Rome negotiations above the tremor crater... From Lebanon's Shiqf to the Strait of Hormuz

Amid the reverberations of the earthquake-shaking explosion announced in Israel—that it was a network of tunnels and shelters belonging to Hezbollah in the vicinity of the Shqif Castle—and the tremors shaking the region, which now appears to be mere hours away from either a “surrender strike” launched by Washington against Iran or an escalation wave that maintains the brakes preventing an open flare-up across all scenarios, the seventh round of direct negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv, under US sponsorship, convenes on Tuesday in Rome.

The successive explosions carried out by Israel in the areas it occupies in southern Lebanon, the largest of which occurred on the night of Thursday–Friday using 700 tons of explosives, causing a 3.8-magnitude earthquake on the Richter scale whose echoes reached Mount Lebanon and Beirut, are exerting pressure on the negotiation round, which runs until Thursday. This diplomatic effort also races against the most dangerous movement of hotspots in the region, given that Iran’s front stands at a critical juncture: one path could open the door to a major clash and a war over Hormuz and its sister straits and perhaps seas, while the other could turn the diplomatic window into a ladder through which the region escapes a confrontation that might otherwise become all-encompassing.

While Tel Aviv’s escalation of bombing operations appeared to be a mix of power display aimed at delineating the boundaries of possible withdrawals under the “experimental phase,” and preparing the ground for any additional withdrawals that Washington might pressure toward, ensuring it “cleanses” them of Hezbollah’s infrastructure itself, the second Rome round—which will be supplemented by experts and specialists to discuss files on the mechanism for verifying that the areas reclaimed by the Lebanese Army are free of any Hezbollah presence, as well as demarcating the land border—seems primarily engulfed in the dust of what may be the region’s fiercest storm. Its onset could halt all negotiation tracks, especially amid breathless anticipation regarding the possibility that the small country might be drawn into its eye.

As the United States illuminated the red warning board for Americans in the region or those wishing to travel there, no one in Lebanon seemed to have an answer to the big question: Will Hezbollah rejoin the war in support of Iran, as it did on March 2 last year?

Although political circles consider that any new wave of strikes on Iran exceeding the parameters of the previous phase would mean for Tehran the use of all “survival war” weapons, including all its regional arms, other sources believe that Hezbollah has become the weakest link in any activation of the unity of fronts and will bear the harshest price if it slides into confrontation. They point out that the course of the 104-day war Hezbollah recently fought in defense of Tehran revealed the extent of its atrophy and military ineffectiveness, having transformed from a supporting factor into an agent needing direct protection, and that its missiles failed to establish a deterrence equation to prevent targeting of the southern suburb, succeeding only because President Donald Trump pressured Israel to protect the Islamabad negotiation track.

According to these sources, what reinforces the notion that Hezbollah has become the “soft underbelly” of the Iranian axis is that any new shelling it directs at the country in the “Holocaust” (October 7) attacks will be the first time it acts without the official legal umbrella previously provided by political equations and ministerial statements. Meanwhile, the current government of President Najib Mikati not only approved the historic resolution on monopolizing weapons in the hands of the state on August 5, 2025, but also, on March 3 last year and shortly after declaring the entry into war “revenge for Khamenei,” imposed an immediate ban on Hezbollah’s military and security activities, deeming them illegal and demanding that it hand over its weapons to the state and confine its role to political work.

The sources further note that Hezbollah is not even akin to Hamas, which benefits from the absence of a Palestinian state as a factor necessitating engagement with it to define the contours of the “day after” the Gaza war. They argue that the Lebanese state, having reversed the effects of the systematic creeping encroachment carried out by Hezbollah and its backers in Tehran on its roles and authority, has regained its diplomatic sovereignty through direct negotiations with Israel. These negotiations are conducted without any partnership or presence of Hezbollah, and continue despite its political opposition to them and its rejection of their core premises, particularly those articulated in the framework formula signed in Beirut, Tel Aviv, and Washington on June 26, which is based on “(returning) land in exchange for (handing over) weapons.”

Although the sources treat these factors as theoretically entering the context of “components” that prevent Hezbollah from joining a new war, which would dissipate its last cards for preserving its position in the “day after” balance of power, and view them as characteristics of an equation along the lines of “Hezbollah’s weakness is Lebanon’s strength,” all assessments by Hezbollah’s opponents fall short when Iran chooses to pursue a “after me, the flood” path. This path has not shown its main arm, five months ago, as willing or able to escape it, especially after data converged indicating a near-total absence of Lebanese margins in Hezbollah’s decisions, which are believed to now be managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps according to the requirements of the larger conflict.

According to Hezbollah’s opponents, regardless of the directions the region, including the Lebanese front, will take, the negotiation track with Israel has acquired diplomatic and political immunity, making it capable of remaining, even if only for a while, the sole regulatory framework for the post-war period if war erupts, or for the transitional phase between explosion and de-escalation. There is a conviction that the Lebanese state has firmly established its footing vis-à-vis Hezbollah and the outside world eager to assist it in reclaiming its foundations, reconstruction, and support in ensuring Israel’s complete withdrawal, according to an experimental mechanism that included its first phase in the Western Zuur, Farun, and Sareea areas. Lebanon wants to expand this mechanism in the Rome 2 round to include the Eastern Zuur, Yeham, and Arnon, extending to the Khiam area, and to establish a field verification mechanism that does not include Tel Aviv and respects Lebanese laws regarding entry into homes and private property.

In this context, the US Embassy in Beirut congratulated the Lebanese Army, reaffirming the United States’ appreciation for its dedication to protecting Lebanon’s sovereignty and security.

It also recalled the statement by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who said: “We hope that the Lebanese Army and the legitimate, sovereign Lebanese government will continue to extend their authority and secure more Lebanese territory.”

For his part, President Joseph Aoun stated, “The time has come for us all to entrench the firm constitutional and national truth: there is no legitimacy for any weapon outside the state’s legitimacy, and no protection for this homeland except through its national, unifying army, which represents all Lebanese. The army alone possesses the authority, power, and legitimacy to serve as the state’s exclusive military arm, and this is what we are steadily and resolutely pursuing, step by step, to safeguard coexistence and stability.”

He added, “In the south, the army’s responsibility is multiplying with each Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. The coming phase requires the full deployment of military units along the entire southern border and the exclusive extension of state authority over its lands, thereby demonstrating to the world that Lebanon, through its army alone, can protect its sovereignty and secure this sensitive area, paving the way for the safe return of its people to their villages and towns. If the army is fulfilling this grave role, then the Lebanese rallying around it is not a luxury but an existential necessity.”

Aoun continued, “With full confidence and pride, I reaffirm my complete trust in the army’s leadership, which has proven in the most delicate and difficult circumstances that it operates at a high level of responsibility, professionalism, and impartiality. It has managed sensitive files with wisdom and a steadfast commitment to the supreme national interest, free from all posturing or partisanship.”

For his part, the Prime Minister emphasized that the military institution remains “the primary symbol of Lebanon’s independence,” stressing that “the restoration of full sovereignty, the consolidation of stability, and the protection of citizens are linked to the army’s deployment across all Lebanese territories and the extension of state authority from Naqoura to Arida.”

Earlier, Aoun had stated that “the massive explosions recorded at the Shqif Castle, which generated ground waves equivalent to a 3.8-magnitude earthquake on the Richter scale, according to the National Center of Geophysics, constitute a highly dangerous escalation and a blatant violation of existing commitments. They also represent a direct threat to the process initiated under the Framework Agreement, to which Lebanon has committed to fulfilling its obligations.”