Talla al-Tahir: A Battle of Regional Accounts for the Conflict or the Settlement
Amid the resurgence of tensions in the region, driven by activity along the “Iranian Fault Line” and its implications for Lebanon’s “twin front,” Beirut has aligned itself with two parallel tracks tied to the volatile regional moment, which has begun to ignite, as well as the post-election phase, with the countdown underway and the “hourglass” ticking against the year’s end. These tracks concern the fate of Ali al-Tahr hill in the south and the day after the withdrawal of UNIFIL from the territory governed by Resolution 1701.
While the Lebanese state lacks the capacity to control potential military developments in the south, in its “connected vessels” with Iran’s front—since Hezbollah and Tehran hold a “monopoly” on deciding whether to drag the “Land of the Cedars” into any new war—the files concerning Ali al-Tahr hill and the post-UNIFIL era remain firmly under the control of Israel and the United States. This persists despite Beirut’s attempts to find “Lebanese-style” solutions to the “battle for the hill” and the mandate expiration of the interim international force in the south, which is intertwined with mechanisms intended to govern the “platform” adopted in the trilateral framework agreement signed with Tel Aviv and Washington, serving as a cornerstone for a balance between the Israeli withdrawal and the phased dismantling of Hezbollah’s arsenal, now termed “experimental zones.”
Indicators are increasingly pointing toward the approaching hour of reckoning at Ali al-Tahr hill, either through an Israeli military strike still awaiting US approval, or through an arrangement laden with several “mines” that places this strategic facility in the hands of the Lebanese army. The army finds itself in the crosshairs of a rolling “vote of no confidence” that Tel Aviv has been diligently cultivating through leaks expressing displeasure conveyed to Washington, accusing the leadership of the Lebanese military institution of “continuing cooperation with Hezbollah and avoiding confrontation with its commanders in the south.” This was followed by a contradictory signal from the Israeli Broadcasting Authority (Kan), which revealed that “senior security leadership recently discussed the issue of continuing control over the Ali al-Tahr heights or handing them over to the Lebanese army.”
Alongside the Kan report’s claims that “there are estimates indicating the death of the majority of Hezbollah elements (besieged) at the Ali al-Tahr heights,” and that “in Israel, there is dissatisfaction with the Lebanese army’s performance so far in the experimental zones,” a senior US official was quoted as saying, “Officers in the Lebanese army told us that they oppose an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon at this stage, fearing that Hezbollah will return to those places. We are working with both sides to reach a future settlement, but that will take additional time. Meanwhile, the United States has briefed Israel on the latest developments ahead of the resumption of direct talks with Lebanon in September.”
Regarding the timing of the new round of negotiations, the Israeli Broadcasting Authority cited an official Lebanese source stating that the date for the talks scheduled for early September in Rome has not yet been set, and the discussions will shift to the second half of the month. The source expressed “fear that Israel will exploit the period preceding the elections to impose a new reality on the ground, and that the Ali al-Tahr heights will become a flashpoint that will not only derail the third round of negotiations but also the calm that has characterized the entire Lebanese front.”
Political circles reacted to what the Hebrew media reported regarding the American official’s comments on the Lebanese Army, interpreting it as an attempt to stir up Hezbollah against the Lebanese military institution. This institution manages the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s decision to concentrate arms in state hands and implement the provisions of the “Framework Agreement” in experimental zones, based on avoiding clashes with Hezbollah that would prove far more costly to the domestic situation than an Israeli war, thereby plunging the Lebanese authority further into local confusion that contributes to prolonging the suspension of negotiations until the direction to be adopted for the unresolved Ali al-Tahir hill issue becomes clear. This issue is practically caught between two perspectives:
- Viewing it from Israel as a golden electoral card for Benjamin Netanyahu in the October Knesset elections, paving the way for a “domino” effect of control over Hezbollah’s strategic points in the Apple Grove region up to the Western Beqaa. This would effectively extend the experimental zones northward to the Litani River, leaving the verification mechanism—which is still incomplete in terms of its composition, inspection boundaries, and controls (regarding private properties and homes)—largely limited to preventing Hezbollah’s return, rather than verifying the dismantling of its military structure there, since Tel Aviv would have already executed that itself.
- Hezbollah approaches the Ali al-Tahir file and its strategic implications as something far more than just a hill. It prefers Israel to drop it, even after a battle that suggests Iran will not stand idly by, rather than handing it over to the Lebanese Army at this stage. Such a move would imply Hezbollah’s acknowledgment that its arms north of the Litani are effectively on the table, not just south of the river. This is particularly significant given that Hezbollah agreed to withdraw from this area in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal, leaving the issue of its remaining arsenal to an internal dialogue on defensive strategy.
Notably, Sky News Arabia quoted a spokesperson for the US State Department stating that the “experimental zones” represent the only viable path to achieving long-term peace and security in Lebanon and Israel, and that disarming Hezbollah constitutes an integral part of the process. The spokesperson added that the “Special Military Coordination Group for Lebanon” will continue its work to ensure the successful implementation of the first experimental zones.
