Lebanon at the Heart of the 'Blue Tsunami' Ripple Effects

The article reviews scenarios for Trump's reaction after his defeat in Congress and its impact on tensions with Iran and Lebanon
Translated by Qiyas from الراي — Original source
Lebanon, which has been drawn into what has become an “elephant struggle” on the Iran front, has never before found itself receiving “shockwaves” from an American event of the magnitude of the shattering defeat suffered by the “Republican elephant” in the congressional elections, from which US President Donald Trump emerged “wounded,” brandishing his red hat (VETO) against the large blue dot that granted Democrats a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Beirut did not close its eyes as it “tracked the footprints” of the votes in American ballot boxes, as if the election were taking place in Lebanon and determining what would befall it. The country has been living since autumn 2023 in the most dangerous “versions” of the connected vessels linking it to the Iranian axis, a situation that reached its peak with the entrenchment of Hezbollah as a single path and destiny with Tehran in a “to be or not to be” war it is waging with the United States.
Behind the blue smoke that has now taken up residence in the “White House,” leaving Trump in the second half of his term as a “lame duck” facing the difficult challenge of cohabitation with Democrats in the two chambers of Congress—a situation that “will steal his sleep” as a president lacking the protection of both chambers for the next two years—dense gray smoke rose, laden with thorny questions that encapsulate various scenarios centered on the next move of the big loser, now that the picture of “the worst nightmare” is complete.
How will Trump respond after this political and personal setback, and after acknowledging that the war on Iran was one of the factors behind his defeat and the “accountability” he faced internally? Will he recalculate his stance on the war against Iran and take a step back to produce a settlement that breaks the closed loop on that front? Or is such an option measured only by its “macro” meaning related to the prestige of the United States, such that any setback before Tehran would be a blow to the superpower itself?
And what about the “troubled twins” in Israel for the defeated president in Washington, namely Benjamin Netanyahu? Will Trump’s “wounds” drive him toward “military reserve” as the “last cartridge” for remaining in power within a national unity government that can only be born under fire?
These are samples of the questions that echoed in the political backrooms in Beirut, where fears were equal regarding a potential swift electoral “counterattack” by Trump in the field on the Iran front before the results of the November 3 election took effect on January 3, as well as fears of rushing for a withdrawal from the war via a settlement, whatever its fragments might be for the region and its balances. There were also fears of a “run forward” that Netanyahu might undertake during the transitional phase preceding the completion of the reshaping of the executive branch, with Lebanon’s soft underbelly feared to be the largest casualty, especially since the Republicans’ “Black Tuesday” carried a transient indicator of partisan alignments, pointing to an extraordinary shift in American mood, under which Israel and its support have become an electoral burden.
Based on these questions, investigations in Beirut went to “sketching” the upcoming phase, governed by three scenarios, with their pros and cons:
The first is that US Vice President J.D. Vance will take a “deeper breath” in favoring the diplomatic option with Iran over war, and subsequently persuade Trump of the necessity of reaching an understanding with Tehran, starting from the points worked on in recent days, adjusting their angles according to the priority of rapidly limiting damage to the US administration, which is now realistically campaigning for the upcoming presidential elections through the popular measurement tool formed by the congressional elections, in which Republicans paid the internal cost of the Iran war on the American people’s tab.
Such a scenario means that Trump is now dedicating the remainder of his term to the campaign of the “Red Elephant” candidate, whoever that may be, and consequently is no longer the President of the United States but rather the campaign manager for his potential successor. This is in addition to the repercussions on the comprehensive project championed by the current president for a “New Middle East,” and the abandonment of the region to Iran, which conducts its war according to the logic that “the blow that doesn’t kill you makes you stronger.” This would also erase any possibility of the “personal legacy” that Trump has often signaled is important to him and influences his major decisions and choices.
The second scenario is that Trump opts for limited military strikes against Iran, in an attempt to draw it into an agreement that portrays him as victorious, or at least not defeated. This would require concessions from Iran, particularly regarding its nuclear file and the management of the Strait of Hormuz in the post-conflict phase.
