Is Israel executing the "Blue and White Strikes" against Iran?

Israel is weighing military options for a potential independent military operation against Iran in the event that the United States ends its campaign, reaches a settlement with Tehran, or refuses to support further Israeli escalation. Senior Israeli officials have acknowledged these preparations as Washington seeks a diplomatic exit from the conflict that began in late February 2026. However, these preparations do not confirm that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has authorized another attack, nor do they indicate that a unilateral military operation is imminent. Military institutions typically prepare alternatives for political leaders. In the current context, Israeli signals are also being used to deter Iran, influence negotiations between Washington and Tehran, preserve Israel’s freedom of action, and reassure a domestic public dissatisfied with the war’s outcomes.

Thus, distinguishing between planning and authorization is crucial. Israel seeks to retain the capability to strike Iran without direct American participation, but it has not demonstrated its ability to independently replicate the scope, duration, and protection of the joint campaign. Therefore, distinguishing between planning and authorization is essential.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has repeatedly insisted that Israel must maintain freedom of action against any attempt by Iran to rebuild its nuclear and missile capabilities. Last July, he stated that the military was prepared to carry out what he termed “Blue and White Strikes”—operations conducted independently by Israel—and to return to Iran with greater force if necessary. He had previously warned that Israel would not consider itself permanently bound by any agreement between Washington and Tehran.

In early August, Channel 13 reported that the military is maintaining plans for unilateral attacks as Washington seeks to reach an agreement to reduce hostilities, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and prevent further disruptions to global energy supplies.

During preparations for the February attack, Israeli officials initially assumed that some operations might need to be conducted without American participation. Ultimately, however, the campaign evolved into a joint US-Israeli operation.

This cooperation was not coincidental. American aircraft, intelligence, aerial refueling, long-range munitions, missile defense systems, regional bases, naval deployments, and other assets expanded the scope of the campaign far beyond what Israel could sustain on its own.

An independent operation would not be a scaled-down version of the joint war, but rather a different mission executed with fewer aircraft and interceptors, limited access to specialized munitions, and no guarantees of US support or intervention. Israel has demonstrated its ability to conduct long-range air operations, penetrate Iranian air defenses, gather intelligence, employ cyber capabilities, and assassinate senior officials. But the harder question remains whether it can sustain a military campaign and translate military losses into political gains.

Israel anticipated that the war would yield more than merely damaging Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure. Netanyahu publicly framed the confrontation as an opportunity to reshape the Middle East and decisively weaken Iran. His remarks pointed toward an emerging regional order in which Israel would wield greater strategic influence, although he did not specify its institutional form.

The political outcome has taken a different course. The first forty days of intensive Israeli and American operations failed to translate military destruction into strategic success. While the campaign damaged Iranian nuclear, military, and energy facilities and eliminated senior cadres, it did not result in verified nuclear disarmament, the permanent elimination of missile capabilities, or a sustainable regional settlement. Nor did it produce the transformation of the Middle East that Netanyahu had anticipated.

Another attack targeting power plants, oil and gas facilities, transportation networks, or other civilian infrastructure could inflict severe damage. Such attacks would cause significant material harm and civilian suffering. However, unless linked to an achievable political settlement, any further attacks would repeat the fundamental limitation of the previous campaign: destroying targets without converting that destruction into lasting strategic gains.

The military challenge becomes more complex if Israel expands its targets to include Iran’s oil, gas, and electricity infrastructure, alongside nuclear and missile facilities. In April, a senior Israeli defense official stated that such attacks were under preparation but awaited US approval. By late July, reports indicated that Israel and the United States were reconsidering them, despite Donald Trump not having authorized them.

The expansion of Israel’s defense budget signals that the government is preparing for long-term insecurity. The original 2026 defense budget was estimated at approximately 112 billion shekels, equivalent to about $34 billion at the exchange rate used when it was approved. As the scope of the war widened, the defense budget was first increased to 143 billion shekels, and then by an additional 15 billion, bringing the total official allocation to approximately 158 billion shekels. According to the newspaper Calcalist, the budget has nearly tripled, and additional financing mechanisms could raise actual defense-related spending to even higher levels, reaching 183 billion shekels in 2026.

