Netanyahu Succeeds but Doesn't Triumph... Israeli Elections Open Battle for Power

Voting has ended and the battle has begun. Israel’s parliamentary elections yielded no decisive victory or defeat for either of the two main competing camps. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu succeeded in preserving his political weight, retaining leadership of the largest party and keeping alive his ambition to form a new government; however, he failed to secure the parliamentary majority needed to govern. Similarly, his main rival, former army chief Gadi Eisenkot, fell short of the 61 seats required to form a government. The result is a fragmented Knesset (parliament), in which neither camp can govern alone, while Arab parties—marginalized by both sides—may hold the balance of power.

According to preliminary results available on Wednesday, October 28, Netanyahu’s right-wing camp won approximately 53 seats, while the opposition camp led by Eisenkot secured 48 seats, and Arab parties won 19 seats. These figures do not include around 600,000 votes that have not yet been tallied. Those votes were cast through the special “double-envelope” system, which covers ballots from military and security personnel, prisoners, medical staff, people with disabilities, and others unable to vote at regular polling stations. The counting of these votes is expected to clarify the final distribution of seats, potentially shifting one or two seats between the competing camps, without necessarily altering the existing parliamentary deadlock.

Netanyahu succeeded in mobilizing substantial support by portraying himself as an indispensable leader for Israel in wartime and depicting Arab parties as a threat to the country’s political direction. His campaign sought to unite Israeli Jewish voters behind the Likud party and maximize his chances of remaining in power. Although he remains leader of the largest party, he failed to win the majority needed to govern. Consequently, his opponents can claim that voters rejected granting Netanyahu a new majority, while Netanyahu can argue that he remains Israel’s strongest political leader. However, neither of these claims answers the fundamental question: who can form a functioning government?

The opposition may get its first opportunity to demonstrate that Netanyahu has lost control of the Knesset even before a new government is formed. The immediate objective is to replace Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana, a prominent Likud politician and Netanyahu ally, with a candidate not subject to the prime minister’s influence. Unlike the process of forming a government, replacing the Knesset speaker does not require agreement on a joint cabinet composition or a unified political program. If the 48 MKs representing the Eisenkot camp cooperate with the 19 Arab MKs, they would theoretically hold a majority of 67 seats, sufficient to replace Ohana, pending the final election results and the willingness of these parties to work together.

Removing Ohana would not automatically end Netanyahu’s premiership, but it would deprive him of an important parliamentary ally and could shift control of the Knesset agenda to his opponents. Arab party representatives, including Ahmad Tibi, have already identified this possibility as an immediate goal. Such cooperation would also create a political precedent: Eisenkot could accept Arab MKs’ votes to control the parliament while continuing to exclude them from government participation. It would become increasingly difficult to justify this contradiction if those Arab MKs later express willingness to support his candidacy for prime minister.

Once the results are certified, the political initiative passes to President Isaac Herzog, who must consult with parliamentary factions and task the Knesset member most capable of garnering sufficient support with forming a government. The president is not bound to choose the leader of the largest party; this means that Netanyahu’s electoral standing does not guarantee him the first mandate.

Eisenkot could receive this mandate if opposition forces and Arab parties demonstrate they command broader parliamentary support. Accordingly, Herzog’s decision may hinge on whether Arab lawmakers recommend Eisenkot, agree to support his government, or simply vote against Netanyahu.

The candidate tasked with forming a government is given an initial deadline of 28 days, which can be extended by up to 14 additional days. If this attempt fails, another Knesset member may be granted a 28-day deadline, followed—should it be necessary—by final parliamentary procedures that allow a majority of members to request granting another candidate a 14-day mandate. A call for new elections becomes necessary only after all these possibilities have been exhausted. Consequently, Netanyahu retains a significant advantage: he remains acting prime minister throughout the negotiation period unless another government takes power, allowing him to exercise executive authority while his rivals struggle to reach an agreement.

