Turkey and Israel on the Brink of Confrontation... Five Gulf Equations That the War May Alter

Turkish-Israeli tensions have ceased to be merely a war of words; the competition has shifted to the Syrian battlefield. On August 18, Israel bombed the Abu al-Dhaher air base in northwestern Syria, declaring that Damascus was on the verge of allowing Turkish forces to be stationed there. Ankara, in turn, denied the existence of any plan to establish a Turkish base, insisting that cooperation was limited to training and the exchange of expertise.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz escalated the rhetoric further, warning President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan against “drawing Turkey into dangerous adventures in Syria” and against “testing Israel’s resolve to defend itself.” The Turkish Ministry of Defense responded by calling on Israel to halt its “reckless” attacks and to comply with international law. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, and other countries then joined Turkey in condemning the raid, describing it as a “dangerous escalation” and a violation of Syrian sovereignty.

While all-out war is not the most likely scenario, direct confrontation has become a more realistic possibility than ever before. Evidence of this emerged when U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack revealed that Turkey had not been notified of the Israeli strike, and that when it spotted aircraft heading north, it could “reasonably” have prepared for a military response. Consequently, Washington is working to establish a deconfliction mechanism between Turkey, Israel, and Syria. Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee stated that Washington does not believe the two sides are yet close to a direct confrontation.

This paradox encapsulates the U.S. position: Washington does not wish to choose between its strategic ally, Israel, and its heavyweight Atlantic ally, Turkey; therefore, its priority is preventing war, not managing its aftermath.

Israel possesses qualitative superiority in air, intelligence, and technology, with military spending reaching approximately $48.3 billion in 2025, compared to $30 billion for Ankara. However, Turkey boasts greater territory, population, strategic depth, and a growing defense industry, in addition to fielding the second-largest army in NATO. Thus, a prolonged war would differ radically from Israel’s conflicts with smaller geographic and military adversaries.

Here, NATO enters the equation. Article 5 considers an armed attack on Turkish territory as an attack on the entire Alliance, but it does not automatically mandate a unified military response; each member decides the measures it deems necessary. Furthermore, striking Turkish forces inside Syria is legally more complex than attacking Turkish territory itself. However, if Turkey itself were subjected to a broad attack, NATO would face a historical test that cannot be ignored.

A new factor is the Jeddah Agreement on Joint Defense between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. On August 31, less than a month after its signing, the three countries agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and to enhance the integration of their forces and defense industries to achieve, according to the official statement, “credibility and effectiveness of deterrence and collective defense.” In this context, attacking Turkey becomes an issue that transcends Turkish-Israeli relations, extending into a new regional security architecture.

Second, the Gulf security equation: the center of gravity in security may shift from near-exclusive reliance on the United States to a broader network encompassing Turkey and Pakistan.

Fourth, the energy and chokepoint equation: the Gulf is already grappling with instability in the Strait of Hormuz. The current crisis has prompted Gulf states to invest billions of dollars in alternative ports, pipelines, and routes. A new war in the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria would add a second geopolitical chokepoint to the existing pressure on Hormuz.

In short, deterrence between Turkey and Israel rests on a simple equation: Israel can hurt Turkey, and Ankara can turn the conflict into a protracted war that Israel cannot guarantee will end favorably. For this reason, mutual fear of war may be the strongest deterrent against its outbreak.

But for the Gulf, the wisdom lies not in waiting for it to happen; geography dictates that the costs of others’ wars in the Middle East soon reach our own doorsteps.