The Gulf: Between Repositioning and the Imperative of a “State of Unity”
- Amid accelerating changes, the Gulf region has become the heart and balance of the equation.
- The US-Iran memorandum of understanding marks a turning point in the regional security equation in the Middle East.
- With shrinking maneuvering room, any new US commitment will be conditional and less engaged.
- Any fragile, collapse-prone understanding will keep tensions in the Strait of Hormuz as a tool for Iranian blackmail and pressure.
- Any sectarian or media escalation by Iran’s proxies requires a unified and strong Gulf response.
- A drop in oil prices, should Iranian oil return to the market, will pressure budgets.
- The challenge is not managed through reactive responses, but through a proactive Gulf project based on multiple tracks.
- “Gulf NATO”: a binding security and defense union, while preserving the political sovereignty of each state.
- The transition from “cooperation” to “union” is a strategic necessity dictated by developments.
- Crises have shown that the more unified the voice and stance, the greater the capacity to confront challenges.
- “Union” grants the Gulf a larger role on the international stage and enhances its bargaining power.
- The peoples of the Arab Gulf are fully convinced of the will of our leadership and their courageous response to changes.
- Turning threats into opportunities to build the strongest Gulf system in the region’s history.
- “Union” is the only option to ensure the Gulf is a key player, not merely a battleground.
- History does not wait… and the security of the Gulf today is written by Gulf pens, not dictated from abroad.
At a pivotal moment in the course of events, and on a matter of profound importance concerning the fate of our present and future, deep and explicit thinking becomes a necessity, not a choice. A question that demands we open the doors of thought aloud, before facts close off the avenues of decision.
And because it is a crucial and fateful issue, thinking must be loud and strong in this case. Amid the rapid changes sweeping the Middle East, the Gulf region is no longer just a stage upon which events unfold; it has become the heart and balance of the equation. The signing of a US-Iran memorandum of understanding, which ended before its ink had dried, is not merely a passing diplomatic event. Rather, it signals the beginning of a new phase that redefines the concept of “guarantees” that the Gulf has relied upon for decades.
Here, thinking becomes a strategic necessity, not an intellectual luxury. The question is no longer what America or Iran will do? We, in the Arab Gulf states, are asking: Where are we heading on our own? What form of guarantees do we desire for our security? And who will shape them if we do not shape them with our own hands?
The security of the Gulf is not an end in itself, but a gateway. It is the gateway to development and prosperity for its states and peoples, and to the transition from a rentier economy to an economy based on knowledge, industry, and technology. It is also a gateway to a life for peoples who always aspire to stability, away from the language of conflicts and destructive wars that have scorched our surroundings and hindered our rise for decades.
Therefore, any discussion about memorandums and agreements of understanding must begin with a fundamental question: How do we ensure that the future is primarily Gulf-driven? And how do we transform a moment of regional anxiety into a moment of founding a “state of union” that places the interests of Gulf peoples above all else, and makes defensive, political, and economic integration a shield that protects development, rather than a wall that besieges it?
I seek to attempt an answer… in an attempt that places all possibilities on the table, because the era of strategic pleasantries has ended, and the era of shared destinies has begun.
Theoretically, the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU), which was signed but not implemented due to the Iranians’ customary failure to honor their commitments, represented a turning point in the regional security equation in the Middle East. It goes beyond the nuclear file or sanctions, directly affecting the structure of political, security, and strategic balances in the Arabian Gulf, the region most sensitive to international and regional shifts.
This situation is characterized by tensions and distrust toward the Iranian regime, driven by its sectarian ideology, sponsorship of terrorism, expansionist policies, and export of the revolution—themes that have dominated the Iranian regime’s discourse since 1979.
The memorandums and agreements carry political, security, and strategic dimensions. The political dimension involves managing competition rather than resolving it. By its logic, the MoU signifies Washington’s shift from a policy of “maximum pressure” to one of “negotiated containment.” This transition conveys two messages:
- The second is directed at the Gulf, indicating that Gulf security is no longer automatically guaranteed by an absolute American commitment, but has become part of a broader geopolitical bargain.
Politically, this weakens the logic of “security dependence” and strengthens the logic of “alliance pluralism.” In other words, Gulf states will be compelled to treat Iran as a recognized actor in the regional equation, even if disagreements persist over its regional behavior—a behavior that experience has shown to be untrustworthy.
Any understanding that reduces the intensity of direct confrontation between the US and Iran may lower the probability of a “proxy war” in the Gulf in the short term, but it simultaneously raises expectations from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states themselves.
Furthermore, non-traditional threats are on the rise. The Houthis, cyberattacks, waterway security, and energy security will remain hot-button issues because they constitute pressure levers not directly covered by the MoU.
In the strategic dimension, the redrawing of alliance maps becomes evident. Strategically, the MoU implies that the US seeks to “separate theaters”—de-escalating tensions with Iran in the Gulf while focusing on China, Russia, and Ukraine. This pushes the Gulf toward diversifying partnerships, potentially with China, Russia, Europe, and India.
Iran is implementing its policy of establishing facts on the ground to control the Strait of Hormuz, contrary to international law. It employs a military strategy known as “denial of access,” whereby, even without achieving full control over the waterway, it makes transit costly and dangerous through the use of naval mines, anti-ship missiles, and drones. This contradicts international laws guaranteeing freedom of navigation. Iran demonstrates power and exerts influence in one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, engaging in economic blackmail by threatening oil tankers and imposing potential transit fees under the guise of “providing security”—an act considered illegal extortion.