Netanyahu’s first strategic option is to persuade members of the opposition camp to abandon their electoral commitments and join him. His primary targets are Avigdor Lieberman and Naftali Bennett, both former political allies who later became opponents. Lieberman, a former Likud politician and defense minister under Netanyahu, shares much of the prime minister’s nationalist orientation but strongly opposes the military service exemptions sought by Netanyahu’s ultra-Orthodox partners. Netanyahu might attempt to attract him through ministerial appointments, national security responsibilities, or concessions on mandatory military conscription, although Lieberman has repeatedly refused to join a government led by Netanyahu.

The second possibility is Bennett, who previously headed Netanyahu’s office, served as a minister in his government, and later became prime minister. Their disagreements concern political leadership and governance more than substantive issues related to Israeli security policy or the establishment of a Palestinian state. Netanyahu could offer Bennett a powerful position, a future leadership arrangement, or a rotating premiership. However, Bennett’s political resurgence partly depends on presenting himself as an alternative to Netanyahu, and he ran in the elections alongside Yair Lapid. Thus, rejoining Netanyahu could undermine his credibility and complicate relations within his political alliance.

Netanyahu, who holds approximately 53 seats, needs at least eight additional lawmakers to reach the required majority. Therefore, he may attempt to attract opposition members individually through political guarantees, ministerial appointments, or promises of future influence. Such defections remain possible within Israel’s fragmented political system, although there are no definitive signs that Lieberman, Bennett, or their deputies are willing to change their loyalties. The broader calculation hinges on whether political ambition and ideological similarities can overcome personal rivalries and electoral pledges that currently separate Netanyahu from his former allies.

The shortest path for Eizenkot to replace Netanyahu is also his greatest political embarrassment. His opposition coalition cannot reach 61 seats on its own, but cooperation with Arab parties could provide the parliamentary majority needed. Yair Golan, leader of the Democrats, who is expected to win around seven or eight seats, has called for cooperation with Arab representatives to end Netanyahu’s rule. However, Lieberman and Bennett oppose forming a government that relies on Arab parties. Thus, Eizenkot must decide whether ousting Netanyahu is more important than honoring commitments made to voters and maintaining the ideological boundaries of his coalition.

Breaking electoral promises is not unusual in Israeli politics, as leaders have repeatedly shown pragmatism when parliamentary arithmetic makes honoring original commitments impossible. Nevertheless, Eizenkot, far from being a peacemaker, has imposed exhausting conditions on potential Arab partners. These include recognizing Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, accepting its core political principles, and acknowledging Hamas as a terrorist organization committed by Israel to its destruction. These demands pose significant obstacles for Arab parties representing Palestinian citizens in Israel, especially since the proposed government offers little opportunity to advance Palestinian national rights.

Accepting the definition of Israel as a Jewish state raises fundamental questions about national equality, collective rights, and Palestinian identity. Although this recognition would not legally preclude the possibility of a Palestinian state, Arab representatives may view it as reinforcing a political framework that marginalizes Palestinian aspirations. Eizenkot’s additional demand regarding Hamas constitutes another ideological hurdle, effectively requiring Arab parties to make concessions that may be unacceptable simply to join a government with a right-wing majority whose main leaders oppose Palestinian independence. Consequently, the very political conditions may obstruct the most viable path for the opposition to reach power.

One possible compromise is for Eizenkot to form a minority government supported by Arab parties outside the coalition. Arab representatives would not necessarily obtain ministerial positions or become formal coalition partners, but they could support the government’s formation or facilitate it by abstaining from voting, in exchange for commitments on municipal funding, public services, combating organized crime, infrastructure, civil equality, and protection from discrimination. Such an arrangement would allow Eizenkot to claim that Arab parties are not part of his government officially, while enabling their representatives to achieve practical improvements without bearing responsibility for every decision made by the cabinet.

However, the government would remain a fragile minority; Lieberman and Bennett might refuse to participate in an administration that relies on parliamentary support from Arabs, even if those Arabs are not formal coalition members. Eizenkot would also need continuous cooperation to pass budgets and key legislation, making the distinction between “external support” and “coalition participation” increasingly artificial. This arrangement could provide a way to remove Netanyahu, but only if the opposition accepts relying on Arab parliamentary support, and if Arab parties see sufficient concessions to justify supporting a government whose broader political and security policies they may oppose.