These funds cover the entire military system, financing operations in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, reserve mobilization, interceptor missiles, damaged equipment, intelligence, salaries, ammunition purchases, and the replenishment of depleted stocks. They cannot be considered a budget dedicated solely to a unilateral attack on Iran.

The proposed 400-billion-shekel force development program is separate from the 2026 defense budget. It is a multi-year expansion program aimed at enhancing procurement, domestic weapons production, air defense, intelligence, and the armed forces over more than a decade. At prevailing exchange rates, its value ranges between $117 billion and $133 billion. The Ministry of Finance has resisted certain aspects of the proposal due to their implications for taxes, borrowing, and civilian spending.

Nevertheless, the budget reveals a strategic vision. Israeli leaders do not expect the confrontation with Iran and its regional allies to end with a single agreement. They are preparing for repeated operations, increased permanent military spending, and a decline in confidence in Washington’s ability to supply necessary weapons on demand.

The same caution applies when examining public opinion. One circulating statistic suggests that 48% of Israelis support another war against Iran. The closest documented figure, 48.2%, came from a poll regarding the resumption of large-scale military action against Hezbollah, even if such action carried the risk of conflict with the United States. This poll did not measure support for another comprehensive war against Iran.

Israeli public opinion on Iran is more contradictory. The joint campaign initially enjoyed broad support, reflecting longstanding concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and regional alliances. Support for weakening Iran’s capabilities remains strong, particularly among right-wing voters.

This casts a heavy shadow over Netanyahu as Israel’s scheduled election date of October 27, 2026, approaches. Repeated polls indicate that his coalition is in a weak position, public trust in his leadership remains low, and the war with Iran has done little to improve his electoral prospects, despite expectations within his camp that a military confrontation might restore his damaged security credibility.

Escalation could shift the electoral campaign toward national security issues and place Netanyahu at the center of decision-making, but this does not mean political motives are driving military planning; security calculations can coexist with domestic gains. Moreover, any unilateral action could backfire if it results in significant human casualties, economic disruption, or a confrontation with Trump.

The United States can restrain Israel by restricting ammunition supplies, aerial refueling, intelligence support, missile interception systems, use of regional facilities, and diplomatic protection. Nevertheless, Israel retains the ability to act independently—particularly in response to an imminent Iranian attack or if there is conclusive evidence of resumed nuclear weapons efforts—but taking such a step in the face of explicit U.S. opposition would entail extremely high military and political costs.

Any unilateral military campaign would also face the limits of Israel’s multi-layered air defense system. Iranian ballistic missiles can be intercepted using the Arrow system, the U.S. THAAD system, or the Patriot system, while the David’s Sling system provides an additional defensive layer against specific threats, including ballistic and cruise missiles. Multiple interceptors may be fired at a high-priority target to increase the likelihood of a successful interception; consequently, prolonged engagements could deplete stockpiles at a rate far exceeding normal production capacity, a problem that has prompted the United States to fund a significant expansion in the production of components for both the Patriot and THAAD systems.

Thus, current preparations should be interpreted as a combination of operational planning and coercive diplomacy. Israel seeks to convey to Iran that reaching an agreement with Washington does not necessarily guarantee protection from future attacks, wants Trump to understand that any agreement ignoring Israeli demands may face challenges and opposition, and aims to persuade the Israeli public that the government still retains freedom of action.

These messages may strengthen Israel’s negotiating position, but they could also deepen rifts with Washington and prompt Iran to disperse and harden its remaining capabilities. The transition from contingency plans to military action depends on any agreement that may be reached between Washington and Tehran, the pace at which Iran rebuilds its capabilities, the nature of the U.S. response, Israel’s remaining ammunition stockpiles, and Netanyahu’s assessment of military and political risks.

Military preparations are already underway, but there is no evidence that a confrontation is imminent. While Israel has the capability to strike Iran independently, the question that no military plan has yet answered remains: Can Israel bear the consequences alone, without U.S. support?