Barrack... Trump's Envoy Who Provokes Israel's Anger
- Israeli official: Americans prefer that dialogue between Tel Aviv and Ankara go through them so they can control it
Israel is concerned about the positions taken by Tom Barrack, the Lebanese-American billionaire and Donald Trump’s envoy for Syria, according to Ynet, the website of the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth.
In Israel, there is anxiety over the approach led by the US ambassador to Turkey and his ability to influence Trump. The airstrikes on the Abu al-Dhur military base in northwestern Syria once again revealed the gap between Tel Aviv and Barrack regarding Syria’s future, Turkey’s role in the region, and Israel’s freedom of action.
Barrack responded to the attack with a relatively sharp tone, stating that it posed a “real risk” of rapid escalation and direct confrontation between Israel, Turkey, and Syria. He also warned that a lack of communication among the parties could have led to an erroneous Turkish reaction. According to him, the United States is currently working to establish a mechanism to prevent friction among the three parties.
However, in Israel, the incident is viewed from a different angle. The office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Syria had ignored Israeli warnings about the potential deployment of Turkish troops at the base, and that the strike aimed to prevent a shift in the security balance on the ground. According to reports, the operation included eight strikes targeting the runway and storage facilities within the base.
Netanyahu himself addressed the attack, saying: “We will not allow Turkish military entrenchment extending southward, as it threatens us, and we have made that clear in general terms. We saw a Turkish intention to entrench at an airport located south of their line, near Aleppo, so we sent a message: Don’t. The message was received, but it seems they did not heed it, so we made sure they understood.”
Tel Aviv believes that the main source of concern is not Barrack’s statements alone, but the vision he espouses, which grants Turkey, particularly Erdogan, a very central role in shaping the regional order.
An Israeli official familiar with Israeli-Turkish relations said: “Barrack is seen as someone working to enhance Erdogan’s interests and those of the Syrian regime in the United States. He is insensitive to Israeli concerns and focuses on the immediate gains the United States can achieve from Syria.”
There is disagreement within Israel regarding the extent of Barrack’s actual ability to influence Trump. On one hand, he has been one of the president’s close associates for decades, maintaining a close relationship with him long before entering government service, and has played a role over the years as a bridge between Trump and the Arab world and Gulf states.
On the other hand, officials insist that personal closeness does not necessarily translate into influence over decision-making. They say: “It is not even clear to what extent he influences Trump. As for (Secretary of State Marco) Rubio, it is certain that he does not.” They point out that after Barrack condemned the airstrike on the airbase, no similar condemnation was issued by Trump or the US State Department.
In contrast, high-ranking Western diplomats present a different picture, believing that Trump sees Barrack as “his man” regarding both the Turkish and Syrian arenas. In their view, appointing him simultaneously as ambassador to Ankara and special envoy to Syria indicates the level of trust the Republican president places in him.
The rift between Bourke and Israel has been evident since Al-Sharaa’s arrival to power in Damascus. Initially, Israel was deeply concerned about the new American approach toward the Syrian leadership, which is largely backed by Turkey. Trump himself met with Al-Sharaa and pushed for a radical shift in U.S. policy toward Damascus, while Bourke emerged as one of the key architects of communications between Israel, Syria, and Turkey.
During these communications, it became clear that Bourke is not only seeking to prevent a war between Israel and Syria, but is also advancing a broader vision aimed at integrating Syria into the regional framework, economically rebuilding the country, strengthening its ties with Turkey, and minimizing the U.S. and Israeli military presence as much as possible.
One statement that exacerbated relations between Bourke and Israel was made in December 2025 during a forum in Doha. The U.S. special envoy said that “Israel can claim to be a democracy,” but added that what has “worked better” in the region is “good governance.”
Subsequently, Bourke visited Israel and met with Netanyahu. In December, it was reported that the meeting addressed, among other issues, Israel’s red lines in Syria and efforts to prevent a clash between Israel and Washington. Following the meeting, the talks were publicly described as “constructive.”
One of the most sensitive issues for Israel is the U.S. attempt to reintegrate Turkey into the American security system. Bourke has publicly advocated for progress on the possibility of Turkey’s return to the F-35 fighter jet program. He stated that productive discussions are underway between Washington and Ankara, emphasizing the positive atmosphere resulting from the relationship between Trump and Erdogan.
Israel opposes this move, among other reasons, due to Turkey’s growing military strength and Ankara’s deepening involvement in Syria.
This is not merely a theoretical issue. Over the past year, Turkey has become one of the most influential actors in rebuilding the Syrian army and its security infrastructure. At the Abu al-Duhur base, which was the focus of the recent Israeli attack, restoration work was carried out with Turkish assistance.
In addition to Bourke’s personal relationship with Trump, some Israeli officials view his business background with skepticism. He is an American businessman and billionaire of Lebanese origin who has been engaged in business relations in the Middle East for years.
These relationships do not, in themselves, prove that Bourke is acting in the interest of foreign entities at the expense of U.S. or Israeli policy. In fact, Bourke has consistently maintained over the years that he seeks to enhance American commercial interests in the region.
However, some Israeli officials believe that his business background explains, at least in part, his worldview: a lesser focus on historical alliances, and a greater emphasis on deals, stability, investments, and the ability to achieve economic gains through regional arrangements.
This may be the core of the Israeli position regarding Bourke. Even Israeli officials who criticize him do not necessarily label him as “anti-Israel” in the traditional sense.
The problem for them is that Bourke does not share Israel’s starting point, which holds that security threats must take precedence over considerations of regional stability and economics.
He views Turkey as a regional power that can and should be engaged. He sees the new Syrian regime as an opportunity to be consolidated rather than a threat to be contained. He also believes that economic arrangements, coordination mechanisms, and direct diplomacy can replace part of the use of force.
For example, following the attack on Abu al-Dhaher, Barak did not focus on whether Israel was justified intelligence- or operationally, but rather on the risk that the attack could lead to a confrontation with Turkey and on the need to establish a permanent mechanism to prevent friction.
Israel and Turkey are currently marking the 20th anniversary of the onset of tensions between them. In Israel, officials avoid describing Turkey as an “enemy,” preferring to label it a “rival.”
Nevertheless, the prevailing assessment in Israel is that there is no real risk of an imminent military confrontation, though caution is warranted to avoid sliding into that scenario.
An Israeli official specializing in Israeli-Turkish relations stated, “The Americans will not allow it under any circumstances or at any cost. It would be a disaster for the United States if two of its allies went to war against each other. What we are seeing is closer to provocations used by both sides for domestic purposes.”
He added, “No one in Israel wants a war with Turkey. There is dialogue between Israel and Turkey, and there are direct channels, but they do not appear to be effective enough. In any case, the Americans prefer that dialogue pass through them so they can manage it.”
