Lebanon seeks to «recycle» the Iranian ambassador crisis... «an exit without expelling him»
Will the designation of the Iranian ambassador as a “persona non grata” trap Lebanon in a situation that silences the drums it has been beating for nearly 19 months, as part of its political struggle to reclaim all elements of its sovereignty and to strip Hezbollah—and by extension, Tehran—of the “visa” to wage war or make peace?
This question has become unavoidable in Beirut due to the expiration of the visa of the appointed ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, today, Monday. Sheibani has been residing in Lebanon since March 24 without official status, defying the Cedar State’s decision to withdraw its approval of his accreditation and declaring him a persona non grata, while demanding his departure from Lebanese territory within five days at the latest.
Just as the implicit expulsion order for Sheibani was issued—following what the Foreign Ministry then described as Tehran’s violation of established diplomatic norms and conventions between the two countries, leaving Beirut with a de facto “forced ambassador” lacking a diplomatic portfolio—there is now fear that the expiration of his visa will become a new arena for draining the state’s capacity to erase the reputation of “ink on paper” that has clung to its decisions. This comes despite the extraordinary dimensions of the official “uprising” that began during the presidency of Joseph Aoun and the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, particularly regarding the state’s monopoly on arms and its corollaries (direct negotiations with Tel Aviv). This file is managed with extreme caution, seeking to balance mimicking external pressures and conditions with weaving a safety net to protect the country from exposure to two fires: internal and Israeli.
As Lebanon engages in a contest with Iran on the front of its negotiations with Israel, which are sponsored by Washington and which Tehran is striving to sabotage by thwarting Hezbollah’s implementation of its key demand—the surrender of its weapons to bring this issue under the bargaining leverage between Washington and Tehran—the fate of its ambassador—whose credentials Beirut refused to accept and who was declared a persona non grata—and Beirut’s handling of the day after his visa expires, have effectively become a “measuring stick” inseparable from the “master battle” to reclaim “diplomatic sovereignty” through direct talks with Tel Aviv.
Sources familiar with the matter noted that after Lebanon firmly established a political “buffer” against Tehran, declaring its refusal to be used by Iran as a “bargaining chip” in its negotiations with Washington, Iran has continued to challenge the Lebanese state. This ranges from forcing Sheibani’s continued presence, as if he were an “ambassador to the Iranian axis in Beirut,” to the recent acknowledgment by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf of “continuing direct communication with Hezbollah fighters on the front lines.” Consequently, this entire trajectory of gradually regaining control over the strategic direction of the small nation—even if the “detonation buttons” remain in the hands of Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic—is now subject to what happens regarding the “ambassador crisis,” whose embers are once again emerging from under the ashes today.
It was no coincidence that, on the eve of the “zero hour” for the expiration of Sheibani’s visa, the atmosphere in Beirut suggested that backchannel communications were not focused on the inevitability of his expulsion from Lebanon, but rather on the necessity of his staying, albeit stripped of his diplomatic status. This is because all roads lead to this characterization, stemming from the decision issued on March 24, which combined the withdrawal of approval for his accreditation with his designation as a “persona non grata.”
Amid reports of a role played by the Director General of General Security, Major General Hassan Chkiri, on the same line as Presidents Aoun, Salam, and Nabih Berri, to provide an exit that preserves the state’s prestige and avoids fracturing the government coalition—particularly among the ministers of the Shiite duo, who had covered up Shiban’s “defiance” of the decision to exclude him—the options available to the state regarding the visa expiration deadline ranged between:
- Obtaining a regular citizen’s visa, i.e., without diplomatic status, which would require submitting an application to General Security, which had not received any orders in this regard.
- Having Iran appoint him as a special envoy to Lebanon, and possibly Syria as well, thereby granting him a “mission” with greater practical impact than that of a ambassador in Beirut, but lower in rank than that of an ambassador, which remains the highest rank in the official diplomatic hierarchy.
- Benefiting from “courtesy residence,” which he could obtain under General Security’s conditions for “a diplomat who previously worked in Lebanon and wishes to reside there after retirement,” given that he had previously been accredited in Lebanon (between 2005 and 2009).
These scenarios exclude extending his diplomatic passport, as that would mean overturning the decision to revoke his accreditation and “rewarding” the precedent set by him and backed by Tehran to remain “by force” in a country that “expelled” him. Any option leading to immediate deportation or departure, or stripping him of any role connected to diplomacy, is also ruled out, as that would fall outside the equation of the state’s victory without compromising other institutions, even if it required “recycling” Shiban’s status, albeit to a rank below that of an ambassador.
However, any exit from this issue, which remains open to the possibility of a diplomatic crisis with Tehran or an internal crisis, must confront the fact that the solution—settlement—will clash with the fact that Lebanon had declared Shiban a “persona non grata.” Furthermore, Foreign Minister Youssef Raji recently confirmed in an interview with “An-Nahar” newspaper that “as soon as any diplomat is declared a person undesirable, he must leave the territory of the host state, and no visa, entry permit, or residence permit previously granted to him has any legal effect authorizing his continued presence on its territory. Therefore, discussing the renewal of any of them constitutes legal heresy and contradicts the most basic rules of international law and accepted diplomatic customs.”
He stressed that “any talk about the continued validity of Shiban’s visa, or the possibility of renewing it, is not legally recognized and cannot serve as a basis for his continued presence in Lebanon.” He added that “Shiban’s continued presence on Lebanese territory after the issuance of the decision declaring him a person undesirable contradicts a clear sovereign decision issued by the Lebanese state. This decision is final and enforceable, admits no exceptions, interpretations, or circumventions, and cannot be subjected to any ‘status regularization’ under any label.”
