Iran's Negotiating Mindset... Mohammed Al-Rumaih Deconstructs Tehran's Calculations

- Kuwait is concerned with deepening specialized studies on Iranian affairs and leveraging Gulf research expertise.

- Iranian negotiation is an extension of the regime’s structure, institutional composition, and political history.

- The Supreme Leader, national security, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: institutions with overlapping roles in decision-making.

- Memoranda from Iran’s Foreign Minister alone are insufficient to understand the considerations shaping Iranian policy.

- Maintaining communication channels and understanding Iran’s decision-making centers are two pillars for managing disputes.

Kuwaiti journalist and academic Dr. Mohammed Al-Rumaihi recently published a strategic report titled “The Iranian Negotiating Mindset: Between Institutionalization and Foreign Ministers’ Memoranda,” as part of the strategic reports series issued by the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies Center at Kuwait University, number (58) for 2026. The report offers an analytical reading of Iranian negotiating behavior, starting from the structure of the political system, its institutions, and its history, going beyond monitoring official statements and negotiation outcomes to examine the entities that set objectives, grant authority, and make final decisions.

The study is based on a main hypothesis: Iranian negotiation is an extension of the political system’s nature, its institutional composition, and its history, rather than an independent diplomatic activity. According to this view, the Iranian negotiator does not necessarily represent himself, nor does he always possess the authority to make final decisions, even when appearing to have broad powers.

Consequently, the study distinguishes between declared political discourse, the performance of Iranian diplomacy in negotiations, and the actual centers of power that determine decisions, thereby helping to explain the apparent discrepancies between officials’ statements and state behavior.

The study clarifies that Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not the sole entity responsible for shaping foreign policy. The roles of the Supreme Leader, the Supreme Council of National Security, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Presidency, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs overlap, with each institution’s influence varying according to the nature of the issue at hand.

Disagreements among these institutions do not necessarily imply a division of decision-making or a breakdown in unity; they may instead reflect differences in means and priorities while shared strategic objectives remain intact.

This analysis highlights that an Iranian negotiator’s agreement to a deal is not sufficient on its own to guarantee its implementation, unless the deal’s content is accepted by influential institutions within the system. Thus, understanding decision-making centers and the network of interests within the state becomes essential for assessing the prospects of negotiation success and its outcomes.

The study links this behavior to a historical accumulation extending from the Persian imperial experience and the Safavid state to the modern state and the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

According to Al-Rumaihi’s analysis, this trajectory has shaped political perceptions focused on preserving the state, protecting identity, avoiding isolation, and expanding the sphere of influence. The Iran-Iraq War and international sanctions have also left their mark on crisis management and negotiations, contributing to a combination of rhetorical rigidity and tactical flexibility, with the possibility of making conditional concessions dictated by circumstances while maintaining strategic objectives.

The study dedicates space to the experience of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, one of the key participants in the nuclear negotiations, drawing from it the importance of technical, legal, and economic preparation; patience in managing protracted negotiations; tactical flexibility that allows changing means without necessarily abandoning core objectives; and the necessity of coordination between the negotiating team and decision-making centers within the state.

For its part, Al-Rumaih warns against treating Al-Rajaji’s memoirs as a sufficient source for understanding Iranian policy, as they document the experience of one participant and do not necessarily reveal all the considerations that govern decision-making. Their use requires comparing them with official sources, historical facts, and testimonies from other officials.

The study presents Iranian negotiation philosophy as a means to achieve state objectives, rather than an independent end. Time is a key factor in this process, as it can be leveraged to shift the balance of power or to wait for changes in political, economic, and international conditions.

Furthermore, the continued existence of communication channels does not necessarily indicate proximity to a final agreement. Hardline political rhetoric may coincide with ongoing practical negotiations, with efforts to keep communication channels open even during periods of escalation.

The study does not present these tactics as exclusive Iranian characteristics, but rather views the specificity of the case as stemming from their interaction with the nature of the political system and the regional environment.

The study uses the 2015 nuclear agreement as a practical test of its interpretation, explaining that the negotiations revealed Iran’s ability to manage complex technical and political files while maintaining the cohesion of its negotiating team within the boundaries set by state institutions.

However, it emphasizes that progress on the nuclear file does not necessarily imply a change in Iranian policy regarding regional issues.

According to the study, Iran’s relations with Gulf states are intertwined with considerations of maritime security, energy, regional influence, and international balances. Developments in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen directly or indirectly affect Iran’s negotiating position. Therefore, completely separating the diplomatic track from the regional environment may lead to inaccurate assessments.

The study places importance on lessons that Gulf Arab states can learn from, foremost among which is building institutional negotiating expertise that does not rely solely on individual skills. This can be achieved by training specialized personnel, documenting past experiences, and developing research and analysis centers. It also calls for linking political, security, and economic considerations, maintaining communication channels during periods of disagreement, analyzing the positions of Iranian officials and their influence on final decisions, and developing expertise in international law, security, energy, economics, and regional politics.

The study holds particular significance for Kuwait, given its geographic location, its historical relations with Iran, and the link between its security and the stability of the Gulf region. Based on the analysis provided, it is crucial to maintain diplomatic relations and communication channels, even during times of political and security disagreement, and to rely on an institutional understanding of the nature of the Iranian system when assessing its positions, rather than basing policies on individual statements or temporary shifts in rhetoric.

The study also highlights the importance of Gulf cooperation in strategic studies, information exchange, and building negotiating expertise, alongside supporting specialized studies on Iranian affairs and leveraging the expertise of the University of Kuwait and Gulf research centers.

These conclusions represent an analytical reading of the study’s implications for Kuwait and are not direct recommendations from the author.

In its critical reading, the study opens up avenues for further research into the stability of Iran’s negotiating mindset amid political and security transformations, and whether the use of time and the prolongation of negotiations constitute a deliberate strategy in all cases, or whether they sometimes result from internal divisions and external pressures. It also raises the question of whether Gulf states can construct a common negotiating policy toward Iran, given the differences in their interests, priorities, and bilateral relations.

The report’s core message is that understanding Iran begins with understanding the state behind the negotiator, including its institutions, history, ideology, interests, and domestic and external pressures. For the Gulf states, the key lessons lie in building deep institutional knowledge, preparing for long-term negotiations, and combining sustained dialogue with the protection of national interests, thereby enabling a shift from reactive responses to Iran’s policies toward a more realistic and balanced foreign policy that grasps the mechanisms producing those policies.