Lebanon: "The State" Emerges from the South on the Way to Florida

The Lebanese state is proceeding with demarcating new “borders” with “Hezbollah” and removing “barriers” in the relationship between the state and the southern environment, based on building trust and protective walls—political, diplomatic, and developmental—that halt the slide into the steepest decline that has plunged the entire country into two wars since 2023, and it is not certain that a third is not already on the way.

While Lebanon is reinforcing its decision to restrict weapons to the hands of legitimate authorities across all its territories, implementation remains a precise test. Factors facilitating this process are weighed against opposing forces, largely due to Tehran keeping this file hostage to the exigencies of its front, driven by military considerations in the current phase and political ones for the post-war period. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s visit to Nabatieh on Friday resembled a “landing” of the Lebanese state behind lines that clearly began to fade in terms of its image in the eyes of a southern environment where a segment had not hesitated to loudly express their hope that the state would lift them from the rubble toward recovery, under the slogan “Enough.”

In the capital of Jabal Amel, which the state “protected” after Tel Aviv’s capture of the Ali al-Tahir hill (before its tunnels were blown up) from intentions to encroach upon it, following the Israeli army’s placement of the area within its “military interest” zone and under its fire, the Lebanese army’s deployment there signaled a shift. Salam’s visit brought forth indications that extended the visit of President Joseph Aoun to the city on September 12, thereby consolidating the role of legitimacy and the “radiance” of the state’s presence in the city as a deterrent to Israel, reinforced by an Arab and international equation supporting the restoration of state sovereignty over its entire territory and the path to restricting weapons.

In a city located 3 to 4 kilometers (a “fire line”) from the Ali al-Tahir hill, the general mood accompanying Salam’s tour strongly supported the state’s efforts to prevent any slide into a new war and to inject the essentials of life into its veins to anchor its residents there. This occurred amid a paradox: citizens extended their hands to Salam as if clinging to a “lifebuoy” from one flood after another.

Despite attempts to suggest that the celebrations for Salam—and by extension, the state—in Nabatieh under the slogan “We are with you” were driven by the significant presence of supporters of the “Amal” movement (led by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri) and opponents of Hezbollah, the manifestation of this embrace, following the absence of any protest even against the visit of US Ambassador Michel Issa to Western Zouar (one of the towns included in the first experimental zone) nearly 20 days prior, was considered the beginning of a measurable transformation within an environment that increasingly views legitimacy as a “lifeboat.” This shift became particularly evident after Berri realistically acknowledged any capacity for Hezbollah to deter Israel, when he declared (days after the fall of Ali al-Tahir) that Tel Aviv “if it wants to occupy (more), it is capable of doing so.”

Salameh of Nabatieh, who had previously visited the area twice, was keen to emphasize that “our true guarantee lies in simultaneously pursuing all possible efforts and support to achieve the complete Israeli withdrawal and to rebuild a capable and effective state—a single state for all its citizens, with one army and one decision-making authority, particularly regarding war and peace. This is the only path to avoid finding ourselves once again facing a new war, new pretexts for aggression against Lebanon, or further expansion of the occupation.” He added, “As for suggesting that we can wait for a major regional settlement, this is not an option for Lebanon in my view. Such a settlement may or may not materialize, or it could be delayed for years. If it does occur, it might come at our expense. And what if a new war breaks out in the region? Are we prepared to let Lebanon and the South pay the price again? Are we simply going to wait?”

Salameh’s visit was not without signaling the state’s commitment to also returning to the region through developmental initiatives. He revealed that the Public Works and Transport Authority (PWA) had launched 23 tenders in the Nabatieh district for projects related to road rehabilitation, the restoration of shelters, and the provision of ambulances, medical equipment, and wireless and satellite communication devices.

The Prime Minister’s visit to Nabatieh gained significant importance as it came two days after his trip to New York and Washington, where he held crucial diplomatic, economic, and financial meetings. During these engagements, he sensed a readiness to support Lebanon within a parallel track that the state must activate along two lines: implementing reforms and reclaiming sovereignty, specifically through the monopoly of arms.

While Salameh briefed President Aoun on Friday evening about his tour in Nabatieh and the outcomes of his prominent meetings in the United States, including “positive discussions with several American and international officials regarding the situation in Lebanon and the region,” government sources sought to provide a broader elaboration on the substance of his stop in the US capital, as well as initial indications of its implementation regarding the mechanisms of the Tripartite Framework Agreement (signed between Beirut, Tel Aviv, and Washington). These mechanisms involve a committee to verify Israeli withdrawal within experimental zones, the deployment of the Lebanese Army in those areas, and the dismantling of any Hezbollah military infrastructure to prevent its re-establishment. Notably, this committee is increasingly intertwined with the post-UNIFIL mandate period at the end of the year, as well as Israeli signals linking any expansion of the “experimental” zones to the Lebanese state initiating a process of arms withdrawal north of the Litani River.

These sources told Lebanese media that Salameh told US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that “the solution in implementing the Framework formula lies in setting a timeline for Israeli withdrawal concurrent with the extension of state authority over its entire territory, and in establishing a robust verification system to halt the exchange of accusations between Lebanon and Israel, ensuring that verification applies to both sides.” They noted that Rubio instructed his team to immediately resolve the pending details regarding the verification mechanism and the body responsible for it, as these constitute the core of resolving the arms and withdrawal issue.

The sources further reported that Salameh demanded in Washington and New York that the post-UNIFIL force be international, based on a new UN Security Council resolution grounded in the framework of Resolution 1701, and complementary to the Framework formula. They added that the US side expressed understanding of this proposal.

Not far from these headlines, political circles were struck by the phone call between Jordanian King Abdullah II and Marco Rubio, which the U.S. State Department announced involved discussions on “a number of regional issues, including efforts related to implementing the trilateral framework agreement, disarming Hezbollah, and ways to support stability in Syria.”

While the Jordanian Royal Court announced that King Abdullah II, regarding the Lebanon file, pointed during the call to “the outcomes of the recent ‘Aqaba Meetings’ held in France to rally international support for the Lebanese Army and enable it to fulfill its responsibilities in safeguarding Lebanon’s security and stability,” monitoring circles focused on the timing and content of this call, linking it to indications of a desire to involve Oman and grant it a role in the “verification committee” overseeing the framework agreement.

This agreement and the means to advance it will be the focus of the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations hosted in Tampa, Florida, from the 22nd to the 24th of the current month, initially limited to military matters only. In Beirut, there is a prevailing view that, regardless of the outcome of this “mini-round,” which excludes the political dimension and will be chaired on the Lebanese side by former ambassador Simon Karam, head of the (political-military) negotiating delegation, in accordance with the principle of “reciprocal representation,” the mere holding of talks before the Israeli elections constitutes a gain for Beirut. Beirut had requested that Washington not postpone the talks to November, as the Israelis preferred, in order to preserve wider margins for maneuvering on the ground and greater freedom of action, consistent with a strategy of garnering more votes through a continuous “harvest of fire” in the south.

The Lebanese Central News Agency reported, citing diplomatic sources, that “more than one country has entered the line of efforts to expand the Tampa meetings to include political and military dimensions, as Lebanon desires. Among these countries are the Vatican, which former ambassador Karam visited in recent hours, and Jordan, whose king discussed the Lebanon file with the U.S. Secretary of State. However, no positive breakthrough has been recorded on this front so far.”