Iran Imposes Militia Weapons on Iraq

There is no need to look far to discover that several wars, with Iranian blessing, are taking place in the Arab region and its periphery. The war in Iraq remains the most prominent among them, with its core issue being the retention of weapons by Iraqi sectarian militias. It appears that these weapons will remain, now that the “Islamic Republic” has succeeded in imposing them on Iraq and its people. The government of Ali al-Zaidi has retreated from its previous commitment, with the end of next September set as the deadline for disarming the militias.

At the same time, the Houthis in Yemen are attempting to close the Bab al-Mandab strait by seeking to return to the port of Al-Mukha, from which they were expelled in 2014 by local Yemeni forces. Will Iran be able to control the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf and the Bab al-Mandab strait, the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, through the Houthis?

Iran has not concealed its decision to adopt an offensive policy in multiple locations. However, what remains most important to the “Revolutionary Guard” at present is maintaining its control over Iraq. A real war is unfolding within Iraq, taking the form of confrontations centered on the weapons of the sectarian militias affiliated with the “Guard.”

The “Guard’s” insistence on retaining the “Popular Mobilization Forces” and their weapons explains all this Iranian focus on Iraq, a country that has become suitable for various Iranian uses serving the interests of the Tehran regime. Among these uses is Iraq’s role in financing part of Iran’s budget.

A few days ago, the Governor of the Central Bank of Iran visited Baghdad to demand $12 billion for Iranian gas used to produce electricity. The Iranians forgot that closing the Strait of Hormuz deprives Iraq of exporting a large portion of its oil, meaning that closing the strait costs Baghdad billions of dollars in losses.

Iran is demanding billions of dollars from Iraq while simultaneously seeking to prevent it from exporting the majority of its oil for its own reasons. These reasons stem from the fact that the strait has become Iran’s strongest weapon in its confrontation with the United States, with Iraq becoming one of its casualties.

Beyond the extent to which the “Islamic Republic” benefits from Iraq’s resources, particularly its oil, Iraq remains the major prize Tehran acquired as a gift from the United States, which insisted in 2003 on handing Iraq over to Tehran “on a silver platter.”

The US administration, at this particular stage, wants to reclaim Iraq from Iran. There is a complete US disregard for the reality that those who have ruled Iraq since 2003 are the sectarian militias affiliated with the “Guard,” which fought the Iraqi army in the eight-year war (1980–1988).

The militias controlled the levers of the Iraqi system and prevented any genuine reform that would have turned Iraq into a normal state balancing its relations between Iran and its Arab environment. There is an Iraqi reality that the Donald Trump administration ignores.

The George W. Bush administration got rid of the Baathist-family Saddam regime. It was necessary to get rid of that bloody and foolish regime, but the condition was knowing who would replace it. The Trump administration is currently seeking to address the consequences of a disaster that befell Iraq, which has now become a dagger in the side of Arab security. Attacks on Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are launched from its territory, and specific locations in the Iraqi Kurdistan region are targeted from there.

It is no coincidence that Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, made it a point to begin his recent visit to Iraq by stopping at the monument erected for Qasem Soleimani, commander of the “Quds Force,” who was assassinated by the Americans along with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy commander of the “Popular Mobilization Forces,” shortly after they left Baghdad Airport in early 2020.

Qalibaf came to Baghdad to affirm Tehran’s opposition to disarming the militias, contrary to what the al-Zaidi government is seeking, finding itself in an enviable position.

Qalibaf did not say so explicitly. But his visit to the Soleimani shrine, where he delivered a speech praising “resistance,” carries significant meaning. Perhaps the first thing it signifies is that the Islamic Republic still regards Iraq as its subordinate “theater,” indeed a key card in a war that is sometimes silent and at other times loud, waged against the Trump administration, and punctuated by periodic public or secret negotiations.

Iraq can now be considered an inseparable part of the conflicts engulfing the region, wars that stretch from Yemen, to the Strait of Hormuz, to the Arab Gulf states facing Iranian attacks, and down to southern Lebanon. Who will have the final say in Iraq? To what extent can Iran exert its pressure? What capacity does the al-Abadi government have to withstand the armed militias?

These are the questions of the coming phase, with Iraq itself as the focal point, where Iran defends its regime and seeks to affirm that there will be no return to the past—that is, to the pre-2003 era. Can the Trump administration rectify a historical mistake that has upended the balances in the Middle East, the Near East, and the Gulf region?