Israel designates Turkey as a 'strategic adversary' after Iran
- Netanyahu’s choice: When diplomacy fails to maintain Israeli hegemony, military force steps in to impose it.
- Netanyahu’s talk of an “emerging axis” lends an ideological tone to this rivalry.
- Deployment of Turkish ground-to-air radars and missiles in Syria could shift the balance of power without requiring an actual attack on Israel.
On February 22, 2026, three days before the arrival of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his next regional strategy, stating that while his country had struck the “radical axis” led by Iran, it now faced another “emerging radical axis.” He proposed a “hexagon” linking Israel with India, Greece, Cyprus, and other selected countries.
Netanyahu did not explicitly name Turkey. However, his subsequent remarks and Israeli operations in Syria clarified the intended target. Turkey possesses the second-largest military force in NATO, a growing defense industry, and resources that could enable it to assist in rebuilding a centralized Syrian state. Israel objects not only to the presence of Turkish troops in Syria but also to the strategic implications of a Syria protected by Ankara.
In April 2025, Israeli aircraft attacked T4 Airbase in Tadmur and Hama, after Turkish military teams had inspected the facilities in preparation for their potential deployment under a defense agreement with the new Syrian government. Reports indicated that Turkish planners were considering using T4 base to deploy aircraft and air defense systems. These strikes warned Ankara that Israel would not tolerate a Turkish presence that constrained its operations in Syrian airspace. Israeli officials viewed the Turkish air defenses there as a threat.
On August 18, 2026, Israel reiterated its warning at Abu al-Dhaher Airbase in northwestern Syria, approximately 70 kilometers from the Turkish border, launching eight airstrikes targeting its runway and storage facilities.
In a subsequent statement, Netanyahu clarified the objective of the attack, saying, “We will not tolerate any Turkish military southward advance.” He added in an Israeli military radio podcast that Tel Aviv had warned Turkey against stationing forces at an airport near Aleppo, but Ankara apparently failed to understand the message. As a result, Israel issued the warning “in a clearer form.”
The statement implicitly acknowledged Israel’s responsibility and explicitly threatened Ankara. Netanyahu claimed that Israel has the right to determine where Turkish forces are deployed within sovereign Syrian territory, even if invited by Damascus. Bombing became the tool Israel used to enforce this alleged right.
Turkey accused Netanyahu of pursuing expansionist policies. U.S. envoy Tom Barrack described the attack as an “unjustified escalation” and warned that Turkey could have responded militarily. Washington later sought to strengthen de-confliction arrangements between Turkey, Syria, and Israel. Netanyahu’s office justified the strike by claiming Syria was on the verge of violating a security understanding.
The operation followed, according to reports, a conversation between Israeli Mossad director Romain Gofman and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shibani. Israel had raised diplomatic objections, which it then enforced by destroying Syrian infrastructure.
Turkish intervention in Syria did not begin with the fall of Bashar al-Assad. During the civil war, Ankara established a significant military, political, and economic presence in northern Syria. Its forces entered through three operations between 2016 and 2019. Additionally, Ankara established monitoring posts around Idlib under the Astana and Sochi agreements to oversee ceasefire arrangements.
Assad has not regained control of Idlib or any extensive territories along the Turkish border. Ankara has supported opposition groups, maintained its own forces, and supplied local administrations. The Turkish lira has circulated alongside the Syrian lira, and councils backed by Ankara have adopted administrative and vehicle registration systems linked to neighboring Turkish provinces. Turkish has been introduced in schools, while Ankara has supported hospitals, telecommunications networks, electricity infrastructure, and local security forces.
Idlib has been administered by the Salvation Government affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, while other areas have been controlled by councils backed by Turkey. Both sides have relied heavily on Ankara.
Israel has tolerated this situation as long as Syria remained fractured and Turkish influence was confined near the border. However, its calculations changed when Ankara’s allies took power in Damascus. Turkey can now translate its influence in the north into a relationship with the Syrian state, helping to build a national army, rehabilitate air bases, and establish air defenses. What Israel had accepted as a limited Turkish presence has become unacceptable once that presence provided a foundation for reviving Syria.
Ankara wants Damascus to regain control over Syrian territory, restrict the armed autonomy of the Kurds, facilitate the return of refugees, and reopen Arab trade relations. A functional and stable Syria would enhance Turkey’s influence throughout the entire Mashreq region.
In contrast, Israel seeks to keep Syria weak and unable to constrain its operations, rebuild its strategic arsenal, or challenge its occupation of the Golan Heights and any territories that may be seized following the fall of the Assad regime. It demands that the south be demilitarized, that the army’s armament be limited, and that it retain freedom to conduct military strikes anywhere within Syria.
Deploying Turkish ground-to-air radars and missiles at the T4 or Abu al-Duhur air bases would shift the balance of power without requiring an actual attack on Israel; such a presence would enable monitoring of Israeli aircraft, complicate any future strikes, and strengthen Damascus’s position in negotiations over Israeli withdrawal. The dispute here is not merely an incidental conflict over two air bases, but rather a contest over who will determine Syria’s security architecture.
Netanyahu’s model operates on the assumption that alliances follow military dominance; adversaries must be weakened and neighboring governments convinced that adapting to Israel is safer than resisting, with the expectation that power will create conditions conducive to normalization.
In contrast, Turkey relies more heavily on solidarity, economic integration, and intersecting interests, offering military training, defense manufacturing technology, trade exchanges, and political support in return for influence.
This behavior does not stem from altruism; Turkey is pursuing its own objectives, but it frames its partnerships as cooperation among sovereign states rather than submission to a superior military power. While Israel highlights the cost of opposition, Turkey emphasizes the benefits of cooperation.
Netanyahu’s references to an “emerging axis” have given an ideological cast to this rivalry. In July, Donald Trump urged against returning Turkey to the F-35 fighter jet program, describing the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a threat to regional balance.
His objections extend beyond Turkey’s possession of the Russian S-400 missile system; Ankara manufactures drones, missiles, and warships, and has forces deployed across multiple operational theaters. An Ankara with military autonomy could constrain Israel’s freedom of action without relying entirely on Washington.
Although a direct war between Turkey and Israel remains unlikely, with Washington striving to prevent an accidental confrontation, Israel, while capable of thwarting Turkish military expansion, finds that every strike it launches bolsters Ankara’s argument that Syria needs protection. Turkey views Syria, as a sovereign state, as a cornerstone of its own security, whereas Israel sees a Turkish-protected Syria as an obstacle to its military freedom. The case of the T-4 and Abu al-Dhaher bases reveals the option Netanyahu has chosen: when diplomacy fails to maintain Israeli dominance, military force takes over to impose it.