It is well known that the verification mechanism within these zones has become the “lock and key” for resuming Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, specifically the eighth round in Rome. Current indications suggest that the outstanding points in this matter are not limited to the boundaries of inspections and the search for weapons caches in private properties and homes, but also extend to the military formation that will assist the Lebanese Army in dismantling any remaining Hezbollah military structure and preventing its return.
As the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’s (UNIFIL) mandate in southern Lebanon enters its final countdown, this milestone has intersected with the verification mechanism and its tools. It is difficult to separate the two or envision an alternative to the international force independent of the “Verification Force” and its objectives. This explains the ambiguity surrounding the “day after” the end of the Blue Helmets’ mission in the south, which has been present since 1978. The majority of UN Security Council countries wish to extend the mandate, an option Beirut favors to prevent any vacuum in such a highly sensitive area, especially if the Framework Agreement train has not taken off as intended. Meanwhile, Washington is hesitating to reach final decisions on the post-UNIFIL file, despite insisting that it does not want any arrangement similar to UNIFIL’s mandate and powers, which have remained “toothless.”
While Washington and Tel Aviv consider UNIFIL to have been a “perjured witness” to Hezbollah’s stockpiling of its arsenal and its substantial military “force” following the 2006 war—which produced an “enhanced UNIFIL” to assist the Lebanese Army in ensuring the implementation of Resolution 1701, rendering the area south of the Litani River initially weapon-free, and subsequently withdrawing militias’ weapons from the entire country in accordance with Resolution 1559 and its sister resolutions—there is a precise reality that Lebanon is keen to avoid: the fear that UNIFIL’s departure would equate to the termination of Resolution 1701 as the UN umbrella overseeing the Lebanese reality in its problematic “relationship” with Tel Aviv. This explains Lebanon’s insistence that any alternative force operate under the auspices of this resolution and under the UN flag.
At a time when Israel’s rejection of any alternative force to UNIFIL that is made of the “same cloth” is evident between the lines, objectives emerge aimed at making the verification mechanism the regulator of the situation in southern Lebanon and wherever necessary, involving direct military coordination that Israel insists upon between the armies of the two countries. Amidst this, questions multiply regarding whether it will be possible, at the appropriate time, to transform the verification mechanism and, consequently, the framework agreement from which the executive tool of Resolution 1701 emerged in its comprehensive sense. This would add the “missing half” to the resolution, enabling it to meet the criteria of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thereby allowing Beirut to gain the “UN flag” and the United States to oversee the disarmament process in a manner deeper than merely taking “notice and information.”
In a related development, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas stated that “more than 10 member states are ready to contribute to a new military and civilian mission to provide advice and training to the Lebanese Armed Forces.” Meanwhile, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot announced that Paris “supports the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon if Lebanon requests it.”
These positions followed the EU’s announcement that “defense ministers are discussing (on Tuesday) the European mission to support the Lebanese Army,” and the Irish Defense Minister’s confirmation that Ireland will participate in the European mission in Lebanon after UNIFIL’s mandate ends.
Over the past weeks, talk has circulated about a European mission to Lebanon, without settling its nature or size, amid the conviction that such a mission, expected to launch in early 2027, will not be a “complete” substitute for UNIFIL nor part of the verification mechanism. Rather, it is likely to serve as a parallel or complementary framework. This assessment is based not only on the fact that such a mission would lack effectiveness unless it emerges from a Washington-led process and gains approval, but also on certain information previously available about it.
Previous reports had revealed that the new mission is being prepared within the framework of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), with Austria closely following the discussions within the EU context. The mission is distinct from both an alternative force to UNIFIL and a force tasked with verifying the disarmament of Hezbollah.
“Independent Arabia” reported that European diplomatic sources stated the mission should combine civilian capacity-building and civil-military coordination, with its primary objective being the enhancement of Lebanon’s internal security system, without replacing Lebanese institutions or assuming executive security tasks itself. The civilian component of the mission rests on three integrated pillars: strengthening the operational capabilities of Internal Security Forces in combating terrorism and smuggling; improving port security governance, maritime border management, and customs coordination; and developing the institutional and training capacities of the Internal Security Forces Institute.
This does not diminish the significance of the European mobilization, which comes less than two weeks before the preparatory meeting for the conference supporting the Lebanese Army, hosted by Paris on the 17th. The newspaper Al-Nahar reported that Jordan’s King Abdullah II will participate in the event alongside French President Emmanuel Macron and Lebanese President General Joseph Aoun.
The Lebanese Army announced on Tuesday the results of its commander, General Rodolphe Haddad’s, visit to Jordan, where he was received by King Abdullah II in the presence of Crown Prince Prince Hussein, Chief of the Joint Staff Major General Youssef Ahmad Al-Hanaiti, and several officials.
According to a military statement, the King expressed his full support for the international conference to support the Lebanese Armed Forces, to be held in Paris, with the aim of enhancing the army’s operational capabilities and its capacity to assume its national responsibilities. He also reaffirmed the Kingdom’s steadfast support for Lebanon and its efforts to preserve its security and sovereignty.
