Lebanon faces a test of the equation: withdrawal from southern Litani in exchange for disarming north of it

The question surrounding the “Framework Agreement” between Lebanon and Israel is no longer limited to the timing of the eighth round of negotiations—whether it will take place in October or be postponed until after the Israeli Knesset elections—but has shifted to a deeper issue: how to translate the “step-for-step” principle, which is supposed to govern the implementation process, and what Lebanese step will accompany each Israeli step toward withdrawal from Lebanese territory.

If this point remained one of the “gaps” left by the general wording of the Framework Agreement in recent periods, the developments following the meeting between Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington gave it for the first time a clear negotiating substance. This reinforced the dynamics discussed by “An-Nahar” in its Monday edition, indicating that the equation of reciprocity in the context of the “experimental zones” regulating Israel’s withdrawal from the security zone is now based on the idea that expanding these zones and scheduling them geographically and temporally requires a parallel withdrawal of Hezbollah’s weapons from areas north of the Litani River.

The newspaper “Nida al-Watan” quoted a well-informed diplomatic source as saying that Salam “presented to the US side the necessity of adopting a timeline and a principle of parallel implementation across two tracks, meaning that Israel’s withdrawal should be accompanied by concrete Lebanese steps regarding arms containment.” In this context, he “proposed that Israel’s withdrawal from an area in the south of the Litani be matched by the clearance of a similar area north of the Litani of Hezbollah’s weapons, thereby ensuring the principles of gradualism and reciprocity in implementation.”

These developments suggest that the Framework Agreement, particularly its core element of “experimental zones,” faces new requirements if it is to be advanced and lifted from its deadlock. Realistically, the equation now hinges on a geographic correlation between two tracks: an area south of the Litani cleared by Israel, in exchange for a similar area north of the Litani from which the Lebanese Army will withdraw Hezbollah’s weapons.

Political circles in Beirut speak of the fact that bringing the issue of arms north of the Litani out of the “obscurity”—which constitutes part of the Framework Agreement, whose spirit and articles revolve around containing arms throughout Lebanon—sheds new light on the question that has accompanied the June 26 agreement since its signing by Beirut, Tel Aviv, and Washington, and which appears to be undergoing redefinition at present: What does Lebanon practically offer in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal?

In the areas still occupied by Israel to the south, it was clear that any withdrawal should be accompanied by the deployment of the Lebanese Army, the extension of state authority, and the prevention of the re-establishment of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. However, in reality, the Israeli Army, during its occupation of these areas, has proceeded—and continues—to destroy large parts of what it considers Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. This raises a practical question regarding the nature of the Lebanese task that will accompany Israel’s withdrawal and serve as its “price,” and whether the required Lebanese action is limited to consolidating deployment and control south of the Litani, or extends, in parallel, to areas located north of the river.

According to these circles, Israel’s withdrawal from a new “cleansed” area within the “Blue Line” and its handover to the Lebanese Army would come without a corresponding military “return” as long as Israel has achieved the objective itself or is capable of completing it without any reciprocal concession. This subsequently raises a question feared to have become the “dominant” factor in the negotiation and withdrawal process: What step is Lebanon expected to take in return that carries equal “weight”?

This touches the core of the issue that has emerged in light of recent developments on the ground, particularly as Israeli pressure has shifted to areas beyond the scope of direct occupation south of the Litani River. Following Ali al-Tahrir, the escalation moved to the Apple Region and the Jezzine Highlands, also north of the Litani. This was seen as a signal from Tel Aviv that this strategic area has become a battlefield for military pressure and will remain so unless the Lebanese state takes action there. There is a prevailing belief that Israel will not agree to a gradual, scheduled withdrawal from the south without the Lebanese state implementing parallel measures regarding Hezbollah’s weapons north of the Litani.

Given the belief that the Framework Agreement now faces the question of “how its implementation is measured,” rather than just “what it is measured by” (the verification mechanism), there is fear that the actual bottleneck determining the course of the next phase may not lie solely in the Israeli withdrawal or the restriction of weapons alone, but in coordinating the relationship between the two tracks: which Lebanese area corresponds to which Israeli withdrawal, who determines that a specific area has indeed been cleared of weapons, and what happens if one party executes its step while the other fails to execute its corresponding step?

While the “step-for-step” formula previously appeared as a general heading, recent hours have begun to give it a more specific shape dictated by reality and pragmatism: south of the river in exchange for north of it, withdrawal in exchange for restricting weapons, and gradualism in exchange for verification. The real test remains how to convert this equation into an implementable mechanism on the ground, especially since its success presupposes agreement on areas, timing, and the verification mechanism, as well as the Lebanese state’s capacity to execute its portion of the equation.

