A "fiery" day in southern Lebanon as Washington fears a third war
As military realities continued to unfold in the south, the Ali al-Tahir heights became the de facto “master” of the Lebanese front. Statements by the US ambassador to Beirut, Michael Issa, deepened the conviction regarding the scale of complexities and challenges facing any attempt to halt the slide into a new, wider war. Such a scenario is impossible without a political breakthrough that is currently unattainable: one in which Hezbollah “decouples” from Tehran and pledges to hand over its weapons to the state, or unless clarity emerges regarding Iran’s trajectory after the dust settles from the “full storm” of economic sanctions unleashed by the United States against it.
At a time when Israel, always eager to ignite a “fire” on whose embers Benjamin Netanyahu could secure his re-election in late October, reaffirmed its equation that any targeting of its forces by the Party in the Ali al-Tahir area would be met with a “belt of fire” in the south outside the “security zone,” the incident on Thursday—which killed a Lebanese woman (who had married just days earlier) and injured six others, including a child, a woman, and two elderly people in a strike on Arab Salim in the Nabatieh district—did little to quell the old-yet-new questions. These questions concern the extent to which Hezbollah’s repeated execution of operations against the Israeli army (which announced on Wednesday night that it had targeted Israeli forces with two booby-trapped drones) is linked to two intertwined factors:
- The requirements of Tehran’s attempt to counter the “economic pain” inflicted upon it by Washington, through reminders of the “collective crippling” it can impose on the region via its “ready” proxies in a “war of existence” should the hour strike.
- The necessity of reassuring “those who care” that the Lebanese state lacks decision-making power at the negotiating table, and that serious and fruitful negotiations, when the time comes, will be with Hezbollah and/or Iran. This aligns with remarks made days ago by Political Council member Mahmoud Qammati, who announced that the Party does not permanently close the door to “the possibility of direct communication with the United States.”
From this, it is also understood, according to political sources, why the Party insists on the “greater Satanic” role of the Lebanese authority in its direct negotiations with Israel under US auspices. In recent hours, Qammati himself escalated his attacks on President Joseph Aoun regarding the negotiation file and the withdrawal of weapons, declaring that “weapons will not be disarmed under Aoun’s presidency or any other (...) the country is being squandered.”
What gave the recent surge of violence that struck the south in recent hours particularly significant dimensions—aside from occurring against the backdrop of the “Ali al-Tahir battle,” which suggests it is “around the corner” and may be the most influential electoral key in Netanyahu’s campaign—was that it came in the wake of the US ambassador’s successive positions. These positions painted an uncomfortable picture of the Lebanese landscape, hinting that the issue of Hezbollah and its weapons has become a reality subject to the balance of power on the ground (the possibility of a new war) or to a breakthrough on the Iran front that would reflect on Lebanon. Furthermore, the negotiations conducted by the Lebanese state with Israel aim to arrange relations between the two, even if divorced from the Hezbollah issue. Thus, these talks have provided a ready framework for the post-resolution of the weapons issue, linked to the Iran file and what will transpire between Tehran and Washington.
However, the most telling indication of the precipice on which Lebanon stands was Issa’s reminder, in remarks following his visit to Sami Abi Mansour, the leader of the Druze Druze Faith, that the shortest path to ensuring Israel’s withdrawal from the south and halting its aggression is for Hezbollah to issue a statement declaring its readiness to hand over its weapons. This came before he adopted the answer of one journalist, who said he saw a third Israeli war on Lebanon if no agreement is reached with Hezbollah, as proposed by Washington.
The journalist’s comment came after he had asked Issa whether he believed such a war was possible. The ambassador replied, “Can you answer this question?” The questioner responded, “My answer would be yes.” Issa then said to him, “You have already answered.”
Earlier, Issa said, “We are always talking with Israel about its strikes in southern Lebanon, stating that they are unacceptable, and we are also pressing to reduce them. But there is an issue we discuss: you demand everything from Israel but ask nothing of Hezbollah. For about two years, we have been asking the party to issue a single statement saying it is ready to hand over its weapons, so we can tell Israel: ‘They are ready to hand over their weapons, and you should also offer something.’ But Hezbollah—Mahmoud Qammati said it—does not want to hand over its weapons… On what basis will we compel Israel to withdraw, when he says, ‘Even if it withdraws, we will not hand over our weapons’?”
He pointed out that “all Lebanese agree on one position: the handing over of Hezbollah’s weapons, and that the state alone should hold authority.” Clarifying a question on how this would be achieved, he said, “As you know, the issue is not confined to Lebanon; there is the matter of Iran and the United States, and the problems occurring have a significant impact on the talks here. We cannot ‘proceed’ until we know what will happen in the region there as well.”
When asked if the Lebanese issue is linked to what is happening between Iran and America, he replied, “The issue is not directly linked, but the situation there affects the condition in Lebanon. As you know, Hezbollah is still suspended to Iranian decisions. We have tried to get the Lebanese state and Israel to engage with each other and decide their own fate.”
Regarding whether his movement aims to bridge differences and keep pace with negotiations and meetings in Rome, he responded, “It must be understood that talks with Israel, whether Hezbollah exists or not, are talks between the Lebanese state and Israel. For us, we want to bring Israel and the Lebanese state closer. At that point, if the issues between the two states are resolved, the question of Hezbollah remains. Then we will see on what basis Hezbollah still exists, whether Iran still exists and defends Hezbollah, or whether Iran’s issues have also been ‘resolved.’ But the talks are between Lebanon and Israel, whether Hezbollah exists or not.”
On his comment that Washington is ready to negotiate with Hezbollah if it has something to offer, he answered, “Perhaps you misunderstood. I said yesterday: if Hezbollah has something it can offer, we are ready to discuss it. We do not want more from it than the handing over of its weapons, nor do we ask for more than that. What I meant is that if the party decides to talk with us, let it talk with the Lebanese state, which we are talking with, and tell it that it is ready to hand over its weapons. At that point, we will contribute to bridging differences and talk with Hezbollah or through the Lebanese state, which will convey its position in the negotiations. Hezbollah, so far, does not want to talk with the state, with us, or with Israel, because it only receives orders from Iran.”
