Reuters: Iranian Network Operates in Secret to Import Equipment and Evade US Sanctions

- Imports include components essential for producing missiles and drones

- Many entities were established in 2013, coinciding with the intensifying impact of sanctions on Iran’s economy

London – Reuters – A Reuters investigation has concluded that Iran established a global network of secret military entities to import equipment, explosives, and heavy trucks worth at least $2 billion since January last year, circumventing the US naval blockade and Western sanctions.

These clandestine entities operate under names beginning with the letters “Waja,” an acronym for Iran’s Ministry of Defense.

More than 5,000 entities form a vast financial and military system. Their financial transactions can be traced through shipping documents and other import data dating back to 2016. Some are linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and commercial groups known as “Bonyads,” which are controlled by Iran’s elite.

During the 18-month period from January 2025 to June 2026—a timeframe that includes the first four months of this year’s war—a single entity among these, “Waja 346428,” imported large quantities of rocket fuel, explosives, and weapons components essential for manufacturing drones and missiles, as well as heavy trucks that can be used as missile launch platforms. These supplies reached Iran by land, sea, and air, and records show that a significant portion originated from China, Russia, and Germany.

All the secret entities share a single address in Tehran, which is also the address of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. These agencies list their establishment date as February 11, 1979—the day Ayatollah Khomeini assumed power in Iran following the overthrow of the Shah’s regime. However, records indicate that most of these entities were actually established in 2013, while Tehran was struggling under the weight of sanctions that led to a decline in crude oil exports and the collapse of its currency.

These entities, identified by Reuters for the first time in collaboration with the Israeli-American risk advisory firm 240 Analytics, form the backbone of Iran’s military procurement system and its efforts to evade sanctions. These entities manage a network of individuals acting as fronts and foreign shell companies, known as “trustees,” who use proceeds from illegal oil sales to purchase goods on behalf of the Islamic Republic.

Senior military commanders involved in Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs utilize this network. Phone numbers registered under 91 of these entities also appear in records from the state-owned Sepah Bank, linked to IRGC personnel holding accounts at the bank. Among them are at least two commanders accused by the United States of committing violations against civilian protesters.

While the Iranian military has been subject to multiple US sanctions for decades, Reuters found no evidence that any of the entities mentioned in the documents have been included in Western sanctions lists.

Mead Kalai, a former senior official at the US Treasury Department who helped design the sanctions program against Iran, stated, “What we see here is the military lifeline of the regime during this conflict and for many years prior. This is the entire integrated system of the Iranian military’s business operations.”

The arms importation network has supplied much of the raw materials Tehran needs to produce missiles and drones. These weapons are responsible for Iran’s ongoing attacks on energy facilities in the Gulf.

Maleki was one of four Iran sanctions and weapons experts who reviewed Reuters’ investigation findings, and he confirmed that many of these materials can be used in missile and drone programs.

As part of its tracking of imports, Reuters examined a portion of approximately 19,000 import records by cross-referencing them with shipping documents, social media video clips, and official media reports. The data show that nearly all materials imported by Iran were exempt from customs duties and were specifically classified as military equipment.

Experts noted that many imports, including explosives, could be considered dual-use and thus might also have civilian applications.

The Wall Street Journal published a report on some shipments from China on September 23.

Maleki, who until last year served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, said that covert military entities operate a parallel foreign trade system alongside the formal global economy, enabling Iran to spend funds earned abroad from illegal oil sales on military equipment.

Money rarely crosses borders, as doing so could trigger alerts about sanctions violations.

Instead, import data showed that 97 percent of the shipments reviewed by Reuters were settled “without money transfer.” Trusted intermediaries, Iranian residents living abroad, purchased goods using funds deposited in foreign banks and then shipped them to Iran.

Among the entities obtaining their needs through this network is the military unit overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile programs. Another is Tander Sahra (Thunder of the Desert), which the United States sanctioned in 2024 for manufacturing and supplying drones to Russia that have caused destruction in Ukraine.

Reuters and 240 Analytics identified Iranian military units by matching import data with company records, email messages, and documents collected by the Wiki Iran website.

