Is Lebanon Raising the Stakes to Provoke American Pressure on Israel?

In the vein of “I speak to Hamas so Hezbollah may hear,” the impact of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s emphatic declaration that there will be no withdrawal from the Gaza Strip until the movement’s arsenal is completely dismantled has triggered repercussions across Lebanon. Beirut is currently engaged in arduous negotiations with Tel Aviv, mediated by the United States, centered on Hezbollah’s military capabilities, which have come to be governed by the same “land for weapons” equation that applies in Gaza.

Netanyahu’s stance on the Gaza file and Hamas reflects a “hardline” strategy he is likely to employ leading up to his elections in October next year. This political climate has increasingly enveloped Lebanon, despite Beirut’s reliance on the United States to persuade Israel of the necessity of offering concessions in the negotiation track with Beirut to keep the process alive, going beyond the modest progress achieved during the recent “Rome 2” round in long-range files (the land border and prisoners).

While Netanyahu appeared to seal with a “red wax” any possibility of withdrawal from Lebanese territory within the “red line” before the Knesset elections, Beirut is counting on Washington, which is sending General Joseph Klairfield to Lebanon soon to try to break the vicious circle surrounding the two most urgent issues: the new experimental zones and the mechanism for verifying withdrawal and dismantling Hezbollah’s weapons. This effort is timed for the period preceding the anticipated “Rome 3” table talks in early September.

This provides the political authority in Beirut with tangible defensive elements against the escalating “assault” by Hezbollah on direct negotiations, which it has described thus far as yielding “zero benefit.” Consequently, it helps counter this narrative and allows the state to gradually reclaim the tools of decision-making and “control” that Hezbollah had seized through fait accompli.

Furthermore, the continuity of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations constitutes, for the United States, part of a broader picture surrounding the Lebanese front. This picture involves the comprehensive political, security, and economic reconfiguration of the entire region, reflecting a new regional system in all its dimensions. Its effects appear to be integrating, even if some are anticipatory regarding the outcomes of the Iranian front... whatever they may be.

From this perspective, anticipation grows regarding how Washington will manage the deadlock that has stalled Lebanese-Israeli negotiations and restart their momentum, ensuring that Netanyahu’s “electoral storm” does not push them backward. This approach must also take into account the Iranian front, which wavers between tepid and hot gusts, as if preparing for a near-term explosion or one following the US midterm elections (early November), or standing on the brink of a breakthrough, even if transitional.

It is now clear that the dynamics of the “experimental zones” (whose first phase began three weeks before the Western Zouk, Froun, and Sraifa incidents) and their transition to a subsequent stage necessarily pass, as Washington has openly stated, through the approval of a verification mechanism for implementing the framework agreement signed between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States. The “experimental” nature constitutes one of its main elements, with key pillars including the deployment of the Lebanese Army in areas from which Tel Aviv gradually withdraws, the dismantling of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure there, and ensuring the prevention of the return of its fighters.

While Israel insists on maintaining a supervisory role within this mechanism, Beirut categorically rejects this demand, explaining the push to identify a third party acceptable to all concerned parties (Washington does not want any role on the ground) “whether through a multinational force, UN inspectors, or European countries such as Italy and France (which Tel Aviv objects to), with Washington playing the role of final arbiter without deploying troops on the ground,” according to the newspaper Haaretz.

Given that these two points are sensitive, and making them a “yardstick” for the progress or stagnation of the negotiation process could lead to frustrating or disappointing conclusions that undermine the strategic importance of these unprecedented direct talks, which have not taken place in approximately 42 years, informed circles are wondering whether it is possible to resort to less complex, immediate issues that the three parties at the Rome table could achieve a breakthrough on, thereby renewing the capital of “diplomatic power.”

In this context, it is expected that focus should be placed on two issues: Israel’s complete ceasefire, and the cessation of violations outside the “security zone,” including incursions and drone strikes, alongside halting dredging, burning, and destruction operations inside occupied villages. This should run parallel to exploring the possibility of pushing for the establishment of a schedule for experimental zones, meaning a gradual withdrawal, even if the timeframe is contingent upon the prior establishment of a verification mechanism and the time it will require based on experience, thereby granting Lebanon at least an “acknowledgment of the principle” of withdrawal and its scope.

Notably, in this context, the atmosphere was conveyed by sources close to the head of the Lebanese delegation to the negotiations, who told Al-Hadath TV channel that there is “Lebanese firmness and caution in returning to negotiations before making progress on three issues: a complete ceasefire on Lebanese territory, an experimental zone encompassing Bint Jbeil and Khiam, and a halt to demolition, dredging, and burning.”

Prior to that, Al-Jadeed TV channel reported similar sentiments from sources close to the head of the Lebanese delegation, stating “not to rely on other tracks that have proven fragile, and that negotiations are difficult given Israel’s reluctance to take any step currently, especially with the approach of Israeli elections.”

The sources clarified that “the military delegation discussed several files concerning experimental zones and border demarcation, but it has not yet received any promises regarding them. We trust in the army and its work; it does not need anyone scrutinizing its back. However, Israel wants to exclude all European countries, even Italy, and rejects Arab participation, while Lebanon refuses to exclude Arab and Western countries from any track.”

Regarding the anticipated date in September for the next round, the sources replied, “No dates yet; we are in a state of waiting to monitor Israeli behavior.”

It was impossible to determine whether this atmosphere, which will undoubtedly overshadow Clarfield’s mission in Beirut, reflects a genuine readiness to halt negotiations unless Lebanon’s conditions are met, or is part of the authorities’ display of resolve in the face of Israel’s continued violations and intransigence, and to secure at least a de facto ceasefire, an end to dredging and destruction operations, and an acknowledgment of experimental zones and their scope, even if “in principle,” as a shot in the arm for the negotiation process and support for the state against the fierce campaign by Hezbollah, which seeks to leverage the entire Lebanese reality for Iran’s front and its negotiation track with the United States.

Compounding this ambiguity, a Lebanese political source was quoted as saying that, contrary to prevailing speculation, the Lebanese side does not intend to boycott the negotiations and is determined to see this process through to the end “because the alternative would be catastrophic for Lebanon and its people.” At the same time, however, it remains steadfast in its positions and demands, which were presented by the Lebanese delegation in recent sessions and will be conveyed to General Clairfield, head of the Coordination Committee, during his upcoming visit to Beirut to discuss the ceasefire and experimental zones.

It remains unclear whether Netanyahu’s remarks about “Israel having worked vigorously in Lebanon over the past few days,” along with his assertion that he cannot disclose further details regarding the nature of ongoing operations, serve as a prelude to de-escalating the ground tensions that began just before the conclusion of the “Rome 2” talks and cast a dark shadow over them, or whether they signal further escalation. The situation is being viewed as a test of the U.S. role in capitalizing on the intersections among the three tracks of the negotiation process concerning the Lebanon front, at the expense of contradictions that are feared could benefit Hezbollah and, behind it, Tehran.

Netanyahu affirmed that Israel is carrying out what he described as an “operation of utmost importance,” noting that the Israeli military had conducted intensive operations in recent days, which he said targeted those he referred to as “terrorists,” including elements in the Al-Tahir Heights.

He added, “We are in the midst of an operation of utmost importance, acting with wisdom and sound judgment, with determination and caution, in coordination with the Israeli military, and working to eliminate threats.”