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Lebanon Fears Israel's Threat of Attack Until the Awali River and 'Displacement of a Million'

Lebanon Fears Israel's Threat of Attack Until the Awali River and 'Displacement of a Million'
Qiyas summary

Israeli Defense Minister Itamar Ben-Giv'at threatens to expand the security zone up to the Awali River and evacuate the southern suburbs, while the US State Department expresses its condemnation of referring a complaint against Ambassador Nada Hamada Maw'oub to the military court.

Translated by Qiyas from الراي — Original source

- A firm stance from the US State Department: Disarmament before reconstruction

- Washington on referring the case against it: It is humiliating for a military court to hear a complaint against the Lebanese ambassador to Washington

In a manner reminiscent of “unreassuring reassurance,” the threat issued by Tel Aviv, voiced by its Defense Minister Israel Katz, to expand the security zone in Lebanon up to the Awali River (north of Sidon city) and to evacuate Beirut’s southern suburb, “and to destroy terrorist infrastructure there,” was made “in case Hezbollah joins Iran in an attack on Israel,” while affirming that his army is ready to execute a “ground maneuver.”

Katz, who had threatened “Hezbollah” with a “harsh strike,” stated that “areas in Nabatieh and the Litani will become part of Israel’s permanent security zone,” and threatened “the evacuation of populations northward up to the Zahrani and Awali lines,” which, combined with the evacuation of the southern suburb, would lead to the displacement of more than one million people within Lebanon. He outlined a “defensive” scenario linked to the possibility that Hezbollah would open a Lebanese front to “support 2” for Iran, yet simultaneously delineated the boundaries of any new war, its starting point, and its objectives.

Informed circles observed that Katz, who was speaking to regular and reserve soldiers operating within security zones in Lebanon and Syria during his visit, effectively signaled that Israel would not undertake further incursions into southern Lebanon in the foreseeable future, specifically toward the Apple Valley and Mount Rouhain area. They noted that by taking this stance, which appeared closer to beating the drums of “delayed escalation,” the Israeli Defense Minister may be attempting to obscure American constraints that prevent Tel Aviv from expanding the “Yellow Line” in southern Lebanon unless Hezbollah opens a front against it. This narrative serves the electoral capital that (along with Benjamin Netanyahu) he seeks to bolster with warnings about indications of attempts by Iran and its proxies to carry out “attacks aimed at influencing the outcomes of the Israeli elections.”

However, Katz’s remarks, which also affirmed that he would not withdraw from the two security zones in Lebanon and Syria, and threatened Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem with targeting him similar to what happened to Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, were considered un-reassuring. They appeared to define the “theater of operations” for the upcoming battle, which would resume from where the war of last March was paused: a new frontline now inside Lebanese territory, with a depth ranging between 4 and 12 kilometers along approximately 100 kilometers from Naqoura to Shebaa and Mount Hermon. It was confirmed that the declared limits of ground incursion would be Sidon (the Awali River), and the southern suburb would return to the heart of the targeting circle.

According to informed circles, this stance, which resembles the phrase “O God, bear witness that I have conveyed,” indicates what will be at stake for Lebanon if Hezbollah leads it again into a war for Iran’s benefit in the event its front descends into the “final clash.” This is particularly significant given the context of near-daily US engagement in “reminder diplomacy” with Beirut, prioritizing the disarmament of Hezbollah as a condition for providing billions in reconstruction aid, and describing this as an integral part of the trilateral “Framework Agreement” signed between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States, which governs the gradual withdrawal from the south, as well as the necessity to repeal laws and practices that penalize Lebanese contact with Israel.

- First, the Chief Public Prosecutor, Judge Ahmad Rami Al-Hajj, referred a complaint filed by a lawyer against Lebanon’s ambassador to Washington, Nada Hamada Muawad—who is one of the leading members of the direct negotiation team with Tel Aviv under US sponsorship—to the Government Commissioner at the Military Court, Judge Claude Ghanem, for review and to take appropriate legal action.

