Approval of Amnesty Law in Lebanon for the First Time Since 1991
The file on the general amnesty, which became law after being approved by the Lebanese parliament on Wednesday, finally cleared after a long and arduous process, under the dual banner of “addressing the issue of prison overcrowding” and “ending injustice” for thousands of detainees who have been held for years without trial.
The law was passed after overcoming a “landmine” that nearly derailed the entire file. This obstacle materialized in the form of Defense Minister Michel Mousa’s insistence on delivering a speech before the general assembly to express the Lebanese Army’s observations on the proposal. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam rejected this move, asserting that he alone speaks on behalf of the government. This prompted deputies from the Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah blocs to walk out of the session without it losing its quorum. The session was subsequently completed with the passage of the draft law concerning the amendment of the law on the reform of the banking sector and its reorganization.
The amnesty law (the first of its kind since 1991) was accompanied by ambiguities that appeared to require time to clarify through its text, particularly regarding the immediate and future beneficiaries and the mechanisms for release. Information indicates that the law stipulates the release of those not yet sentenced who have spent 12 years in prison without trial (they will be tried while out of prison), and the reduction of certain sentences on a discretionary basis (for example, life imprisonment was reduced to 12 actual years, equivalent to 14 years of detention). However, there are wide exceptions, most notably intentional homicide, terrorism against civilians and military personnel, serious attacks on the army, espionage and dealings with Israel, offenses against public funds, money laundering, and crimes related to depositors’ funds and banks, as well as rape, human trafficking, domestic violence, torture, enforced disappearance, and repeated crimes involving theft and drugs.
It has emerged that 79 Islamist detainees out of 146 will benefit from the law and be released from prison upon its publication in the Official Gazette. Data converged on the fact that the law was drafted in a manner that delays the release of Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir (detained since 2015 in the file concerning the Abara events with the Lebanese Army). Estimates suggest that under the issued law and the reduction of sentences, his release might be possible by 2028.
Reports of a “preliminary agreement” on a new round of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel in early September resembled a surprising yet unsurprising development, given the convergence between Beirut and Washington on renewing confidence in this track as the “compass” governing the roadmap for closing the southern front.
The visit to Beirut by General Joseph Clerfeld, head of the US-led Military Coordination Group for Lebanon (MCG4L), reinforced indicators that had emerged regarding the Lebanese authorities’ awareness, particularly President Joseph Aoun’s, of the deep significance of sustaining negotiations. Aoun insisted on contradicting narratives that spoke of the failure of the seventh round, the second consecutive one hosted in Rome last week, by affirming that these talks “are making progress and remain, in any case, better than the results of the devastating war upon us.”
Aoun’s positions, expressed on the eve of welcoming Clerfeld, appeared to express a Lebanese desire to rely on the breakthroughs achieved by “Rome 2,” particularly regarding the stabilization and demonstration of Lebanon’s international borders with Israel. This underscores that these negotiations are comprehensive and cannot be measured solely by immediate files, such as the experimental zones (Israel’s gradual withdrawal and the deployment of the Lebanese Army based on dismantling any Hezbollah military infrastructure and preventing its return), which require direct US patronage to dismantle their obstacles and advance steps that Washington itself has labeled with the motto “Safety lies in caution.”
Beirut’s stance does not, under any circumstances, imply a lack of pressure exerted through Washington on Tel Aviv to halt the fighting and accelerate the “experimental” phases. Such progress is increasingly seen as contingent on establishing a verification mechanism through a third party, likely multinational, as much as it signals that Beirut seeks to avoid being drawn into options such as boycotting negotiations, as had been rumored in recent days. Such a move would nullify the “insurance policy” for the Lebanese state in any future conflict and release Israel from its sole “brake,” President Donald Trump, both militarily and in any attempts to evade its obligations under the “Framework Agreement” signed with Beirut and Washington on June 26, which mandated a full withdrawal from the south, albeit within an implicit “land for weapons” equation.
This underscores Lebanon’s need to manage the negotiation file and its steps regarding it with extreme caution, while providing the Americans with reasonable maneuvering room to restrain Benjamin Netanyahu and end his obstinacy over issues such as egregious violations of the ceasefire. Israel is pursuing a strategy to embarrass Beirut and perhaps push it off the negotiating table ahead of the Knesset elections, as indicated by the “headwinds” blowing from Tel Aviv. These developments follow reports of an understanding to resume negotiations in early September, alongside Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz’s confirmation that he had ordered “all necessary steps to ensure a long-term presence in the security zone in Lebanon, alongside areas in Syria and Gaza.”
Katz made these remarks during a visit to Israeli forces deployed in southern Lebanon, where the Defense Ministry announced he had discussed with army commanders “preparations for the anticipated campaign against Hezbollah later.”
“We will dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure and every house in the security zone, and we will not allow threats to our citizens,” he added, noting, “We destroyed the tunnels they built with Iranian support to invade the Galilee. Our army defeated Hezbollah with exceptional skill and took control of Mount Shtawi in southern Lebanon.”