Another possibility is that Eisenkot attempts to woo the Shas and United Torah Judaism parties, whose political priorities include issues such as religious education, funding for religious communities, and exemption from mandatory military service. Although these parties have traditionally allied with Netanyahu, their institutional interests do not necessarily depend on his personal retention of the prime ministership. If these parties become convinced that he can no longer form a majority, they may enter negotiations with another leader willing to protect their interests. Such a shift in alliances could enable Eisenkot to form a government without the participation of Arab parties, but it would require concessions on issues that have been at the center of division between the competing camps throughout the election campaign.

The issue of military conscription remains the main obstacle; the opposition is committed to ending the broad exemptions enjoyed by ultra-Orthodox Jewish men, a stance vigorously defended by Lieberman and supported by other opposition leaders. Eisenkot will need to reconcile this pledge with the demands of religious parties, whose participation may be essential for him to assume the office of prime minister. Any settlement on this matter could alienate voters who specifically supported the opposition due to their opposition to Netanyahu’s approach of accommodating Haredi leadership demands. Thus, this scenario illustrates how the pursuit of parliamentary power could force Eisenkot to abandon another core electoral commitment.

Forming a national unity government that brings together members of Netanyahu’s coalition and factions from the opposition camp led by Eisenkot might offer the numerically easiest path to a stable parliamentary majority; however, this option faces serious political hurdles. Eisenkot campaigned on ousting Netanyahu and explicitly refused to serve under his leadership, including the idea of rotating the premiership. Other opposition leaders have taken similar positions. Any agreement with Netanyahu would require him to relinquish the office of prime minister, accept the principle of future leadership rotation, or allow another Likud figure to form the government. In return, Eisenkot and his partners would have to abandon the core commitment on which they campaigned.

Prolonged political deadlock or a major security emergency could increase pressure to reach such an arrangement, as Israel has previously formed national unity governments during crises. Nevertheless, numerical stability would not necessarily resolve disagreements over judicial policy, military conscription, the national budget, Palestinian rights, or responsibility for the failures surrounding the October 7, 2023 events. A government formed primarily to avoid new elections may reproduce the same political divisions that prevented either camp from governing independently. The survival of such a government would depend on the ability of leaders who campaigned against each other to agree on a sufficiently coherent program.

Prolonged political deadlock could ultimately benefit Netanyahu if he fails to form a majority; he may view holding new elections as an opportunity to address shortcomings in his campaign, rally more right-wing voters, and exploit divisions among Eytan’s allies. Netanyahu could portray the opposition’s inability to govern as proof that only a cohesive right-wing bloc can ensure stability. He might also leverage the opposition’s refusal to cooperate with Arab representatives to deepen political divisions, arguing that the alternative to his leadership is political paralysis or reliance on parties that his supporters deem unacceptable.

For Eytan and the Arab parties, new elections carry significant risks. Both sides have invested heavily in electoral mobilization, and there is no guarantee that the same results will be repeated. However, Netanyahu cannot assume that another electoral round will necessarily favor him; voters may hold him responsible for the political deadlock, or reward the opposition if it demonstrates greater cooperation. Thus, new elections would constitute a gamble for all parties. If all constitutional avenues for forming a government are exhausted, Netanyahu could remain prime minister in a caretaker capacity until a new government is formed, prolonging uncertainty while retaining substantial executive influence despite the government’s lack of a parliamentary majority.

The war represents another factor capable of altering the course of negotiations. The Israeli elections took place amid ongoing regional confrontations involving Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, and other regional actors. Renewed military confrontation with Iran, or a major escalation elsewhere, could prompt Netanyahu to frame leadership continuity as a national security imperative. He might argue that the country cannot afford prolonged coalition negotiations during a military emergency, seeking to persuade opposition figures to join a broader government. Such circumstances could strengthen his political position, particularly if public opinion rallies around the current government amid renewed fighting.

However, military escalation could backfire, increasing criticism of Netanyahu and bolstering demands for accountability. Eytan, the former army chief, possesses extensive national security experience and has already warned against allowing political considerations to influence military decisions. The consequences of another war will depend on its timing, military outcomes, human and economic costs, and public perceptions of responsibility. There is no basis for assuming that renewed conflict will automatically benefit Netanyahu, but a major regional confrontation could derail negotiations, prolong his interim premiership, or fundamentally alter the calculations of competing parties.

