Scenarios for Forming the Israeli Government and the Map of the Coming Phase

- Netanyahu’s strategy: From “annulling the results” and casting doubt on Arabs to prolonging the state of emergency

- The right’s solution, in its view, is the “Iranian scenario” following the US midterm elections

- Israel is not facing a government-formation crisis, but a crisis of systemic legitimacy

- The shortest path to a “solution” is not a ballot box, but the skies over Iran

Public and private deliberations and meetings, along with Israeli studies and analyses aired on television and cable channels and published in the newspapers Yedioth Ahronoth, Haaretz, and Ma’ariv, reveal an unusual political crisis, or rather a moment of coup against the very rules of the democratic game. The essence of what emerges from these deliberations can be summarized in three points:

The first point: Netanyahu effectively lost the election (53 against 48 + 19), but he refused to acknowledge the defeat and transformed the “result” into an “accusation.” Instead of negotiating a government, he launched a “stolen elections” campaign using security (Shin Bet and police) and media (Channel 14) tools, with the aim of thwarting the formation of any rival government.

The second point: Gadi Eisenkot, who appears to hold the “historical opportunity,” also refuses the only card that would grant him a majority, namely Arab votes. He seeks to draw the Haredim (Yahadut HaTorah and Shas) into forming a “Zionist government” without Arabs, but he encounters opposition from Avigdor Lieberman and rejection from Arieh Deri.

The third point: The Iranian obsession is not a theoretical analysis, but a practical scenario planned by Netanyahu to prolong the state of emergency and freeze the new Knesset. This is explicitly revealed by Haaretz: pressure on Trump to carry out a strike after the US midterm elections.

Netanyahu lacks a majority even with the Haredim, let alone with Lieberman outside his calculations. He attempts to compensate for this deficit with a “election fraud” campaign, but even the Shin Bet itself issued a statement at 4:00 PM on election day, stating that the investigations “were not sufficient to annul the elections or blame Arab voters,” which Haaretz described as “too little and too late.” The campaign is not aimed at actually annulling the results, but at poisoning their legitimacy and confusing his opponents.

The second path: Eisenkot’s government “without Arabs” (41 + Yahadut HaTorah = 48, + Shas = 54) is more theoretical than practical...

Eisenkot is working with all his might to persuade the Haredim to join, and a source close to him says: “This will not be with the Arabs. We believe this is possible.”

However, the obstacle is twofold: Lieberman has pledged not to sit with the Haredim, and Deri (Shas) refuses any government without Likud. Therefore, Eisenkot is exerting intense pressure on Lieberman, who “had expected an offer regarding the premiership.”

This path requires breaking two public pledges simultaneously—Lieberman’s pledge and Deri’s pledge—which has not yet happened.

This is the path that Eisenkot himself rejects, and which a large part of the Jewish public rejects, despite it being legally sufficient; for a government, in a confidence vote, does not need 61 members, but only a majority of those voting, and Arab parties could support it from outside the coalition.

Eisenkot breaks Lieberman’s pledge, Yahadut HaTorah joins, and a government of exactly 61 seats is formed (without Shas), relying on external Arab support in the confidence vote.

It would be a short-lived government, but it would control the Knesset, replace Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana, and pass laws against Netanyahu (including forming an official investigation committee).

Netanyahu is convinced that he cannot form a government, and is therefore focused solely on preventing others from doing so, according to sources from the Change and Democracy bloc cited in Yedioth Ahronoth. His tactics include refusing to allow Ohana to bring the motion to elect the Speaker of the Knesset to a vote, appealing to the Supreme Court to prolong the dispute, and portraying the elections as “stolen.”

His calculation is that new elections could improve his position, particularly if Zini and Levy remain in their posts, which Haaretz describes as “Netanyahu’s loyal guardians.” However, this scenario collides with the reality that the new Knesset, once it begins its work, can pass laws against him; therefore, Netanyahu seeks to shorten its term or freeze it.

Haaretz reports that Netanyahu is “pressuring US President Donald Trump to launch an attack on Iran immediately after the US midterm elections,” after failing to pressure for a strike before the Israeli elections. He has begun “a series of verbal provocations and practical attempts” to draw Iran into a preemptive strike, which Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir thwarted.

Milstein confirms in Yedioth Ahronoth that the Middle East “widely believes” an Iranian strike is expected after November 3. He argues that war would delay the opening of the Knesset and the swearing-in ceremony, freezing all steps by the Change and Democracy bloc. However, this scenario is not solely in Netanyahu’s hands; he needs US approval, and Iran may not cooperate with the “provocation.”

The first truth is that the “refusal to include Arabs” is not a transient political stance, but a structural feature of the system. Even the left, as Gideon Levy mocks, opposes a government with Arabs, just as the right does. The result, as he explains, is that 19 Arab seats are transformed into “invalid votes” in the political calculus, even though they are legally sufficient to overturn the equation.

The second truth is that the security apparatus (Shin Bet and the police) has abandoned neutrality. Haaretz explicitly states that Zini and Levy “have been exposed as full collaborators and political players,” and that any “attempt to restore democracy must begin with the immediate dismissal of Netanyahu.”

The third truth is that the world is watching. Milstein warns: “It is not certain that the world will continue to grant Israel its trust if another election round is held, and pressure is likely to increase,” including European sanctions. As Netanyahu pushes toward war, Israel’s international image is eroding at a faster pace than ever before.

Following the US midterm elections on November 3, two variables will enter the landscape: US pressure (whether for a strike on Iran or for restraint), and consultations by President Isaac Herzog, which begin on Wednesday, November 4. The decisive day is November 10, the session for the swearing-in and the vote for the Speaker of the Knesset. If Ohana refuses to bring the motion to a vote, we will face an open constitutional crisis that could last for weeks.

If a government is not formed by then, the most likely outcome is an Israeli strike on Iran, not because it is a strategic “solution,” but because it serves as a tool of will for Netanyahu: freezing the Knesset, prolonging the state of emergency, delaying accountability, and reshaping national priorities around the “existential threat” rather than the “alleged fraud.”

In conclusion, Israel is not facing a government formation crisis, but a crisis of systemic legitimacy. Netanyahu wants endless elections; Eizenkot wants a government that does not rely on Arabs; and Arabs hold 19 seats that no one wants to acknowledge.

In this equation, the shortest path to a “solution” may not be the ballot box, but the skies over Iran.