Beirut Anxious After Falling into the 'Triangle' of US, Israeli, and Iranian Calculations

Beirut had barely finished assessing the repercussions of the US midterm elections on Washington’s regional policies, after President Donald Trump found himself perched above a “pit” filled with Democrats eager to “pounce on him.” Since Saturday night, it has found itself under the influence of the imperative to harness Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s “popular mandate,” which was delivered in the Knesset elections in favor of Gadi Eizenkot, and what this entails for the Lebanese front, given that this mandate is viewed as carrying dimensions related to the rebranding of the Jewish state, correcting its image globally, and addressing unprecedented fissures that have turned relations with it “toxic” for both the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States.

As monitoring continued for any new “signal” from Trump in an attempt to determine his next steps, domestically and on the Iran front—which links Lebanon to a war of peace and war with Hezbollah—interest circles in the “Land of the Cedars” expanded to the “fire playground” in its southern flank and its fate, given the rising prospects of Eizenkot’s success in forming a government that might bypass the red lines of Benjamin Netanyahu’s return more than it represents a “yes” to the leader of the “Yesh Atid” party. This extends to what will happen regarding negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv under US sponsorship, under which a trilateral “framework agreement” (June 26) was signed, governing Israel’s withdrawal and the disarmament of Hezbollah.

At a time when the bet that Trump would back down before the “Cedar tide” seemed to have collapsed, following his message that “the decision is mine within my administration and my party,” and his rebuff of Democrats who were “shocked” by his promotion of Steve Miller to White House Chief of Staff, his signal that he does not intend to conduct a “revolutionary” review of the entire course of the war with Iran was no less significant. This was reflected in his elevation, even if temporarily, of “soft firmness” toward Tehran through a steel siege. If this is not the “winning horse,” it may serve as the “transitional horse” until conditions are ripe for a return to military confrontation, governed by the January 3 deadline (the swearing-in of the new Congress). This culminated in his statement commenting on the midterm results: “Don’t worry, we will return bigger and stronger than ever.”

The performance of “Trump post-defeat” served as a clear indicator that estimates suggesting he would accept that the Knesset election results and the “no to war” stance, which characterized the narrative, meant “yes to America’s defeat” against Iran and the failure to achieve battle objectives, were incorrect. Meanwhile, the US State Department’s decision to expel Lebanese Consul in Michigan, Ibrahim Sharara, on the grounds of his pro-Hezbollah stances on social media and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut (1983), was considered the clearest measure that Washington is not inclined to relax its stance on Lebanon regarding the Hezbollah file and its weapons, nor allow further “political evasion” in Beirut from the necessity of demonstrating actions that would take the negotiation file with Israel out of the realm of stagnation.

Political circles were struck by Eizenkot’s delivery, in his “first entry” style, of a highly significant message regarding the Lebanese front, which contradicted expectations and leaks suggesting he would be more lenient than Netanyahu regarding withdrawal from the security zone in southern Litani. This deepened fears that the “Yesh Atid” leader might be a new title in Israel and for it, but with a content no less hardline regarding established objectives related to the security of the Jewish state.

Shortly after being tasked, he announced that Israel is “in a state of emergency with open fronts and war objectives not yet achieved,” following his party’s deliberate denial of what Shlomo Reisel said on Sunday morning on Channel 14, that Eizenkot was conducting negotiations with foreign entities regarding an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

“Yariv” described this information as “pure falsehood, entirely baseless, and never having occurred,” calling on Reisel to issue an apology and the channel to retract the report, accusing it of attempting to “sow fear, incite divisions, and obstruct the formation of a new government in Israel.”

Eisenkot’s remarks, following his official appointment and the rapid denial of any intention to withdraw from Lebanon, were seen as an effort by the former Northern Command commander (2006–2011) and architect of the “Suburb Doctrine” (named after Beirut’s southern suburb and advocating the use of disproportionate force against civilian infrastructure in areas harboring militants) to affirm that he would not squander the gains Netanyahu achieved across various fronts, particularly in Lebanon, where Israel occupies more than 700 square kilometers in the south.

This performance was also interpreted as evidence that Eisenkot’s appointment, which reports suggest Trump pushed behind the scenes, carries dual dimensions related to:

- Favoring the establishment of a new Israeli government with a fully qualified constitutional leadership, which is now unavoidable, in line with the tight deadline facing the US President to reactivate the military option against Iran if necessary.

- The need for a new face in Israel to cleanse relations with Washington of the “toxins” caused by Netanyahu’s conduct, which had turned support for Israel into a burden for both the Republican and Democratic parties and a source of public backlash, after it had previously been a strength and a magnet for voters on both sides. This is based on the conviction that while Eisenkot may mitigate damage to Israel’s image among its closest partners, he is not a peace advocate on any of the fronts where Netanyahu waged wars, nor is he lenient regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Against this backdrop, and amid attempts in Beirut to exploit Tehran’s renewed effort to wield the Lebanon card as leverage in negotiations by “merging the two tracks” onto a single table—through requests for Washington to pressure Israel to offer something that revives the “viability” of direct talks between Lebanon and Tel Aviv and the Framework Agreement—Hezbollah once again lined up to demonstrate its continued adherence to a strategy of defiantly refusing to hand over its weapons, thereby handing the Lebanese state the key to the success of its negotiations with Israel: its arsenal, leaving it to Iran and its negotiations with Washington.

In this context, Hezbollah’s deputy, Ali Fayyad, stated in light of the US and Israeli election results that “Iran and its allies appear to be in a position of cohesion, clarity, resilience, and ability to manage the confrontation in a way that thwarts the enemy’s capacity to achieve its objectives,” emphasizing that “Lebanese must realize that the outcome of the confrontation has not yet been finalized, and that balancing against the Israeli enemy, which considers everything permissible, will only be possible through their steadfastness and reliance on the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has made ending the war in the region, halting aggression against Lebanon, and withdrawing from its territory a primary condition in its negotiations with the Americans.”

He added that “escaping the Lebanese impasse will not be possible outside this path, and that the Islamic Republic is funding this stance from its own resources.”

Notably, Hussein Al-Nimr, the Hezbollah official for the Bekaa region, declared, “We are in a phase of preparing anew to restore what can be restored of the resistance’s capabilities, and we are seriously working to rebuild all our formations. You must know that we are very strong.”