The agency was unable to identify the operators of Wiki Iran, a website that receives leaked documents from the Islamic Republic and asserts that it is run by Iranian opposition figures “forced to live in exile.”

According to import databases for the first six months of this year, shipments included $1.9 million worth of detonators, tons of explosives, aircraft engine parts, rocket fuel components, and heavy launch vehicles.

Weapons and sanctions experts said all these materials could be used as key components for manufacturing and launching ballistic missiles and drones, including Shahed drones.

Peter Salisbury, a non-resident senior fellow at Columbia University who has spent the past few years studying Iranian arms transfers and supply chains, said, “This appears to be a large-scale effort to rebuild or expand Iran’s current arsenal” of drones and missiles.

The United States and Israel have targeted Iran’s ballistic missile and drone operations since the start of this year’s war on February 28, including factories that the U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon) said were producing munitions.

Reuters was unable to determine the extent of the damage, but Tehran continued to target its neighbors and ships attempting to navigate the Strait of Hormuz.

Imports entered Iran via cargo ships through the Caspian Sea from Russia, by trucks from Central Asia, and by cargo planes from China, according to import data and documents obtained by Reuters.

In response to detailed questions about its findings, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that it was “not aware of the situation you describe.”

In a statement sent by fax, it added, “We strongly reject attempts to maliciously link combat operations in the region to China or to smear China’s reputation.”

In addition to individual components, Iran purchases precision machinery that can be used to manufacture its own military equipment. These purchases include items classified as advanced computer-controlled lathes, electron beam furnaces, and particle accelerators, according to import data covering the period through June.

All of this equipment has industrial applications and can also be used in the manufacture of military equipment, including drone and missile airframes.

In addition to Maleki, the list of arms experts included Christian Baes and Henry Thompson, specialists in Iranian arms supplies, and Damien Splitters, founder of Heimdall, an organization focused on illicit supply chains and arms procurement.

Niamh Binstock, senior analyst at 240 Analytics, which collects and analyzes terrorism risk and financing data for corporate and government clients, said, “These entities with numbers serve as the hidden infrastructure of the Islamic Republic’s network to circumvent international sanctions, and much more.”

He added, “The volume of money passing through these entities is staggering, and no one has previously paid attention to them.”

Binstock, a 35-year-old economist, said he discovered the entities in June 2025 while uploading thousands of pages of freely available documents from Sepah Bank to “Wiki Iran” on the 240 Analytics electronic platform.

A group calling itself “Code Breakers” claimed responsibility for the bank hack, later announcing additional operations to seize Iranian government data.

In an email response to Reuters’ questions about the data, “Wiki Iran” stated, “We can confirm that the materials are authentic and that their source has been verified through our sources and contacts inside and outside Iran.”

Binstock explained that he initially believed the documents would help uncover Iran’s financial operations. However, he quickly realized that thousands of those accounts belonged to entities following the same naming pattern. All their names began with the letters “Vadja,” followed by a five- or six-digit number written in letters rather than numerals. All were registered on the same date and at the same address.

Binstock said that when he first saw the size of the account balances in Sepah Bank, he thought he had misplaced the decimal point. He found that 36 of these entities held foreign currency accounts with deposits totaling $1.2 billion by the end of 2024.

The rest of the network held approximately $1.8 billion in local currency, averaging about $360,000 per account.

Each entity affiliated with the Ministry of Defense could also be identified by a unique 11-digit government identification number, and these entities were listed in the Iranian Commercial Registry, an official database containing thousands of companies.

Binstock realized that the 11-digit identification number or the Ministry of Defense number itself repeatedly appeared in shipping documents, invoices, and bank statements, enabling the tracking of the network even when entities operated through front companies.

At that point, Analytics 240 contacted Reuters to help map the network of entities. Using the 11-digit identification numbers provided by Binstock, Reuters reviewed confidential shipping documents and recent import data, and consulted Iran’s corporate registry to uncover the scope of the network and how it enabled Iran to replenish its stockpiles during the war.