In this context, political circles reminded themselves that the Lebanese government, following its decisions in August 2025 regarding the restriction of weapons to the state, approved a five-phase plan. The first phase began in the south of the Litani up to the international borders (the Lebanese Army announced it had completed this phase in terms of operational control). The second phase was supposed to cover the area north of the Litani River up to the course of the Awali River (north of Sidon city), for which the Lebanese government set an initial deadline of four months in February 2026. The third phase was intended to expand to include the Bekaa (the eastern part of Lebanon), the fourth Beirut and its suburbs (including the Southern Suburb), and the fifth would cover the rest of the Lebanese areas in the north and Mount Lebanon.

President Salam, prior to the conclusion of his visit to Washington—which was described as highly successful and underscored significant US interest in the Lebanese situation—reiterated the “scheduled” path for restricting weapons, placing it in a parallel framework with the Israeli withdrawal “according to a required timeline.”

In this context, the Prime Minister emphasized that “Lebanon has settled its choice, and we have chosen that there be no authority above the state’s authority, no weapons outside its legitimate institutions, and no decision on war and peace outside its constitutional institutions.” He clarified that Lebanon “has chosen negotiation and diplomacy, which led to the trilateral framework signed here in Washington, because we believe this path can lead to the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty through achieving the Israeli withdrawal and ensuring the restriction of weapons to the state across its entire territory.”

He added: “This framework is based on two constructive principles: reciprocity and phased implementation. However, to move forward, we must translate these principles into practical steps. Here, we rely on American leadership. This requires: first, establishing a clear timeline for Israeli withdrawal and for implementing the state’s monopoly on weapons. These two tracks must advance in parallel. Second, a reliable verification mechanism must be put in place to ensure compliance with commitments by both sides.” He continued: “Third, we must mobilize international partners to effectively support the government in rebuilding the country, and, as the framework stipulates, to enable displaced persons to return.”

Salameh’s remarks came during a dinner in his honor hosted by Lebanese Ambassador to Washington Nada Mawlawi, attended by a gathering of senior U.S. officials, including National Security Council Deputy Assistants Michael Needham and Joseph Catiller, as well as other representatives from the State, Treasury, and Commerce Departments, and U.S. President’s aide Sebastian Gorka, alongside diplomats including Saudi Arabia’s special envoy to Lebanon, Prince Yassir bin Farhan, and ambassadors of several Gulf and Arab countries to the United States, including Kuwaiti Ambassador Sheikh Al-Zain Al-Sabah.

Prior to that, Salameh met with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, where they discussed “economic and financial relations between Lebanon and the United States.” Salameh outlined the progress made by the government in the path of financial and banking reforms.

Discussions also covered the negotiation track with the International Monetary Fund, cooperation with the World Bank, and “the government’s efforts to combat the cash economy, reduce the use of cash outside the financial system, enhance transparency and compliance, and combat money laundering and terrorist financing.”

Following the meeting, Bessent posted on X that he had discussed with Salameh and Lebanese Finance Minister Yassin Jaber the country’s key financial sector reforms and “the need to take decisive action to disrupt the financial networks of Iran and Hezbollah, and the importance of fundamental reforms in the financial sector to restore confidence in the Lebanese banking system.”

The U.S. State Department had announced that Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed to Salameh “the United States’ strong commitment to supporting Lebanon in implementing the Framework Agreement, which represents the only path to achieving lasting peace between Lebanon and Israel,” and praised the Lebanese government’s “efforts to extend state authority,” reiterating Washington’s support for a sovereign Lebanese state free from the harmful influence of Hezbollah and Iran.

Meanwhile, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told U.S. Congressional members Darren Lahoud and Josh Gottheimer that “Lebanon places great importance on the United States pressuring Israel to compel it to implement the ‘Framework Agreement,’ as Israel continues to refuse to adhere to its provisions despite Lebanon’s full commitment to its implementation.”

He considered that “activating the ‘Framework Agreement’ requires swift action to complete the repatriation of Lebanese prisoners, resolve disputed points along the Blue Line, and achieve the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and their deployment by the Lebanese Army up to the internationally recognized southern border.”

He added: “Any delay by Israel in implementing the Framework Agreement will sustain tensions in the south, prevent the state from extending its authority over its entire southern territory, eliminate armed manifestations, and enable displaced southerners to return to their villages and towns.”