What hinders this scenario is that initial signals from Tehran, through Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, confirm that Iran views the “Blue Tsunami” that swept through Congress as a referendum against war with it. Furthermore, what Iran did not grant the U.S. president with “full force” in Congress, it will not grant him when he is “on one and a half legs” or less. This means that any escalation against it, similar to what occurred since last March, would merely repeat an experience during which Tehran learned from the U.S. president’s hesitation and the lack of clarity regarding the final objectives of his military campaign. Tehran will double down on betting on time, which it has already used to secure a double loss for Trump: a significant political defeat and a strong moral blow.
There is a prevailing conviction that Tehran seeks to extend its purchase of time until after the U.S. presidential elections. Even if Washington were to adopt the advice of CIA Director John Ratcliffe to pursue a “no war, no deal” policy with Iran and let the economic sanctions take their course, based on the premise that “biting one’s nails” to urge Iran to make concessions would have forced Trump to “swallow his pride” after the November 3 defeat and compelled him to make further concessions.
The third scenario is that Trump considers a decisive resolution on the Iran front unavoidable, one that would turn the tables and put an end to the performance that cost him the congressional elections. This was due to the protracted conflict with Iran, the poor management of the Strait of Hormuz crisis, and the lack of adequate preparation from the outset, which led to waves of inflation in fuel and commodity prices that became a “political lightning rod” in his own territory. Experts and observers noted that the landslide vote in favor of the Democrats was more a reflection of the war’s repercussions than of its principles.
This scenario, which carries a timeframe constrained by the January 3 deadline and, to a lesser extent, the transitional phase in Israel, hinges on Trump’s personality. He cannot tolerate a “full storm” politically and militarily, both domestically and internationally. It is difficult to imagine him closing the chapter of his presidential life on a defeat that carries moral dimensions, which would dictate the remainder of his second term and write history. This is alongside the profound impacts of any “great escape” from the region and “handing over its keys” to Iran, unless it is part of a settlement that addresses the concerns of Washington’s strategic allies and ensures the realization of the current president’s vision for the “Historic Dawn of the New Middle East” and its pillars of peace and prosperity.
It was not coincidental that the White House published an image of Trump accompanied by the phrase “Trump is still your president,” followed by “Thank you for your interest in this matter,” after he had defended the option of war and its “long-term” consequences for the United States, the region, and the world.
These two positions were seen as a dual indicator that Trump will not back down from a military course, and that he needs to restore the prestige he fears has been lost in the “field of fire” with Tehran, despite the unclear level of escalation. Lebanon is inevitably linked to this escalation, as affirmed by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s message that “the response to any new aggression will be without geographical constraints,” a point reinforced by Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani, who declared the “Resistance Front’s absolute loyalty to the unity of the fronts.”
Amid fears in Beirut that Netanyahu might handle the Lebanese front unilaterally in the coming days if he perceives the war with Iran as “suspended” or concluded, a particularly significant incident occurred: an airstrike on a motorcycle in the southern town of Qabraya (in Nabatieh Governorate), which killed one person and injured another, accompanied by intensified drone flights over Beirut and its southern suburbs. In this context, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s “preventive warning” to Hezbollah was striking. He cautioned against dragging Lebanon into “any new reckless adventure in service of external interests” and plunging it into confrontations that it cannot afford the consequences of.
Salam’s stance, which appeared closer to “tightening belts,” followed his meeting with President Joseph Aoun. He began his warning by citing “the risks of renewed war in the region,” asserting that “protecting Lebanon is a national responsibility that requires prioritizing its supreme interests above any other consideration, and committing that the decision for war and peace rests exclusively with the state and its constitutional institutions.”
He continued, “In this context, I strongly condemn and denounce the interference of any Lebanese elements or groups in the internal affairs of our Arab brothers, particularly engaging in any form of military activities that threaten the security and integrity of their countries. The latest such development was announced by the government of our brotherly Yemen, and these actions can only result in harm to Lebanon and the interests of its people. We are deeply committed to respecting the sovereignty and security of our brothers, preventing any harm to them, and we look forward to strengthening and developing our relations with them on the basis of mutual trust.”
In the same vein, Aoun contacted Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad al-Alimi, informing him of “Lebanon’s commitment to the sovereignty of the Yemeni state and its rejection of any individual or group interfering in Yemen’s internal affairs or engaging in activities that undermine its security, stability, and the safety of its people.”
Hezbollah had previously denied the presence of its experts in Yemen or their participation in managing military operations, developing the Houthi’s military and training capabilities.