One entity stood out, with purchases dating back to 2016, identified by the number 346428.

Purchases by 346428 from abroad steadily increased over the years, rising from $442 million in the 12 months ending in March 2023 to $989 million the following year, according to customs statistics published by Iranian media. This placed the entity among Iran’s top ten importers.

Reuters found that 346428 imported $2.3 billion worth of military equipment between January 2025 and June 2026, according to records provided by Import Genius, a platform that aggregates import and export data.

Import data showed that between January and April 2025, 346428 imported 886 tons of chemicals through the Bandar Abbas port complex. The data indicated that the origin of these materials was China, and that they fell under a customs heading that included sodium chlorate and other types of perchlorates, which are key raw materials used in the production of solid rocket fuel.

Two people familiar with the April 26 explosion said it was caused by the ignition of sodium perchlorate while it was stored in shipping containers on a port dock. Iranian state media reported that Sina Port and Marine Services Development Company was storing the chemicals.

The explosion killed at least 70 people and injured more than 1,200. The CEO of Sina at the time said the blast was caused by “incorrect information” regarding the contents of a shipment delivered “without documents or identification cards.”

Reuters was unable to determine whether the chemicals in the 75-ton shipment were responsible for the explosion.

The United States imposed sanctions on Mostazafan Foundation in 2020. Although it presents itself as a charitable institution serving the poor, the U.S. Treasury Department stated that it is used by the Supreme Leader to enrich his office and reward his allies.

Hossein Dehghan manages the foundation. He was appointed Minister of Defense in 2013, when most of these entities began their activities.

Dehghan held that position for four years. Prior to that, he was a commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Lebanon during the bloody bombing that targeted international peacekeeping forces in Beirut in 1983, which killed 241 American soldiers, 58 French paratroopers, and Lebanese civilians, according to a U.S. Treasury statement on the sanctions imposed on him. The United States held Iran responsible for the attack.

In addition to components that can be used to manufacture rocket fuel, the data also shows that Iran imports heavy trucks, which the military uses as mobile, camouflaged launch platforms for missiles and drones.

Binstock identified an early example of such imports. In the fall of 2022, an Iranian car dealer living in Italy purchased six trucks for €426,000, according to records from Wiki Iran. The trucks were shipped to another company, which in turn arranged their delivery to the port of Bandar Abbas.

The 11-digit identification number of the end buyer belonged to 346428. According to the shipping list, the trucks were ultimately delivered to Sahra Tander, which plays a key role in the manufacturing and sale of Iranian Shahed drones.

Delmi did not respond to a request for comment on the deal.

Between January 2025 and June 2026, VDJ 346428 imported an additional 346,428 trucks of the 435 model. Using satellite imagery and social media, Reuters tracked some of these trucks to a customs yard on the outskirts of Tehran in February 2025, and used import data to match the identification numbers of three vehicles—unique codes that identify the vehicle’s manufacturer and origin.

Another truck of the same type appeared during the war, when U.S. Central Command posted a video on social media in March claiming it showed a strike targeting a camouflaged Iranian mobile missile launch platform.

Reuters could not determine whether the truck was among those imported by VDJ 346428. However, analysts at Jane’s, a British open-source defense intelligence firm, said the truck shown being destroyed in the video was a model imported by Iran.

Using VDJ 346428, Iran also imported thousands of trucks, which were modified by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its allied armed groups to mount heavy machine guns on their rear beds.

Video footage from protests in Iran earlier this year showed security forces escorting vehicles equipped with machine guns as part of a convoy patrolling the streets of Tonekabon, a city in northern Iran.

On February 9, 2026, a ship arrived in Bandar Abbas carrying 93 tons of raw Chinese titanium, a hard metal that weapons and sanctions experts said could be used in manufacturing missile bodies and engine casings.

Overall, during the month preceding the outbreak of war on February 28, ships also transported a total of 268 tons of nitrocellulose and 276 tons of other chemicals from China, classified under the customs heading that includes perchlorate, a component used in the production of rocket fuel and explosives.