Coinciding with the defense minister’s comments, the Israeli army announced the withdrawal of a reconnaissance unit from the Golani Brigade from the Shtawi Castle site, approximately 50 days after operations began, following the “completion of its mission there.”
“Katz’s storm” did not divert attention from the mission of General Clairfield, who visited President Aoun accompanied by U.S. Ambassador Michel Aoun (Note: The text says "Safir al-Amreeki Michel Issa" - Ambassador Michel Issa). During the visit, “measures aimed at implementing the Framework Agreement reached during Lebanese-American-Israeli negotiations in Washington were discussed, in light of the talks General Clairfield held in Israel last week.”
Lebanese Army Commander General Rodolphe Heikel also discussed with the American general “developments in the south and security arrangements related to the Framework Agreement, as well as the difficulties the army faces in carrying out its missions, foremost among them the continued aggression and acts of excavation and destruction by the Israeli occupation.”
The start of the visit by the head of the Special Military Coordination Group for Lebanon coincided with information about a “preliminary agreement on a new round of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel in early September.” This was reported by Al-Ahad channel, citing sources that also confirmed that “America is exploring the formation of a committee comprising officers from several countries to monitor the Framework Agreement in Lebanon.”
In this context, Reuters reported that “Israel and Lebanon agreed that Britain, Italy, Switzerland, and Indonesia would be potential contributors to a proposed mechanism that might see the deployment of foreign forces in Lebanon to verify the disarmament of Hezbollah.”
It added that “under the proposed mechanism, villages in southern Lebanon would be inspected to ensure they are free of weapons, with Israel wanting the inspections to include private homes.”
She clarified that “the issue of private property requires handling, including how it will be inspected and by whom, and it is also necessary to clearly define the freedom of movement of foreign forces.”
Sources announced that “the mandate for the presence of foreign forces in Lebanon requires an agreement, and the most likely scenario is that these forces will receive an official invitation from the Lebanese government within a framework approved by Israel.”
It was noted that “it is unlikely that the United States and Israel would accept United Nations intervention, while European countries may oppose the oversight of the Peace Council established by US President Donald Trump.”
A US State Department official expressed Washington’s approach to the overall Lebanese-Israeli negotiation process and its achievements, emphasizing that recent technical talks featured “constructive and detailed discussions,” and explaining, “The parties have completed the final details necessary to implement the pilot areas and other aspects of the trilateral framework, including agreeing on common definitions for verification and clearance operations.”
He added, “We also discussed US-led diplomatic efforts to support and complement the trilateral framework, including the use of a third party to verify clearance operations carried out by the Lebanese army. We also held separate bilateral talks with the Lebanese delegation regarding the provision of necessary support for timely reconstruction.”
He revealed that “military delegations have completed the determination of operational standards and joint maps, and have drawn up a roadmap for opening future pilot areas; we now have clear definitions and success metrics. In the next round of technical talks, Lebanon will present detailed roadmaps for securing new areas, coinciding with the continued implementation of operations in current areas.”
While noting that Washington “has reiterated its opposition to renewing the mandate of UNIFIL,” he clarified that “the political track is scheduled to resume in Rome in early September, with talks continuing in Beirut, Jerusalem, and Washington during the interim period. The Lebanon Military Coordination Group will continue its efforts to ensure the successful implementation of the first pilot areas in the coming weeks.”
He pointed out that “we must address important details, including determining the entity responsible for verifying the clearance operations conducted by the Lebanese army. Once these details are clarified, the pace of the process will accelerate significantly.”
He explained, “Both sides face political constraints; we are working to address them in a systematic manner, because quick and superficial solutions lead to the same failed outcomes we have witnessed over decades. The overall track remains positive, and there is no slowdown or delay from any party in the implementation phase.”
He continued, “We are optimistic about the course of events; the agreed framework is being implemented (...) and we are not naive about the difficulties. Hezbollah is attempting to obstruct the process, and both Israel and Lebanon are democratic states facing domestic political pressures. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the teams are sitting together, engaging in direct communication, and presenting options and alternatives constitutes a fundamental change in the structure. This process was designed to accommodate those constraints and continue moving forward, by first succeeding in the pilot areas and then expanding in subsequent phases.”
In parallel, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated that “Israel’s actions in Mansouri, Eastern Zouitri, Kafr Kanna, and other southern villages and towns—consisting of attacks, incursions, and systematic bulldozing and destruction of homes, residential neighborhoods, infrastructure, government offices, and places of worship—constitute a serious violation of the principles and rules of international law and international humanitarian law.”
He said that “the justification for bulldozing and destruction on the pretext of the presence of military facilities is refuted by the nature of what is being targeted on the ground. The claim that entire villages and towns, with their homes, neighborhoods, government offices, public facilities, places of worship, and infrastructure, are entirely ‘military facilities’ is an assertion that defies all logic and cannot serve as a cover for their destruction, the displacement of their residents, and the prevention of their return.” Salam emphasized that “Lebanon’s sovereignty, the security of its people, and the right of southerners to return to their land and rebuild their villages are not matters open to negotiation.”
