Firefighting in southern Lebanon amid contradictory Israeli signals

The “bloodless” fall of Tel al-Ahmar has plunged Lebanon into a vortex of cascading questions that intertwine with highly dangerous realities in a region that seems to reside in the “muzzle of a gun,” ready to be fired at any moment. This development has relatively dampened the momentum gained by the direct negotiation track between Beirut and Tel Aviv, which had been bolstered by Israel’s release of the first batch of prisoners following the October 2024 war with Hezbollah. This move was intended to provide the negotiating table with a “proof of viability” capable of easing pressure on the Lebanese negotiators domestically, given the stalemate that had gripped the “experimental zones” and nearly rendered the anticipated eighth round of talks in Rome this month “futile.”

While assessments in Beirut suggested that Benjamin Netanyahu, having solidified the image of the man who “captured the fortress” (Tel al-Ahmar) as an effective election poster, would seek to calm the field and pave the way for a new round of negotiations with Lebanon—whose final date has not yet been set—he instead surged toward escalation. Yesterday’s focus was on the Nabatieh district, following Saturday’s expansion toward the Sidon district and the Western Bekaa, in what appeared to be an effort to “demarcate” a new battlefield consistent with multi-front war scenarios Israel is preparing for, above the layer of the US “steel siege” on Tehran, which fears might trigger a “after me, the flood” preemptive strike.

Although Israel framed the escalation following the “fall of the hill” (which resulted in at least 11 deaths and 60 injuries on Saturday and Sunday) within a dual framework—countering an “imminent threat” to its soldiers in the area and northern residents, and preventing Hezbollah from delaying the final phase of clearing the underground infrastructure of “Tel al-Ahmar,” which would include detonating two major tunnels, thereby signaling a transformation of this strategic site—the nature and intensity of this surge carried signals that cannot dismiss the possibility of links to the regional theater, which witnessed the recent ignition of a “ship war” between the United States and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.

This dimension was reinforced by the Israeli army’s surprise exercise, named “Dawn Rise 2.0,” which simulated a sudden, multi-front scenario and assessed readiness to confront a variety of operational scenarios. Amidst Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir’s confirmation that the army is going through a “tense and volatile period on all fronts,” reports in Israeli media also indicated renewed coordination between Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as between Iran and its various proxies, in preparation for a potential war fought simultaneously across Lebanon, Iraq (Popular Mobilization Forces), Yemen (Houthis), and Gaza.

While it is not excluded that Hezbollah’s deliberate launch of drones against Israeli forces, around Tel al-Ahmar or inside the occupied security zone, was part of a “readiness” declaration to pressure the trigger button whenever Tehran decides, it remains difficult to foresee the extent to which large-scale explosion scenarios could be translated into reality in the near term. This is based on the conviction that only Iran determines the timing, as Washington has entered a waiting period regarding the effects of the unprecedented siege, which could produce an economic impact comparable to the “Berlin Wall,” meaning the Iranian regime might collapse under its weight or surrender to its conditions. Meanwhile, Tel Aviv is “prohibited” from any “sabotage” of the pace set by President Donald Trump for the Iranian front.

In recent hours, contradictory and ambiguous statements and leaks emerged from Israel, reinforcing the impression that developments in the south are aimed at preparing the ground for all scenarios, including the worst-case, and constitute a psychological warfare campaign that involves, in some respects, identifying the “highest-value target bank” for any new confrontation. The most prominent of these include:

- According to the newspaper Ma’ariv, the positioning of Israeli forces on Ali Taher Hill is effectively on the line of the last organized defense line of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon; “thus, the path to Beirut and the Bekaa is now open.” This was interpreted as a signal that in any new war, there would be no geographical boundaries to the escalation of hostilities and ground incursions.

- Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that control over Ali Taher Hill marks the culmination of tightening the grip on the security zone in southern Lebanon. He added: “We advanced toward Ali Taher following intelligence indicating the presence of Hezbollah’s command and control tunnels. This is the last fortified position for defending the Nabatieh area, which holds great significance for Hezbollah.”

