Friedman: Major Shift Coming in US-China Relations Due to AI

American writer Thomas Friedman argues that the era of artificial intelligence is fundamentally transforming the nature of the relationship between the United States and China, pushing the two superpowers toward strategic convergence in the face of shared security and technological risks, even as it exacerbates their economic and commercial rivalry.

In his article published in The New York Times on Monday, the veteran journalist draws on observations from a nine-day visit to China, which included Beijing and the Xiong’an New Area, as well as tech hubs in Hangzhou, Ningbo, and Shenzhen. He concludes that AI is no longer merely a technological race but has become a factor reshaping global power balances.

Through his monitoring of technological developments, Friedman notes that the common threat facing Washington and Beijing is no longer confined to competing states; it now includes individuals and small groups capable of wielding destructive tools once exclusive to nations, such as drones and AI-enabled cyberweapons.

He warns that the advancement of intelligent models and their growing ability to operate autonomously and self-improve multiplies the risks of losing control over them. This makes US-China cooperation to establish international rules and safeguards increasingly essential, despite the deep political divisions between the two countries.

Friedman anticipates that 2027 will see serious moves by both sides to explore common AI controls, and that a major crisis may push them beyond their traditional calculations to cooperate in safeguarding global security.

Conversely, Friedman believes AI will widen the economic and trade gap between the two countries, as China possesses a massive industrial base, integrated supply chains, and advanced infrastructure that enable it to rapidly convert technology into productivity gains.

Here, the differing approaches of the two countries become apparent. While US companies spend billions developing highly advanced AI models, Chinese firms focus on smaller, lower-cost models that are sufficient to enhance production and manufacturing.

The writer describes this approach as “good enough” AI, but one that could grant China a formidable competitive advantage, particularly in sectors such as electric vehicles, robotics, smartphones, steel, and advanced industries.

He cites the rapid development of Chinese robots, which in one year improved their time in a half-marathon (21 kilometers) from two hours and 40 minutes to 50 minutes and 26 seconds, surpassing the human world record previously set by Ugandan long-distance runner Jacob Kiplimo.

Friedman points out that China now produces about one-third of the world’s manufactured goods, with its trade surplus reaching $1.19 trillion in 2025 and expected to rise to $1.3 trillion in 2026.

He warns that integrating AI into this industrial dominance will enhance China’s ability to flood global markets with low-cost products, threatening American, European, and Asian industries.

He adds that imbalances within China’s own economy contribute to this problem. While its manufacturing and export sectors enjoy exceptional strength, domestic consumption continues to suffer from the fallout of the real estate bubble burst and the decline in Chinese household wealth, prompting Beijing to rely more heavily on exports and industrial expansion.

The writer emphasizes that China’s control over rare earth minerals represents one of its key sources of strength in the AI era, given their critical importance in manufacturing chips, batteries, robots, electric vehicles, drones, and military technologies.

He notes that the United States and Europe were years behind in building a competitive industry, and that regaining their position could take at least five years, perhaps ten, granting Beijing broad economic and geopolitical influence.

In his political assessment, Friedman argues that China benefits from its ability to think long-term and implement strategic plans, despite flaws in its political system, including weak domestic consumption and the risks of political interference and sudden arrests of officials, which can paralyze the bureaucracy.

Conversely, he believes the United States is experiencing the worst aspects of its political system despite possessing strong institutions, resources, and foundations, due to the absence of long-term planning, declining investment in scientific research, and constant fluctuations in economic policies, particularly in the clean energy and electric vehicle sectors.

He sees the restoration of U.S. competitiveness not achieved by pressuring China or demanding its retreat, but by rebuilding American industrial capacity, enhancing innovation, attracting talent, and developing products capable of competing globally.

China holds a clear advantage in deploying artificial intelligence within manufacturing and supply chains, while the United States remains ahead in developing more advanced models. However, continuing this competition without shared rules may open the door to risks beyond the capacity of both countries to contain.

The message he conveys to Washington is that confronting China’s rise is not about slogans, tariffs, or volatile policies, but about restoring seriousness in governance, planning, investment, and innovation.

The core idea Friedman seeks to convey is that artificial intelligence not only redistributes wealth and power, but also compels the world’s two largest powers to redefine their relationship. Cooperation has become essential for survival, and economic competition has become a battle for the future of the global order.

The only way to restore some balance in the economic relationship between China and the United States (and between China and Europe), in his view, does not lie in begging Beijing, but in “regaining our cards of strength.”

This, in his opinion, involves returning to seriousness in management style, manufacturing products with competitive costs, planning beyond the next week, and then implementing those plans.

Friedman concluded, “I know exactly what this strategy could be called. I saw the phrase written on a red baseball cap one day: Make America Great Again... but if only we started by electing people who know how to achieve that.”