Yemen's future... at the mercy of Iran's fate!

More than ever before, Yemen is drowning in its crises, particularly with the loss of control over the city of Taiz in the center of the country. There are no indications that the Yemeni government forces possess sufficient military capabilities to repel the Houthis (Ansar Allah) and engage them in battle in Sanaa. Instead of besieging Sanaa, Taiz has now become besieged. Anyone who examines the Yemeni map and scrutinizes its details will discover the strategic importance of a city with a large population and a crucial location on multiple levels. This includes the historical relationship between Taiz and Aden, and its port, which at one point, prior to the 1967 war, was the third most important port in the world.

The alarming aspect is that the Yemeni situation has become linked to the “Islamic Republic” in Iran and the future of its regime. Nothing in Yemen will improve as long as nothing changes in Iran. Much will depend on whether the United States intends to deliver a “decisive blow” to Iran. The coming days will be of paramount importance, as they will reveal whether the Donald Trump administration will strike a deal with Iran or engage it in a new war.

On the sidelines of the ongoing battle in Taiz—which is a conflict Iran is waging in Yemen to assert its control over the country—it is necessary to note the advance of “Ansar Allah” throughout the governorate and their arrival at Mukalla, which is no more than 80 kilometers from Aden. Those familiar with the terrain in the area separating Taiz and Aden know that the presence of the Houthis in Taiz and its surrounding areas opens the gates of Aden, the capital of southern Yemen, to them.

Notably, while advancing on the ground, the Houthis continue to attack the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which previously sought a political settlement in Yemen that included them.

One must not underestimate what is happening in Yemen at present, particularly since the Houthis entered the city of Al-Mukha a few weeks ago and the forces led by Tariq Mohammed Abdullah Saleh withdrew from it, without receiving adequate support from other government-aligned forces stationed in the mountains overlooking Al-Mukha. All Yemeni sensitivities suddenly awakened—including the animosity of the Muslim Brotherhood, who were expected to assist Tariq Saleh’s forces in Al-Mukha. The Muslim Brotherhood militias refused to provide cover for forces that were supposed to be part of the government forces controlling Al-Mukha.

At all times, it is necessary to remind ourselves that the Houthis took control of Sanaa on September 21, 2014. The “legitimacy” forces have never been able to advance a single step toward Sanaa. Had it not been for the efforts made by a certain regional power in the period following the fall of Sanaa, the Houthis would still be in Aden. The Houthis were expelled from Aden, just as they were expelled from the port of Al-Mukha. However, their return to Aden is now a possibility, given that the current Iranian plan involves not provoking Southerners and remaining within the boundaries that separated North and South Yemen prior to unification in 1990.

The outcome of the battle for Taiz will reveal whether the Houthis intend to expand the geographical area they control toward the south... or whether their primary concern is controlling the Bab al-Mandab Strait, in accordance with an Iranian strategy linking Bab al-Mandab with the Strait of Hormuz.

In any case, it is impossible to ignore the need to restore cohesion within the ranks of the “legitimacy” forces in order to revive them. This is not possible without some form of regional consensus that takes into account the negative role played by the Muslim Brotherhood, through their militias, in directly or indirectly supporting the Houthis.

A question of paramount importance now imposes itself, as the Houthis have taken control of Taiz and threaten the entire city and its surrounding mountains. This question is tied to their capacity to govern a modern state in a region undergoing an extremely sensitive phase. There is no evidence to suggest that the Houthis possess the ability to manage state institutions. They lack an economic project or a development agenda, and their educational programs are limited to preparing teenagers for suicide in service of Iran’s expansionist project, which shows no signs of having a future.

The more critical question concerns Yemen’s future and whether it is possible to reconstruct a country that has shattered. One cannot escape the reality that Yemeni unity has ended. The dream of the southern state’s return has also vanished. That state collapsed even before the unification in May 1990. The experience of South Yemen since its independence in 1967 demonstrated that the country was unviable. Between 1967 and unification in 1990, South Yemen witnessed a series of internal wars that culminated in unification with the North, a unity that itself ended with the departure of Ali Abdullah Saleh from power in February 2012.

At some point, it will be necessary to discuss Yemen’s future. However, such discussion will be of little value as long as it remains unclear whether the United States has decided to engage in another war with Iran to bring it to heel.

Ultimately, the situation in Yemen will not change without a transformation within Iran itself, given that Yemenis have proven incapable of confronting an ideological organization that does not hesitate to send teenagers to their deaths in service of Iran’s regional project.