The Shah's Ambitions... and the End of the Mullahs' Rule!

To understand Iran’s relationship with the Gulf Arab states, it is necessary to distinguish between two historical phases: the era of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s rule before the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the era of the Islamic Republic after the revolution. Although the two regimes differed significantly in ideology and political discourse, both sought to enhance Iran’s regional influence, albeit through different means, alliances, and justifications.

Historical documents indicate that the Shah aimed to make Iran the dominant regional power in the Gulf, leveraging its geographic location, oil wealth, military strength, and relations with the United States.

However, it is important to distinguish between the desire for regional hegemony and the claim of sovereignty over territory; these are not the same, even though they sometimes converged in certain Iranian policies. The Shah believed that Iran was well-positioned to assume a primary security role after the withdrawal of British forces, and that it could protect sea lanes and its oil interests while confronting what it considered regional threats.

A 1972 U.S. document noted that Iran sought a dominant role in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Shah built a large military force to achieve this goal by strengthening military capabilities, investing heavily in purchasing modern American and British weapons, and developing the air force and navy. As a result, by the 1970s, Iran had become one of the most prominent military powers in the region.

The well-known book by Fereydoun Hoveyda, the former Iranian diplomat who served as his country’s representative to the United Nations during the Shah’s era, is titled “The Broken Crescent: The Threat of Radical Islamic Fundamentalism.” Published in 1998, the book examines the history, ideas, and connections of radical Islamic movements with the Iranian Revolution. A central theme of the book is the relationship between the Iranian Revolution and the rise of radical Islamic movements. Hoveyda places the Iranian Revolution in a broader context concerning the rise of radical political Islam currents, linking it to the history of ideas and movements that seek to establish political systems based on strict religious interpretations.

The book also discusses the instrumentalization of victimhood in political discourse, analyzing how some radical movements interpret the problems of Islamic societies as a result of Western dominance, and use this narrative to justify conflict with the West and the overthrow of existing governments.

Regarding the impact of radical ideology on Islamic societies, Hoveyda argues that the threat posed by these movements is not limited to Western countries but may extend to Islamic societies themselves, with resulting political, economic, and social consequences. This is evident today in Iran, where the population is impoverished due to the diversion of funds toward expansionist ideologies and the financing of armed groups, such as the financial and technical support provided to the Houthis.

Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic has been built on a combination of revolutionary religious legitimacy, the concept of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), and Iran’s security and strategic state interests.

Therefore, the survival of the Islamic Republic and its institutions, foremost among them the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is one of the most important determinants of Iranian policy. Iran possesses several military institutions: the first is the regular army, responsible for border defense; the second is the Basij, tasked with maintaining internal security; and the third is the IRGC, which protects the regime. Consequently, the IRGC holds significant power and financial resources, and it wields the highest authority over all military institutions.

To protect its regime, Iran has built fierce external armed proxies in several Arab countries. This influence provides Tehran with pressure tools beyond its borders, enabling it to shape regional conflicts without relying exclusively on its regular military forces.

The end of the mullahs’ rule has become a matter of time, given this extensive external expansion, particularly in light of the suffocating economic crisis and its lavish spending on destabilizing Arab governments. Iran’s proxies do not enter a country without turning it into a failed state. Meanwhile, Gulf states have invested their funds in developing their peoples, industry, and energy sectors—everything that serves their citizens’ interests. In contrast, Iran’s resources have been directed toward missiles, drones, and the support of armed groups beyond its borders. As soon as the Iranian people find an opportunity, they will rise against the mullahs’ regime, and I do not believe that day is far off.