From Ceasefire to Permanent Control... Netanyahu Expands the Doctrine of Security Zones

Benjamin Netanyahu has dispelled much of the ambiguity surrounding Israel’s intentions in the Gaza Strip, the occupied West Bank, southern Lebanon, and Syria. His government asserts its right to remain in adjacent territories until all organizations deemed dangerous by Israel are disarmed or eliminated. Since Israel alone determines when this condition is met, these arrangements are subject to no specific timeframe or deadline.

At a cabinet meeting held on August 9, 2026, Netanyahu announced that no Palestinian state would be established during his tenure, neither in Gaza nor in what he referred to as Judea and Samaria, i.e., the occupied West Bank. He rejected alternatives, describing them as “Fatahstan” and “Hamasstan,” portraying both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas as unacceptable foundations for sovereignty.

He also rejected the 15-point Gaza framework, backed by the United States and promoted by the Peace Council chaired by President Donald Trump, insisting that Israeli forces would not withdraw until Hamas was completely disarmed and its tunnels destroyed.

This is not merely a disagreement over sequencing. Even if the movement surrenders its weapons, Netanyahu’s declaration excludes the establishment of a Palestinian state governed by Hamas or Fatah. Disarmament thus becomes a condition for a potential, untimed withdrawal, without any reciprocal recognition of Palestinian sovereignty.

The US framework linked Palestinian disarmament to Israeli withdrawal and the transfer of governance to a Palestinian committee backed by international forces. Netanyahu rejected this exchange. Hamas insists that disarmament is inseparable from ending the occupation and reaching a credible political settlement. The core dispute lies in whether disarmament will lead to withdrawal and the right to self-determination, or to the entrenchment of Israeli control within a different structural framework.

The ceasefire announced on October 10, 2025, was intended to halt operations, allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and initiate a sustainable transitional phase. However, violence continued throughout the following 300 days.

The Gaza Government Media Office reported 4,091 Israeli violations during that period, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,254 Palestinians and injuring 4,121 others.

UNICEF reported that at least 300 children were killed during the first 300 days. Israel claims that many operations were carried out in response to Hamas violations, tunnel activity, attempts to rebuild military capabilities, or threats to its forces. Nevertheless, the pace of Israeli attacks and their consequences make it difficult to characterize this agreement as an effective ceasefire.

Humanitarian provisions were also not implemented. The agreement stipulated the entry of at least 600 trucks carrying essential goods daily. Oxfam found that this level was not maintained, while UN reports documented rejected shipments, transit delays, and restrictions on essential supplies.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported last July that a quarter of humanitarian aid trucks arriving via the Rafah crossing were returned or rejected during the reporting period. What is certain is that the minimum daily quota was not consistently met, and permitted shipments often failed to meet Gaza’s urgent needs.

Israeli military officials stated that Israeli forces controlled between 67 and 70 percent of Gaza, compared to approximately 53 percent under the original ceasefire line. UNICEF reported that families were overcrowded in about a third of the sector amid destruction, lack of potable water, spread of disease, and acute malnutrition.

This doctrine extends far beyond Gaza. Defense Minister Israel Katz declared that Israeli forces would remain in the security zones in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria without any time limit. Netanyahu and Katz affirmed that troops would stay in southern Lebanon and continue operations against what Israel considers “terrorist infrastructure.” Withdrawal remains contingent on Israel’s determination that “Hezbollah no longer poses a threat to its northern settlements.”

In Syria, Israel expanded beyond the occupied Golan Heights following the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, establishing positions in Mount Hermon and parts of Quneitra. It describes this deployment as defensive, while Damascus and a large segment of the international community view it as “additional occupation.”

Netanyahu argues that the 2005 disengagement demonstrated the dangers of relinquishing territory without maintaining military control. At that time, Israel withdrew its settlers and permanent ground forces… Hamas won the 2006 elections, took full control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, and then launched the October 7, 2023 attacks.

Netanyahu views the withdrawal as having removed the barrier between an armed organization and Israel. Consequently, his government considers strategic depth more reliable than agreements or international monitoring. This doctrine enjoys significant domestic support following October 7, 2023, while Netanyahu’s coalition partners oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state and withdrawal from the territories.

Politically, the problem lies in the fact that demanding the complete absence of any potential threat before proceeding with withdrawal may mean it never happens at all; armed groups can hide their weapons, reorganize under new names, or reemerge due to changing circumstances. Thus, Israel can always conclude that the danger persists.

A security zone not tied to a specific timeline effectively becomes an occupation; a buffer zone can be expanded whenever military assessments change, while withdrawal can be postponed whenever intelligence indicates a resurgence of armed activities.

Thus, what begins as an emergency measure may evolve into permanent control without the need for formal annexation of the land. Security concerns alone do not justify prolonged occupation, land seizure, or depriving Palestinians of their right to self-determination.

This situation creates a vacuous dynamic; Israel retains the land due to the existence of armed resistance, while armed groups justify retaining their weapons due to the existence of the occupation. Israel demands the disarmament of Hamas before withdrawal, while the movement links this step to withdrawal and obtaining guarantees preventing the resumption of war, whereas Netanyahu rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state that could constitute an alternative authority. These are conditions impossible to reconcile.

Israel claims that the Strip ceased to be under occupation after 2005, describing its current positions as temporary defensive zones. In contrast, Palestinians, Lebanon, Syria, and UN bodies consider territories under Israel’s actual control to be occupied lands. The 2024 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice classified the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip as occupied Palestinian territories, concluding that the continued Israeli presence there is illegal.

Labeling land as a “buffer zone” does not exempt one from the legal obligations arising from actual military control, and Israel’s security concerns do not grant it an absolute right to control adjacent territories or deprive Palestinians of their political rights.

Netanyahu has made his position clear: no Palestinian state as long as he remains prime minister, no complete withdrawal prior to full disarmament, and no time limit on control over territories that Israel deems essential for its security. This approach may offer tactical flexibility and defer immediate threats, but it cannot entrench legitimacy, achieve reconciliation, or build a sustainable regional order; the doctrine of eliminating every risk before permitting withdrawal carries the danger of turning occupation into a permanent reality and rendering peace structurally unattainable.