Additionally, there is a qualitative arms race. Iran may gain economic relief through the release of frozen assets, which would bolster its missile and drone programs and enable it to continue supporting its terrorist affiliates.
From this, I arrive at an important issue in the Gulf dimension: internal and societal security. Any sectarian or media escalation by Iran’s proxies, exploiting the understanding, will require a unified and strong Gulf discourse that distinguishes between “political coexistence” and “security concessions.” This is a crucial and fundamental matter for maintaining cohesion among Gulf peoples as they face storms.
Turning to the economy and energy—the lifeblood of development and prosperity—the return of Iranian oil to the market, coupled with lower oil prices, will pressure national budgets, necessitating accelerated economic diversification and the advancement of joint electricity, industrial, and transportation infrastructure projects, including the integration of road and rail networks among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states.
The challenge cannot be managed through reactive measures, but rather through a proactive, comprehensive Gulf project built on several parallel tracks. The first is a unified defensive military track, led by a single Gulf military command and activated through the development of mechanisms for joint military operations. The second is an economic and technological track, encompassing a common Gulf market, a unified currency, and the localization of joint investments. The third is a media and cultural track, featuring a single Gulf narrative addressing public opinion. The fourth is a legal and institutional track, anchored by a binding Gulf security charter, under which any aggression against one member state is considered aggression against all, accompanied by rapid deterrence mechanisms.
We now arrive at the most critical aspect of this discussion, posed loudly and clearly: transitioning from the “Cooperation Council” to a “Union State.” Has the time come? Is the Council’s system capable of formulating a “vision for future pathways”?
Forty-five years ago, the leaders of the Arab Gulf states laid the foundation for building a Gulf entity, initiated by the consensus of the leaderships and peoples of six Gulf states that established the Gulf Cooperation Council. Its strong foundation was designed to usher in the first phase of launch as the Cooperation Council, ultimately leading to a state of union. Undoubtedly, the Vision 2030 frameworks have created an integrated political, economic, and social structure ready for political and security integration, forming the nucleus of a “union state”—a mandatory security and defense union, while preserving the political sovereignty of each state. This model resembles a “Gulf NATO.”
The Council’s Basic Charter has defined its core objectives, including achieving coordination, integration, and interconnection among member states in all fields, leading to their unity. While the past years have witnessed numerous joint initiatives in economic, security, and social areas, they have not yet reached the level envisioned by the founders.
Over the past decades, the region has faced immense political, economic, and security challenges, ranging from wars and regional conflicts to oil price fluctuations and global shifts in energy and economic sectors. Successive crises have highlighted the importance of a collective stance: the more unified the voice and position, the greater the capacity to confront challenges. Some crises faced by Gulf states, most recently the US-Iranian tensions, have underscored the importance and necessity of achieving a higher degree of institutional and political integration.
The transition from cooperation to union reflects a deep political will and translates the aspirations of the region’s peoples for prosperity and stability. Among the most prominent advantages of a union is the enhancement of political and security resilience, providing a stronger framework for adopting unified and effective decisions in the face of threats, reducing internal disputes, and increasing the global prestige of the Gulf position.
Furthermore, it will lead to deeper economic integration through unified markets and a Gulf currency, along with greater liberalization of capital and labor mobility, contributing to income diversification and sustainable development. It will also strengthen Gulf identity, as the union deepens the sense of belonging to a shared Gulf body and helps consolidate shared values and heritage. Additionally, it will increase international effectiveness by granting the Gulf a larger role on the international stage and enhancing its bargaining power, particularly in energy, trade, and investment matters.
In a world where balances are shifting rapidly and imposing escalating economic and technological challenges, Gulf states require more robust and flexible collective mechanisms. A union could provide the ideal umbrella for them.
The peoples of the Arabian Gulf are fully convinced of the resolve of our leadership and its courageous response to change, as well as of the conscious popular participation in supporting the transition and achieving cohesion between leaders and citizens. Moreover, practical initiatives to strengthen unity—such as developing joint Gulf institutions and expanding rights for Gulf citizens—contribute to consolidating the foundations of a union.
Forty-five years after the Council’s establishment, the transition from a state of cooperation to a union remains a necessity demanded by the future. It is not a luxury option, but a practical and strategic response to the challenges and imperatives imposed by reality. Achieving it requires all GCC member states to read the past with awareness, to bravely envision the future, and to reinforce the constants upon which the Gulf Cooperation Council’s journey has been built since its inception.
The memoranda of understanding and US-Iranian agreements are not the end of the story, but the beginning of a “post-guarantee” phase. It is up to the GCC states to shape the future and leap to a “state of union” with strategic awareness, transforming threats into opportunities to build a Gulf system that is the strongest in the region’s history.
As a Gulf citizen, I see the transition from cooperation to union not merely as a political dream, but as a historical necessity imposed by the challenges facing our region. The GCC’s experience over the past decades has proven it to be a successful framework for coordination, even though it has not yet reached the level of integration that would safeguard the peoples’ interests in the long term.
Reaching a state of union is essential for a better future for the Gulf’s states and peoples, reflecting a deep aspiration toward a more stable and robust future for the region. The idea of transitioning from cooperation to union is not just a political step, but a civilizational project that opens the door to economic, security, and cultural integration, placing the Gulf in a more influential position on the international stage.
A union is not a luxury, but a necessity for a better future. I believe that union is not one option among several, but the only choice to ensure that the Gulf remains a key player in the twenty-first century, rather than merely a theater shaped by others’ decisions.
History does not wait. The security of the Gulf today is written by Gulf hands, not dictated from abroad.