The greatest paradox of these elections lies in the position of the Palestinians. Palestinian citizens of Israel, represented by Arab parties, may have prevented Netanyahu from securing the majority he sought and could have determined whether Eytan would succeed him. Nevertheless, they remain among the principal political losers regardless of the final outcome. Neither Netanyahu nor Eytan offers a serious commitment to establishing an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. Their disagreements center on political leadership, governance, judicial policy, mandatory military service, and the management of Israel’s strategic interests, rather than on recognizing Palestinian national rights or ending the Israeli occupation.

Both political camps include influential figures who support military operations against perceived regional threats, oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state, and favor continued Israeli control over the occupied territories. Their differences should not obscure the significant convergence in their views on national security. Consequently, Palestinian citizens of Israel have focused their urgent political demands on practical issues, including protection from violence, municipal budgets, infrastructure, public services, civil equality, and anti-discrimination measures. These goals are important to their communities, but they do not amount to realizing Palestinian national aspirations or fundamentally altering Israel’s approach toward the Palestinian people.

Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank face a more difficult reality, as they lack direct electoral representation in the Knesset, even though decisions by Israel’s next government will profoundly affect their security, freedom of movement, geographic future, and prospects for self-determination. None of the main candidates offers a credible platform to reverse settlement expansion or establish a negotiating path toward Palestinian independence. Thus, the Israeli elections may change the identity of the prime minister without significantly altering the conditions imposed on Palestinians. While Arab parties may influence who governs Israel, their electoral gains do not necessarily translate into progress toward Palestinian national liberation.

The Israeli elections may change the identity of the prime minister without substantially altering the conditions imposed on Palestinians.

The electoral arithmetic reveals a fundamental flaw. Netanyahu’s return to power hinges on convincing members of the opposition camp to switch their allegiance, while the closest opportunity for Eizenkot involves cooperating with Arab representatives rejected by influential members of his alliance. Israeli politicians have previously shifted their political loyalties, and ambitions to reach power may outweigh campaign rhetoric. Nevertheless, Eizenkot must decide whether ousting Netanyahu takes precedence over the ideological conditions imposed on potential partners. Rejecting Arab support could enable Netanyahu to retain the political initiative despite failing to secure an electoral majority.

The emergence of Arab parties as a force capable of tipping the parliamentary balance exposes a fundamental contradiction in the opposition’s strategy. Eizenkot cannot claim to have a parliamentary majority opposing Netanyahu while simultaneously refusing to recognize the political legitimacy of a core component of that majority. Netanyahu has long exploited Arab opposition to participation to mobilize Jewish voters, but Eizenkot now faces the consequences of adhering to such political boundaries. If his alliance insists on excluding Arab representatives, it may sacrifice its only direct chance of toppling Netanyahu, thereby granting the latter an additional opportunity to consolidate his position.

Netanyahu survived another electoral confrontation and remains the leader of the largest party, retaining the advantages of incumbency. However, he failed to secure the majority needed to form a government with his current allies. Gadi Eizenkot has a chance to replace him, but this requires political concessions that could fracture the opposition alliance he leads.

At the same time, Arab parties have gained tangible parliamentary influence, without a corresponding real opportunity to advance Palestinian national aspirations. The result is an election in which every active political party achieved certain gains, yet none succeeded in achieving its primary objective.

Accordingly, Israel enters a phase of negotiations, with the decisive question lying in the extent to which political leaders are willing to abandon their promises and reshape their alliances. The immediate contest will center on control of the Knesset, beginning with the election of its speaker, Amir Ohana, followed by consultations conducted by President Isaac Herzog, leading to the formation of a government. Netanyahu may succeed in attracting politicians from the opposing camp, or Eizenkot may accept support from Arab parties, while Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties might shift their loyalties. Alternatively, a minority government or a national unity government could emerge, or the country could head toward new elections. A resumption of regional conflict would alter all calculations. Netanyahu has survived but has not secured a decisive victory; Eizenkot has an opportunity but without a guaranteed majority; and Palestinians have gained electoral leverage without a prospect of national liberation. Nothing has been settled yet, and all cards remain on the table.