Katz’s remarks came a day after the Israeli Broadcasting Authority reported, citing security sources, that “the Israeli army will withdraw and position itself at a distance closer to the Israeli border, at a depth of 3 to 4 kilometers, and prepare to reduce its forces and establish a new security line in Lebanon closer to the border.”

According to sources, the plan includes reducing the number of Israeli troops and establishing a new security line in Lebanon closer to the border, as part of a reorganization of the Israeli army’s deployment in the area.

Political circles viewed the contradiction between Katz’s statements and those of the Broadcasting Authority as reflecting the reality on the ground: a security zone spanning approximately 700 square kilometers and extending 8 to 10 kilometers south of the Litani River, alongside a smaller, “paper” security zone believed to be postponed until after the Knesset elections. This is linked to anticipated pressure from Trump to strengthen the negotiation track between Lebanon and Israel, unless the Iranian front ignites a rapid escalation first.

These circles estimate that Netanyahu will find it difficult to dissipate the gains achieved at Ali Taher Hill through an early withdrawal that would reduce the area of occupation—especially while the outlines of a larger occupation (up to the Bekaa and Beirut, according to the Ma’ariv leak) are becoming visible. This would occur before his elections and before completing the verification mechanism within the “experimental zones” as per the framework agreement signed between Israel, Lebanon, and the United States on June 26. This, in turn, precedes reaching an understanding on the form of this mechanism, which will monitor the deployment of the Lebanese army in the liberated areas, dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure there, and prevent its return. It also involves determining which countries will participate and which will lead it. There is a belief that Ali Taher Hill alone may serve as the title for a second area being negotiated for handover to the Lebanese military institution after it is fully cleared.

However, military developments over the past two days, particularly the focus on the Nabatieh district and the upper Nabatieh area (where Ali Taher Hill is located between it and Kafr Kila), indicate that Israel is attempting to form a defensive line around the hill to consolidate its hold on it. Although some circles consider this may be related to the need to protect ongoing operations aimed at detonating the two main tunnels and preventing attacks on its forces operating along this route.

On Saturday, Hezbollah launched drone attacks against Israeli forces in the Ali al-Tahir heights, prompting the Israeli army to respond with several airstrikes, including a warning to evacuate a building in the town of Arab Salim in the Nabatieh district before striking it. Targeting intensified on Sunday, with the most severe strike hitting the Gandour Hospital in Nabatieh al-Fawqa (Mukhli), which was completely destroyed. Tel Aviv claimed the facility was being used as a “Hezbollah headquarters,” and three people were killed in the attack. A subsequent airstrike on a car in Nabatieh al-Fawqa also resulted in three casualties.

The Israeli military announced that it “attacked earlier on Sunday Hezbollah elements and infrastructure in southern Lebanon. As part of the airstrikes, the Air Force targeted weapons depots and buildings that had been designated for use by Hezbollah operatives to plan and direct operations in the security zone.” Additionally, “the Israeli military attacked a command post established inside a building that had previously been used as a hospital.”

It added: “The airstrikes were carried out in response to Hezbollah’s attempt to execute an operation on Saturday against Israeli army forces operating in the Ali al-Tahir heights area, during which two suicide drones were launched toward the troops. The Israeli army forces will continue their operations in the Ali al-Tahir heights area and will not allow militants in the area to advance plans against our forces.”

President Joseph Aoun condemned the renewed Israeli attacks on the city of Nabatieh and its towns, which resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians and caused severe damage to the Ministry of Finance building there, as well as the destruction of Gandour Hospital. He emphasized that these strikes constitute a serious escalation that goes beyond repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement and the Framework Agreement, now targeting Lebanese state institutions and service facilities that serve citizens’ needs and vital interests, including hospitals and health centers.

The Israeli side was held fully responsible for this ongoing escalation, with calls for the United States and the international community to take urgent action to halt these violations and hold perpetrators accountable. President Aoun affirmed that Lebanon, despite all these attacks, remains committed to safeguarding its sovereignty, the stability of its south, and the safety of its citizens.