From Fleet Strength to Attrition Power... (The New Sea Equation)

The paradox has become one of the most significant realities of modern military conflicts. Naval superiority no longer necessarily implies the ability to exert complete control over the sea... Conversely, possessing a smaller fleet does not equate to an inability to influence the calculations of a more powerful adversary. With the proliferation of long-range missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), mines, fast attack craft, and small submarines, there is now a growing capacity to deny an opponent freedom of movement and raise the cost of their operations without engaging in traditional naval confrontation.

These are the transformations revealed by the experiences in the Black Sea and the Gulf, although each case has its own distinct circumstances. In the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ukraine did not possess a conventional fleet comparable to Russia’s; instead, it relied on missiles, naval drones, special operations, and intelligence to curtail the freedom of movement of the Russian fleet and force it to recalculate its strategies. Here, an important concept in modern warfare emerged: it is not necessary to control the sea in order to prevent your adversary from using it.

However, these developments do not, in any way, glorify the Ukrainian experience or treat naval attacks as achievements in themselves. The Russo-Ukrainian War has left wide-ranging humanitarian and economic repercussions, and targeting infrastructure, ships, and civilian interests remains a threat to regional and international security, regardless of the party carrying out such actions.

In the Gulf, the equation takes a more sensitive form. Over decades, Iran has developed naval capabilities relying on coastal missiles, fast attack craft, mines, UAVs, and small submarines, leveraging the geography of the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. These capabilities are not aimed at competing with the US Navy in terms of fleet size but are largely designed to make any confrontation costly and complex, thereby raising the risks associated with the movement of enemy ships and forces.

This is what the concept of “sea denial” describes: preventing a stronger power from fully leveraging its superiority, rather than attempting to defeat it in an open battle.

However, this Iranian strategy does not imply conventional naval superiority, nor does it justify threatening international navigation or using the Strait of Hormuz as a means of political and military pressure. Threatening ships and sea lanes harms not only adversaries but also threatens the stability and economy of the region, with Gulf states among the most affected.

This is where the uniqueness of the Gulf lies: the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a theater of confrontation but a vital artery for global energy and trade movements. Therefore, Gulf security in light of this new naval equation requires a vision that transcends traditional military preparedness. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are called upon to enhance their capabilities in monitoring, early warning, and protecting infrastructure, ports, and oil facilities, as well as addressing threats from drones, mines, and missiles, alongside strengthening Gulf cooperation and international partnerships to safeguard freedom of navigation.

Conversely, de-escalation and regional dialogue remain essential components of maritime security. While defensive capabilities are crucial for protecting interests, they are insufficient on their own if Gulf waters become a permanent arena of confrontation. As military tensions rise, the likelihood of miscalculation increases, leaving the economy, trade, and energy vulnerable to shocks.

Furthermore, responses to naval attacks must adhere to a single standard. Just as Russian attacks that threaten security and stability are condemned, so too must Ukrainian attacks targeting navigation and civilian interests be condemned, as well as Iranian threats and attacks that endanger international navigation. The principle must be the protection of navigation and the rejection of targeting civilians and commercial infrastructure, regardless of the identity of the perpetrator.

The Iranian and Ukrainian experiences reveal a broader transformation in the nature of naval power. Aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines will remain core elements of military force, but missiles, drones, mines, and unmanned systems have redistributed a portion of maritime influence.

This defines the new maritime paradigm: a shift from absolute sea control to the ability to deny adversaries access, and from seeking decisive victory to degrading an opponent’s capacity to achieve its objectives.

For the Gulf, the greater challenge is not to engage in this new calculus, but to prevent it from becoming a permanent reality in its waters. The stability of navigation, energy flows, and trade constitutes a shared Gulf and international interest. Safeguarding these interests requires a credible defensive capability, effective Gulf coordination, and international partnerships and diplomacy capable of preventing escalation before the sea devolves into an open arena of attrition.

In this new maritime equation, true strength lies not merely in the ability to sink or destroy enemy vessels, but in the capacity to protect the sea from becoming a weapon against the security, economies, and stability of nations.