Lebanon 'Preempts' Netanyahu's Move... Betting on Trump's 'Carrot and Stick' Mediation
Amid the anticipation surrounding the aftermath of the meeting between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and its potential impact on the shifting winds regarding the fronts of Iran and Lebanon—both governed by a dynamic of “simultaneity and separation”—Beirut, alongside monitoring this meeting and its outcomes, focused on preparations for the seventh round of negotiations with Tel Aviv, hosted by Rome on August 4 under US auspices, for the second consecutive time.
As “radars” in decision-making capitals and across the region attempted to uncover the nuances of the Trump-Netanyahu meeting—whether it laid the groundwork for a new escalation akin to previous episodes between the two men, or whether the US President had completely distanced the Israeli Prime Minister from the circle determining the course of regional events, thereby deepening the “buffer zone” that allowed him to carefully manage the trajectory of highly dangerous developments in the Middle East—Lebanon appeared relieved by what it had achieved, particularly through President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Washington and his summit with the White House host on July 21. This visit seemed to have given Aoun a step ahead of Netanyahu, placing him in a defensive position vis-à-vis Trump, highlighted by several key points:
- Consolidating the separation between the Lebanon and Iran tracks, as expressed by the transition of the “Framework Formula” signed by Beirut, Tel Aviv, and Washington on June 26 into effect through the experimental phase of Israeli withdrawal and the deployment of the Lebanese Army in areas liberated from “fire control.” This practically meant that including a ceasefire on the Lebanon front in the first item of the suspended US-Iran memorandum of understanding became merely a facade for a structure overseen by an entirely independent diplomatic, political, and security architecture, with implementation tools completely detached from the Islamabad track.
- Persuading Washington of the seriousness of the official Lebanese stance on restricting weapons to state control, which is the operational term for disarming Hezbollah, and emphasizing that this is a comprehensive process not limited to the military dimension—which requires a full Israeli withdrawal to deprive Hezbollah of its excuses—but also encompassing financial, investment, and economic pillars that would strengthen the state’s position against Hezbollah’s parallel economy and strip it of its multi-dimensional social influence. This led Trump and his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, to use the “carrot” of lifting the ban on flights to Beirut and to pave the way for a broad return of US investments.
While anticipation prevailed in Beirut regarding whether the White House meeting on the Lebanese file would provide a boost to the experimental phase by giving the green light for an Israeli withdrawal from new areas beyond Froun, Srayfa, and Western Zouitar, and by agreeing on a verification mechanism for the dismantling of any Hezbollah military infrastructure by the Lebanese Army—expected to crystallize in the “Rome 2” meeting—political circles considered it highly unlikely that Tel Aviv would accept any path based on a return to the status quo before October 7, 2023, even with the distinction of making the southern Litani area free of Hezbollah and its weapons. They noted that Israel, under Netanyahu, treats the reality it created in its north as a valuable card it will not relinquish through a comprehensive withdrawal, in exchange for less than a complete disarmament and in the manner of a “one-time, final solution.”
It was not merely a passing remark on the eve of the summit meeting; Tel Aviv was keen to send a positive signal, ostensibly aimed at Washington and an attempt to appease the US President, even if the subject matter concerned the Lebanese Army, according to what the Israeli Broadcasting Authority revealed: that the mechanism coordinating between the United States, Lebanon, and Israel had been informed that the Lebanese Army had discovered a Hezbollah weapons cache during its activities in one of the areas of the pilot phase.
The Broadcasting Authority reported that Israeli officials confirmed to it the discovery of the weapons cache, noting that this was the first time since the start of the pilot phase that the Lebanese Army had been able to identify a Hezbollah target during its operations, including uncovering a hideout containing weapons and ammunition.
Diplomatic officials, according to the same report, viewed this step as evidence of the effectiveness of the current coordination mechanism, which could encourage expanding the role of the Lebanese Army in efforts to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure.
