"Flattery" Keeps Iranian Ambassador in Lebanon as an Ordinary Citizen for Six Months
As the region and the world remained fixated on Washington’s launch of “the largest economic offensive ever, aimed at strangling Iran and cutting off its remaining financial and commercial lifelines,” Beirut found itself in a state of heavy anticipation regarding the unfolding of the American “landing” behind the lines of the “exhausted adversary,” and how Tehran would respond to this “decisive” development and its potential to fragment Lebanon.
It was hardly ordinary for Lebanon to find itself at the “eye” of Washington’s surge to deliver a blow to what has become Iran’s “Achilles’ heel”—a path on which the United States is pressuring all countries to “board the train or else”—in light of the highly complex dimensions of the US Treasury’s decision to “de-Lebanize” Hezbollah and elevate it to a classification as an “agent of Iran rather than an independent entity” (last Thursday). This classification was based on premises asserting that Hezbollah is a direct executive instrument of the Iranian military command, specifically the Quds Force.
While Beirut was busy monitoring whether it needed to “update” its procedures to prevent being drawn into the crosshairs of the “Economic Normandy” offensive against Iran, the diplomatic-political “landing” by the “Cedar Country” against the “Islamic Republic” on the front of what has come to be known as the “rebel ambassador crisis” was not trivial. This crisis involved Mohammad Reza Sheibani, who was forced to concede to Lebanon’s removal of his “diplomatic stars” last March and to renew his residence permit, which expired on Monday, in a civilian capacity.
Despite the “settlement” character acquired by the renewal of Sheibani’s residence, who has been living since March 29 as an “ambassador by force,” after Lebanon (on March 24) withdrew its consent to his accreditation and the Foreign Ministry declared him a “person undesirable” and ordered him to leave within five days, Tehran’s compulsion to adopt a “back door” to resolve a situation that had become embarrassing for it, and its submission to the “unyielding” reality that precluded maintaining any diplomatic status for its representative in the “Cedar Country,” reflects, according to political circles, Beirut’s success in managing this file in a way that balanced two considerations:
- Avoiding the provocation of a gratuitous crisis with Iran that would divert attention from the confrontation it is facing on the “main battlefield,” constituted by direct negotiations with Tel Aviv sponsored by the United States, which do not end without firmly establishing “diplomatic sovereignty” by wresting the decision for peace from Tehran’s hands.
It was learned that Sheibani submitted an application for a residence permit to the General Security Directorate, and that after the legal department reviewed the request, he was granted a “courtesy residence permit,” valid for six months, in his capacity as a former diplomat who served as his country’s ambassador to Lebanon between 2005 and 2009, and not in his current capacity as ambassador.
While General Security announced that Sheibani’s residence renewal was granted “in a civilian capacity,” this step, which was learned to have been achieved following a “settlement” negotiated among Presidents Joseph Aoun, Nawaf Salam, and Nabih Berri, does not grant the “former ambassador” any type of diplomatic immunity, but rather confirms that he is an ordinary Iranian citizen in Beirut, not subject to any protection outside the embassy walls.
According to political circles, the “courtesy” approach Lebanon adopted in dealing with this multifaceted crisis, despite containing elements of containment and “circumventing” the problem—specifically by turning a blind eye to the “undesirable person” status attached to his expulsion order, which required his immediate departure—nonetheless, the essence of the exit strategy cemented that Beirut refused for the first time to accept an Iranian ambassador, then requested his departure, and firmly stripped him of any diplomatic status.
In this context, the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s announcement stood out, with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi praising, during his meeting with Hassan Fadelallah, deputy leader of Hezbollah, the “resilience and steadfastness of the Lebanese people against the Zionist aggression,” while affirming “the comprehensive support of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the Lebanese people in defending their country’s territorial integrity, dignity, and national sovereignty.”
This issue, however, did not divert attention from the Lebanon-Israel negotiation file, which has yet to set a date for the anticipated eighth round in Rome this September. It is widely believed that finalizing the timing of the talks hinges at least on reaching an understanding regarding verification mechanisms within the “experimental zones” to ensure the withdrawal of the Israeli army and the removal of Hezbollah weapons from each zone, alongside a deeper elaboration of the sequential framework governing these areas.
There is now an openly expressed fear that Israel may exploit the gaps in these two provisions, as well as the time gap before the next round of negotiations, to launch an offensive to capture Mount Ali al-Tahir and the strategic Hezbollah facility located beneath it. The site is effectively under siege and on the verge of collapse. Meanwhile, discussions have begun about the “post-battle” scenario, hinting at the possibility that Tel Aviv, having likely secured control, could expand further into the Apple Region and the Western Beqaa.
While Sky News Arabia quoted a Lebanese security source as saying there are “two scenarios regarding the fate of the Ali al-Tahir heights: either the Lebanese army takes them over from Hezbollah (which it refuses), or Israel launches a military offensive to seize them,” an Israeli source told Al Arabiya channel that “the framework agreement with Lebanon charts a path toward peace and stability through the disarmament of Hezbollah.”