The complaint was lodged in the wake of circulating alleged information about Muawad contacting the Israeli ambassador to Washington, Yehiel Laiter, and her condemnation of the incident in which her son was run over in the West Bank.

Despite reports from judicial sources denying that Muawad had been referred to the military judiciary—clarifying that the matter was limited to referring the complaint to the Military Prosecutor General as a routine procedure, which does not constitute an accusation against the ambassador nor a referral for investigation—the US State Department responded with a strong stance. A spokesperson stated: “It is shameful that a military court should consider a complaint against the Lebanese ambassador to Washington merely for implementing her government’s legitimate policy and participating in negotiations led by the United States.”

The spokesperson added: “The Lebanese military judiciary should dedicate its limited resources to pursuing members of Hezbollah who are plotting against the Lebanese government and people, rather than targeting those who work in their interest.” He concluded: “Laws and practices that allow for this kind of politicized targeting of civilians and diplomats must be abolished, while Hezbollah members are systematically protected. We will not tolerate any obstruction.”

The US’s hardline position on this development reflected its broader dimensions, transcending the technical track that is unlikely to yield results. Specifically, it was seen as a message regarding the overall negotiation trajectory, which Hezbollah rejects, and as an attempt to embarrass President Joseph Aoun, to whom Ambassador Muawad reports on all matters related to negotiations, given that Aoun serves as the constitutional and political pillar of the process alongside Prime Minister Nawaf Salam.

It is well known that Muawad held a meeting on Tuesday at the US State Department, discussing the situation in the south and preparations for the presumed military negotiation round between Lebanon and Israel scheduled for next week in Tampa, Florida. However, finalizing the date still requires agreements on unifying perspectives and concepts regarding the verification mechanism within the “experimental zones” (for Israeli withdrawal and the removal of Hezbollah’s weapons) and the mutually agreed timelines and geographic arrangements.

Internal divisions also emerged over the referral of the complaint to the Government Commissioner at the Military Court, as evidenced by several condemnatory statements, including one from the Lebanese Forces party. The party reminded that the Lebanese civil service and public administration system requires obtaining authorization from the competent administrative authority before subjecting any employee or diplomat to judicial investigations. It emphasized the “necessity of safeguarding the role of Lebanese diplomatic institutions and protecting their capacity to perform their national duties, especially at this stage that requires concerted efforts to strengthen Lebanon’s position and interests.”

- The second file that prompted US State Department engagement involves Hezbollah launching a shelter assistance program for displaced persons resulting from the war it initiated last March, which was seen as an indicator of continued Iranian financial flows to the group.

A spokesperson for the U.S. State Department, commenting on these aid efforts, stated, “We have heard a lot from Hezbollah today, but the bottom line is that the alleged funds coming from Iran simply do not exist. The money that Hezbollah does not receive from Iran to fund terrorism, it obtains through criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and partnerships with drug cartels in Latin America.”

He added, “This is another false declaration aimed at salvaging Hezbollah’s reputation, not at helping the people whom it dragged into war from the outset. Hezbollah must stop making false claims and holding fake press conferences, and realize that its time is up. The party has brought Lebanon into war in a suicidal manner, and even if it possessed any funds, it would use them to purchase weapons that threaten Israel and intimidate its growing number of opponents. Hezbollah’s weapons have brought only misery and destruction to Lebanon.”

He continued, “In contrast to the false claims promoted by Hezbollah, we are working effectively with our partners in the Gulf and Europe on a plan that would allow the release of billions of dollars in aid earmarked for Lebanon’s reconstruction, but disarmament must come first. Things will improve when peace is achieved, and peace will not be realized unless Hezbollah is disarmed.”

He concluded, “The three-track framework remains the only viable path to achieving long-term peace and security for Lebanon and Israel. The United States will continue to support this framework, in line with its interests in promoting regional stability, preventing further conflicts, and implementing President Trump’s agenda to enhance peace among nations. Disarming Hezbollah is an integral part of this process.”

