Will Hezbollah's Revival Trigger a War Scenario on the Iran Front?

- A US State Department official stated: “Qassem is a tool in Iran’s hands, and as long as Hezbollah’s weapons are not disarmed, he will continue to carry out what his masters in Tehran dictate.”

The fervor surrounding the Israeli Knesset elections has somewhat subsided in Beirut, without the fears regarding the implications of the “National Unity Government” slogan having abated. There remains a pressing need to consolidate Israel’s domestic front in preparation for a potential post-November 3 war on the Iran front, amid concerns that this conflict could become a “bridge” to a configuration favored by Washington, based on a “neither victor nor vanquished” dynamic between Benjamin Netanyahu and Gadi Eisenkot.

As attention focused on the “final meters” of the electoral race in Tel Aviv, with the counting of “double envelopes” completing the new balance-of-power landscape—suggesting that Netanyahu neither won nor lost, that Eisenkot triumphed but did not secure victory, and that Arab parties achieved the largest gains, albeit gains unlikely to translate into power-sharing—the city of Beirut began to emerge from its “stuck” state, glued to screens monitoring political winds. This election took place on a military operational theater where southern Lebanon constitutes a key component, serving as the “twin front” to Iran and its war, which appears inevitable unless the “final diplomatic bullet” creates a breakthrough that pushes back the gears of the fierce confrontation currently drumming up hostilities.

It was no coincidence that, in the final hours, a “Souryal” reality emerged in Lebanon, characterized by coexistence under a single sky between the “roaring” anxiety of the small nation standing on the brink of drowning again in a sea of blood and destruction, and the clamor of “social media battles” sparked by a $13 “chic” sandwich that exposed the social gap in the “land between two collapses”—financial and security (war)—and the blue “Nice chair” that sat on the Ain El Mreisseh corniche, awakening public sensitivity toward the “famous chair” (the state authority).

This coexistence seemed wrapped in dimensions combining a full awareness of what is at stake if the region erupts and Hezbollah decides a third time to place the country in a leaking ship to weather the fiercest storm, according to “Iran’s desires,” alongside the need for an “outlet” to avert one’s gaze from the black cloud looming on the horizon and to vent anger—prohibited from being directed at the door of the greatest danger—onto the “Art and Friendship” chair from Nice to Beirut and onto a chicken sandwich whose pricing became a symbol of the humiliation of a middle class that may still be “like a slaughtered bird, dancing from the intensity of pain.”

The tense scene, hovering between “everything and nothing,” was completed by the appearance of Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem, who issued an “unprompted” statement on Wednesday evening that seemed “reminding.” He reiterated that his party’s weapons are not up for discussion as long as the Israeli occupation exists and its aggression against Lebanon continues. He affirmed that “resistance will confront aggression against it and against Lebanon,” and that there is no legitimacy to the “Framework Agreement” between Beirut, Tel Aviv, and Washington. He called for “putting an end to American oversight and its control over certain state levers (...) noting that oversight, like occupation, is both a violation of sovereignty.”

What most caught the attention of political circles in Nasrallah’s remarks was his reference to “our interest in the Iran-US agreement, as it is the only available source of strength alongside the resilience of the resistance, our people, and its supporters, and the agreement has proven its effectiveness as soon as the memorandum of understanding was issued to reduce the level of aggression against Lebanon,” considering that the other side of this statement can be read as “linking conflict” with any new war on the Iran front and paving the way for new involvement in it, according to the narrative adopted to market his engagement in supporting Tehran (March 2 last year) on the basis that this allows the party to “link up” with the larger front and benefit from it to make itself part of the solution and on the terms of the “Axis.”

It was understood from Nasrallah’s remarks that “Hezbollah” is preparing to engage in a battle that it believes will be of the “kill or be killed” type for Iran, if it erupts, contrary to the atmosphere that spread that it informed parties in Lebanon that it would not get involved this time, amid assessments by monitoring circles that even Hezbollah’s assurances are not reassuring, based on at least the two war experiences of July 2006, which followed promises at the dialogue table at the time that there would be no military surprises in the summer, and then the revenge war for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (March 2, 2026), during which he broke promises he had conveyed to his partner in the Shia duo, President Nabih Berri, that he would not enter the confrontation.

In the wake of the “shock” from the Secretary-General’s appearance and its timing, an official in the US State Department told Lebanon’s Al-Jadeed TV channel, commenting on Nasrallah’s remarks, “He is a tool in Iran’s hands and has no right to preach about sovereignty,” adding, “Ultimately, as long as Hezbollah’s weapons are not dismantled, it will continue to carry out what its masters in Tehran dictate, and will force the Lebanese people to pay the price.”

Nasrallah’s remarks and the US position reinforced the conviction that the file of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, under Washington’s sponsorship, remains stalled, amid anticipation of how Tel Aviv will manage it in light of the transitional phase Israel is experiencing politically, during which it is feared that no voice will rise above the voice of military escalation, with Iran as well as Lebanon, and in light of signals from Washington that the near future, perhaps after the midterm elections next Tuesday, will see escalating pressure and likely sanctions on personalities and officials in Lebanon at all levels, linked to the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons and the hesitation to refer the shipment of explosives seized in early October to the judicial council and to cancel the law boycotting Israel.

On Thursday, President Joseph Aoun chaired a meeting attended by Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal and the head of the negotiating delegation, former Ambassador Simon Karam, during which he was briefed by the Lebanese military delegation on the results of meetings held in Tampa, Florida, with the American and Israeli delegations on October 20 and 21.

A diplomatic source had previously told Al-Arabiya channel that the Tampa negotiations “did not yield any practical results due to Israel’s refusal to commit to the framework agreement, as it has no desire to continue with the idea of ‘pilot zones’ that would require it to gradually withdraw from occupied areas and then allow the Lebanese army to deploy there,” and that “there is no solution in the Lebanese horizon before the picture becomes clear in the region, specifically through an American-Iranian agreement.”

At this time, the issue of the Hezbollah explosives shipment has become a flashpoint, beginning to signal potential fractures within President Nawaf Salam’s government due to its hesitation in referring the case to the Council of State. The government’s choice to wait for the results of ongoing judicial investigations before taking action has been viewed as a new tactical maneuver, reflecting Lebanon’s reluctance to provoke a confrontation that Hezbollah had threatened if the “Sea Fury and its associates” case were elevated to the country’s highest criminal judicial authority, whose rulings are final.

The repercussions of this delay became evident when four ministers from the Lebanese Forces party boycotted the cabinet session convened to discuss only the waste management file. They protested the exclusion of the “Dahr al-Bider explosives file” referral to the Council of State from the agenda. The Lebanese Forces considered this an unequivocal national security issue that must be referred for investigation from that specific perspective, rather than continuing to waste time pursuing low-level operatives unrelated to the decision, while turning a blind eye to the decision-makers who have openly acknowledged their responsibility for the explosives.

Meanwhile, reports indicated that the Government Commissioner at the Military Court, Judge Claude Ghanem, had received the preliminary investigation reports conducted by the Lebanese Army’s Intelligence Directorate and the Information Branch regarding the explosives shipment. He is currently reviewing them to determine appropriate legal measures and file charges against those implicated. The investigation has uncovered the identities of seven individuals suspected of involvement in the case, including the detainees Ali al-Kurdi and Haitham Amhaz, as well as his wife, and the defendants Sajjad and Dhu al-Fiqar, along with the owner of the truck that transported the explosives.