support of the Joint List and the Unified Arab List, and defended his readiness to reach a compromise with Haredi parties regarding the conscription law, arguing that making concessions on this issue has become necessary to prevent new elections and end Benjamin Netanyahu’s rule, claiming he does not seek the premiership at any cost.
In an attack on the Arab parties, Lieberman claimed that some of their MKs “declare their support for Hamas, describe it as a charitable organization and a legitimate resistance, and accuse Israel of genocide and committing crimes against humanity,” adding, “I want to make it clear: this will not happen.”
In contrast, Eizenkot sticks to his four principles, which he requires any party joining his government to accept: recognizing Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, accepting the values of the Declaration of Independence, the duty of service for all (military, national, and civilian), and recognizing Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Hours after Herzog announced his intention to task Eizenkot on Saturday evening, Netanyahu emerged, warning that a government relying on Arab parties “will not fight Hamas or eliminate the Iranian threat, nor will it preserve the Jewish character of the state,” describing it as a “government of national suicide.”
Analyst Yossi Verter wrote that Netanyahu’s true objective in his speech was “to halt talks between the Change and Renewal bloc and United Torah Judaism, and to open a new chapter of negotiations… its sole aim is to waste the additional 28 days” available to Eizenkot, adding, “Even when Netanyahu pretends to seek unity, he cannot shake off his habit of lying and distorting history.”
The Yesh Atid party responded to Netanyahu’s invitation by stating that “Likud and its allies, if they desire unity and the formation of a broad government, are called upon to announce the dissolution of their alliance with extremists and to accept Eizenkot’s principles.”
In an analysis published by Haaretz, Yossi Verter wrote that Eizenkot “does not rule out forming an expanded government, but he sets conditions: dismantling the Likud-Haredi alliance, agreeing to his four principles, and sitting under his leadership. Is this the beginning of negotiations? Certainly not. Netanyahu will never agree to separate from Ben Gvir and Smotrich, nor will he be willing to work under Eizenkot’s leadership.”
For his part, Itamar Ben Gvir, head of the racist Otzma Yehudit party, expressed his opposition to Netanyahu’s remarks on forming a unity government, describing it as a “government that would lead to stagnation.”
Regarding the election results, Ben Gvir claimed that “they stole the election here, did things that are forbidden, and this election was manipulated. This is my understanding and vision, and I believe many in the people of Israel think so.”
Ben Gvir rejected assessments of a political crisis between Israel and the United States stemming from Trump’s announcement of halting military aid to Israel, adding, “We do not need security assistance from them, and we should not be dependent on anyone,” while affirming that Israel would develop its own F-35 fighter jets and that “we must build our own aircraft.”
Based on the above, key scenarios for the future of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and a ceasefire in Gaza can be outlined, where Israeli government formation calculations intersect with U.S. pressures:
With Netanyahu continuing in his role as head of a caretaker government or a fragile coalition, and facing a pressing Democratic U.S. administration, any serious negotiations would be impossible. Israel would continue its war in Gaza under the guise of “security necessity,” but would gradually lose U.S. diplomatic and military cover. A Democratic Congress might impose restrictions on aid or pass resolutions condemning Israel’s policies, weakening Israel’s ability to sustain the war for long. This scenario implies continued humanitarian suffering in Gaza and escalating settler violence in the West Bank, without a clear political horizon.
If Eizenkot succeeds in forming a government (possibly with external support from Arab lists), Israel might move toward a limited de-escalation with Gaza and a long-term ceasefire, in exchange for a U.S. commitment to security support. This scenario requires significant political courage and the abandonment of far-right coalition partners (Ben Gvir and Smotrich).
- A minority government led by Eizenkot, relying on abstentions by Arab and Haredi parties, comprising 48 MKs. This scenario faces a major obstacle in Avigdor Lieberman’s firm refusal, making its realization without a split in Yisrael Beiteinu difficult.
- A 61-seat coalition with the Haredim, comprising Eizenkot’s camp (48) + United Torah Judaism (7) + Shas (6) = 61 seats. This scenario requires a painful compromise on the conscription law, which Lieberman has shown willingness to accept, but Eizenkot and Golan insist on the principle of “universal service obligation.” Additionally, Shas’s participation remains tied to the stance of United Torah Judaism’s religious leadership.
- Eisenkot’s failure and Netanyahu’s mandate: If Eisenkot fails within the deadline (28+14 days), Herzog could task Netanyahu with forming a government for 28 days, but Netanyahu’s chances of forming a government remain limited amid the electoral complexities.
- New elections: If no path succeeds within approximately 100 days, Israel will head toward its fifth elections in just a few years.
- The coming phase will reveal whether Israel is moving toward a fragile government of change or toward another round of elections that deepens the crisis of confidence in the political system, amid a “tsunami” of dual shocks that are reshaping the rules of the regional and international game.