Amidst the glare of these headlines, President Joseph Aoun received a phone call on Wednesday afternoon from Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, during which “the current situation in the region was discussed in light of recent developments.”

While the Lebanese presidency stated that there was agreement on “the necessity of supporting diplomatic solutions as the best means to end conflicts in the region,” the Iranian Foreign Ministry noted that Araghchi “emphasized during the phone call with President Joseph Aoun the need to halt Israeli attacks on Lebanon.”

Araghchi’s call came shortly after the arrival of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh and a diplomatic delegation in Beirut, without the nature or objectives of the visit being clarified.

Meanwhile, reactions to the case of an explosives shipment seized from two Hezbollah operatives, which was allegedly intended to be transported from Baalbek to Beirut’s southern suburbs, have not subsided. The Lebanese state insists that investigations into the hundreds of kilograms of high-explosive materials, along with iron balls and nails, must reach their conclusion to reveal their objectives. Observers are watching how and whether commitments to accountability in this context will be translated into action, whether the shipment’s “label” is deemed “military” against Israel—contrary to the government’s decision to restrict arms—or relates to internal security matters concerning assassinations that evoke dark pages from a period lasting nearly a decade, marked by the liquidation of leaders opposing the former Assad regime and the transformation of Hezbollah into a “breaker of internal balances.”

These headlines did not obscure the visit of UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix, who met with senior Lebanese officials and discussed the post-mission phase of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon at the end of the year.

President Aoun informed Lacroix that “Lebanon is committed to the continued presence of UNIFIL,” clarifying that “the circumstances resulting from Israeli aggression and the occupation of southern villages and towns, most of which fall within the operational scope of UNIFIL, make the presence of the international force of paramount importance, as its withdrawal would create a vacuum with negative repercussions on the security situation in the region, as well as the absence of any international oversight on developments there.”

He expressed “his hope that the Security Council would respond to Lebanon’s request to maintain UNIFIL’s operational mandate during the coming year, which the Council had previously set as a one-year period for the withdrawal of these forces, particularly if an Israeli withdrawal to the international borders is achieved and the Lebanese Army is deployed, which will need to benefit from the essential humanitarian and logistical services provided by UNIFIL.”

For his part, Lacroix announced that “the meeting comes at a critical moment, as the field situation in the south remains complex, amid ongoing military activities and their severe impact on the population. As for the future of the UN presence, I believe that discussions in the Security Council will now begin, and it is important, indeed essential, that Lebanon’s voice be heard in this regard, as it is the state directly concerned with this issue.”

He said, “Our goal is to support efforts aimed at restoring stability to Lebanon and the region, and at re-establishing full Lebanese sovereignty. We believe that the United Nations is still capable of playing a role in this framework. It is precisely from this standpoint that the UN Secretary-General presented the Security Council with a number of options regarding the possibility of continuing the UN presence after the expiration of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). These options were prepared based on what we have heard from Lebanese authorities, and they remain on the table. We are aware of Lebanon’s position, including the content of the message it addressed to the UN, in which it requested an extension of UNIFIL’s mandate for a temporary period.”

A poll conducted by Statista Lebanon showed that 66.4 percent of Shia participants in Lebanon supported handing over Hezbollah’s weapons to the state, while 29.6 percent preferred that the party retain its arms under the status quo.

According to the poll results, conducted last September and considered in Beirut an indicator of a shift in the mood of Lebanon’s Shia community, 67.4 percent of participants believed that the party had not achieved its objectives in the war with Israel, or had achieved only part of them, while 42.1 percent expressed negative sentiments regarding the party’s leadership handling of the war and its aftermath.

Regarding security institutions, the poll showed that 78.5 percent of participants trust the Lebanese Army, while 71.1 percent believed that the decision on war and peace should be the exclusive prerogative of the Lebanese state.

As for security arrangements with Israel, 17 percent supported the possibility of reaching a security agreement guaranteeing border security, while 24.9 percent preferred a security agreement under the auspices of a third party.

The poll included 800 Lebanese Shia citizens aged 18 and above from various regions of the country.

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