The 'Nightmare Scenario'... Will a Wide War Force a Unity Government Led by Netanyahu?

Israel’s 26th elections delivered shock and surprise to all, with Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc securing 53 seats, the opposition bloc led by Gadi Eisenkot winning 48 seats, and Arab parties capturing 19 seats—the highest number in their history—alongside an Arab voter turnout exceeding 80%.

However, neither camp holds the parliamentary majority (61 seats) required to form a government, making Arab parties the numerical “kingmakers.” Yet Israeli reactions to this new force were sharply divided: analysts criticized the refusal to cooperate with Arab parties as “short-sighted and dangerous,” while the right and key opposition leaders insisted on excluding them.

Veteran writer Nahum Barne’a, in an analytical article in Yedioth Ahronoth immediately after the elections, stated directly that the “trilemma of three constraints” facing Eisenkot’s camp lies in the fact that it is “impossible simultaneously to reject an alliance with the Likud party, exclude Haredi parties, and refuse reliance on Arab parties, since these three constraints cannot all be met at once.”

He noted that betting on “new elections” carries risks, as the enthusiasm that drove Arab voters to the polls may not recur after a few months. His stance reflects the anxiety of the liberal media elite: the numerical calculations are clear (67 versus 53), but the political “taboo” against excluding Arabs is what prevents Israel from escaping the deadlock.

Jackie Khoury, news director at Al-Shams radio in Nazareth and a writer for Haaretz, argued that statements by Democratic Party leader Yair Golan advocating cooperation with Arab parties do not represent all factions within the Change camp. Eisenkot’s, Naftali Bennett’s, and Yair Lapid’s positions constitute the “core dilemma.”

Khoury outlines three scenarios: a rotating unity government (led first by Netanyahu, then transitioning to Eisenkot or Bennett), which would be difficult without U.S. intervention; or Eisenkot’s initiative to form a minority government with external support from Arab parties, though this faces Avigdor Lieberman’s categorical rejection; or continued deadlock leading to new elections, which could benefit Netanyahu, who remains head of a caretaker government until May 2027.

Meanwhile, political science professor Suhail Diab identified three achievements of Arab participation: the elimination of two right-wing lists that would have enabled Netanyahu to form a more extreme government; forcing the opposition to choose between “toppling Netanyahu” and “aligning with a hardline Zionist vision”; and internationalizing the issue of national persecution of Palestinians within Israel.

Diab proposes three pathways, with the most likely being the “shadow scenario”: exploiting the Change majority (67 versus 53) to change the Knesset speaker, repeal the judicial overhaul laws, establish an official investigative commission into the failures of October 7, 2023, and take other legislative steps that weaken Netanyahu and pave the way for a more stable Change government.

Diab also retains the possibility of a “nightmare scenario”: a large-scale military escalation (possibly against Iran) to impose a state of emergency that would push the opposition toward a unity government headed by Netanyahu.

In an interview with National Public Radio (NPR), former Israeli diplomat and political analyst Alon Pinkas, who served as an advisor to Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres, described the opposition’s refusal to cooperate with Arab parties as “short-sighted and reckless.”

His argument rests on two points: numerically, Eizenkot either forms a coalition with Arab parties or establishes a minority government that relies on their external support; ideologically, he refutes the claim that “reliance on Arab parties will undermine Israel’s Jewish character.” He asks, “Why doesn’t the same logic apply to the ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties, which describe themselves as non-Zionist?” His assessment of Netanyahu’s ability to form a government is unequivocal: “Mr. Netanyahu cannot, I repeat, cannot form a government.”

- A change government relying on external support from Arab parties (low probability). 48 seats for the Eizenkot camp plus 19 Arab seats equals 67 seats, which is the only viable numerical path. However, Bennett and Liberman openly oppose any government “relying on Arab parties,” and Eizenkot himself hesitates regarding formal arrangements.

- A national unity government (medium probability). A rotation government with Netanyahu first, followed by Eizenkot, similar to the 2020 precedent between Netanyahu and Gantz. This path avoids the taboo of relying on Arabs, but requires Eizenkot to abandon his core electoral pledge to “bring down Netanyahu,” which could lead to a split within his camp. Liberman’s position (only without Netanyahu personally) further complicates matters.

- The “shadow scenario”... a parliamentary war without forming a government (relatively high probability, as Diab suggests). Although no government is formed, a majority of 67 seats can operate within the Knesset: changing the Speaker of the Knesset, repealing the judicial overhaul laws, establishing an inquiry committee into October 7, and obstructing Netanyahu’s key legislation. Netanyahu continues as head of a caretaker government but is parliamentarily besieged.

- New elections (high probability, as Khoury suggests). If no party can form a government within 42 days, or if the Knesset fails to find a majority within 21 days, the Knesset will be automatically dissolved and new elections will be held within approximately 90 days.

The risks of this scenario for the change camp: Arab electoral enthusiasm may not endure; for Netanyahu: the caretaker government continues longer, but he also risks losing seats.

- Overall assessment: The numerical strength of the Arabs (19 seats) has changed the rules of the game, but the “Zionist red line” regarding Arab parties has not moved. The real deadlock is not about numbers, but rather that opposition leaders prefer to maintain “Zionist purity” over ousting Netanyahu. As Pinkas stated, one cannot “keep Arabs out and call them in only when their votes are needed.”

In the next phase, the most likely outcome is an open parliamentary struggle over the “interpretation of the numbers,” rather than a definitive resolution of them.