The significance of the Axios website’s report, citing a US official, was no less: “We are entering the next round of Rome talks between August 4 and 6, driven by significant momentum, following the successful launch of the first pilot zone in southern Lebanon and the productive meeting held last week between President Aoun and President Trump.”
The official emphasized that “in Rome, technical teams will focus their efforts on moving forward with the full implementation of the framework agreement; this includes expanding the scope of the pilot zones, resolving all outstanding border issues, and working toward concluding a comprehensive peace and security agreement.”
He added, “The first pilot zone represents a tangible opportunity to achieve real progress on the ground, restore the authority of the Lebanese state through verifiable disarmament of terrorist organizations, and build the necessary trust to take the next steps. The experience of the initial zones will help us improve the implementation mechanisms of the pilot zones, thereby allowing for their gradual expansion.” The official continued, “The trilateral framework is the only way to achieve lasting peace; the full implementation of this framework clearly serves the interests of both countries, and the Trump administration is committed to ensuring its success.”
Meanwhile, amid reports in Beirut about the possible visit of Saudi envoy Prince Yitzhak Ben Farhan and Qatari envoy Mohammed Al-Khalifi in the coming days, President Aoun’s stop in Turkey on Thursday stands out. This visit is being treated as exceptional in both its timing and its political and economic content, particularly in light of Turkey’s potential roles vis-à-vis Tehran, which the Lebanese President had accused of using “the Land of the Cedars” as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Washington. It is also significant regarding “new Syria,” given President Trump’s repeated hints about requesting President Ahmad al-Sharaa to intervene in Lebanon to help address the “Hezbollah” issue—a move that al-Sharaa has affirmed on multiple occasions is not within his plans—without overlooking the fact that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated about a month ago that “Turkey’s security begins in Beirut and Damascus.”
In a related context, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, after receiving the President of the Federal National Council of the United Arab Emirates, Saqr Ghobash, affirmed that “the stronger Lebanon’s ties with its Arab depth, the faster it can proceed on the path of recovery and prosperity. The deeper the Arab cooperation, the greater the ability of our countries to achieve security and stability and safeguard the interests of our peoples.”
Salameh discussed with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri the developments in the general situation and the latest political and field updates, in light of Israel’s violation of the ceasefire and its continuation of bombing and destroying homes and villages in the occupied southern Lebanese areas, as well as Salameh’s visit to Baghdad.
Political and security headlines did not divert attention from a protest movement by depositors who have been unable to secure a mechanism for the return of their funds frozen in banks for nearly seven years—the duration of the catastrophic financial collapse that struck Lebanon in the autumn of 2019. The path out of this crisis remains stalled due to the lack of necessary infrastructure, including the bank reform law, which is still under consideration.
As depositors set fire to a branch of Bank Byblos in the Sin el-Fil area and in front of the entrance of the adjacent Bloom Bank, alongside demonstrations in Martyrs’ Square in central Beirut, political circles noted that while depositors’ demands are legitimate, there is concern that someone is pushing the protest movement from behind, driving it forward for objectives linked to the climate fostered by Hezbollah against the authorities, the negotiations with Israel, and the “Framework Agreement.”
In this context, the Central News Agency quoted political sources as saying that the timing and location of the movement, specifically in the Sin el-Fil area, which is predominantly Christian, carries direct messages to the President of the Republic and the military establishment. These messages affirm that the party in question has the capacity to organize demonstrations in areas with a Christian majority, amid a delicate political and security climate and a systematic campaign against the authorities and their decisions, both domestically and internationally.
In media statements, it was noted that “one of the main reasons for the anger is the banks’ return to normal operations, through launching new banking programs, granting loans, issuing credit and debit cards, and attracting new customers, while depositors remain unable to access their money.”
Faroun cast doubt on the legislative process, pointing out that talk of reform and restructuring laws has continued for seven years without any tangible progress in the situation of depositors. He believes that “the bank reform law will not enter into force before the approval of the Financial Regulation Law,” adding that “depositors have paid the price for this delay, and many of them have passed away before recovering their rights.”