Even as the war intensified and an embargo was imposed on Iranian ships, the Iranian military continued to bring in materials from abroad. According to data, monthly import volumes initially fell 47 percent to $54 million in March compared to the previous month, but rose to $77 million by May.

In June 2026, a Russian shipment of fuses valued at $1.9 million arrived. Fuses are tools that can be used to detonate highly explosive materials, such as those found in drone warheads and missiles. This shipment was among five similar Russian consignments totaling $7.6 million since the beginning of 2025.

Imports did not come solely from Russia and China. Companies in the European Union, which has imposed sanctions on Iran’s Ministry of Defense, also shipped goods to the Iranian military.

Import data showed that trucks, aircraft engine components, and electronics worth hundreds of millions of dollars, including $34 million worth of trucks, all came from Germany and other EU countries. All of their documentation was listed under the name VDJ 346428.

Not all import data included detailed descriptions of the shipments. In many cases, Reuters relied on customs codes to identify their declared contents and origins, without being able to verify them independently.

A European Union spokesperson said member states are responsible for enforcing the bloc’s sanctions, which include those against “Sahra Tender” and others.

A large part of Iran’s economy is controlled by quasi-governmental institutions known as “Bonyads” in Persian, which are run by elite figures.

Many of these organizations were established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution using assets seized from the deposed Shah’s family and other individuals deemed enemies of the new state.

According to a 2013 Reuters investigation and multiple documents regarding U.S. government sanctions, the Iranian elite use Bonyad institutions to maintain their grip on power by linking loyal officials to a vast network of cronyism.

The United States and Europe have emphasized in sanctions imposed over the years that Bonyad institutions, like the Revolutionary Guard, play a pivotal role in the violent suppression of Iranians for years.

One such institution, the Foundation for the Preservation of Cultural Heritage and the Promotion of Sacred Defense Values, illustrates the extent to which the Defense Ministry’s network has penetrated the Iranian economy and the repressive apparatus. According to documents reviewed by Reuters dating back several years and linking the foundation to at least two separate entities under the Defense Ministry, transactions include not only imports but also domestic financial transfers.

The foundation is tasked with promoting “the culture of resistance, sacrifice, jihad, and martyrdom.” It serves as a key propaganda arm of the government and is responsible for maintaining the legitimacy and ideology of the Islamic Republic.

In 2017, the foundation received four shipments of electronic devices and cooling units, according to WikiIran data. Again, the registration number on the shipments matched the entity and Vaja 346428.

It is unclear how the foundation used these materials, but its leadership includes senior Revolutionary Guard commanders across all 31 provinces of Iran. In Khuzestan, this includes Brigadier General Hassan Shahvarpour, who has long commanded the elite Guard forces in the troubled region.

According to a U.S. sanctions document, units under Shahvarpour’s command killed at least 100 Iranian civilians in Mahshahr in 2019 during protests over fuel price hikes. The United States stated that these units surrounded people attempting to flee using armored vehicles and fired machine guns into crowds.

A local human rights activist, who witnessed the killings, said that Shahvarpour’s forces subsequently set fire to sugarcane fields where some fleeing protesters had taken shelter. His account was corroborated by a second activist present that day.

In 2021, Shahvarpour requested 50 billion Iranian rials, then worth more than $1 million at the official exchange rate, from a state-owned steel company to fund a new Revolutionary Guard building in Khuzestan, according to a document reviewed by Reuters.

The account holder designated to receive the funds, according to signed documents, was entity Vaja 424000.

Earlier this year, Shahvarpour’s men crushed new protests in Khuzestan that were part of a nationwide uprising against the economic collapse, according to activists. Across Iran, thousands were killed and tens of thousands imprisoned.

In Khuzestan, the two activists said they documented the names of 46 dead, most of whom were killed on January 8 and 9 when the Guard opened fire on protesters.

Footage broadcast by state media from an event earlier this year showed Shahvarpour’s Guard forces patrolling a town in Khuzestan in white trucks favored by the Defense Ministry network. One of the trucks carried a bright pink Shahed drone.