Houthi Threats... They Are Bigger!

Despite all the escalation they have resorted to, which necessitated a response from the international coalition, the Houthis can do no more than cause disruptions. They cannot close the Bab al-Mandab, the entrance to the Red Sea. The most they can manage is striking a Saudi or other foreign-flagged ship. However, the issue of imposing a blockade on Saudi ports is beyond the capabilities of both the Houthis and Iran itself.

It is impossible for the Houthis to carry out their threats of imposing a blockade on Saudi seaports. All they have done is miss, through their empty rhetoric, the opportunity to become part of the political game in Yemen—a game aimed at reaching a political settlement that excludes no party.

By their overt alignment with the “Islamic Republic,” the Houthis have removed themselves from the political game in Yemen. They have simply proven that they are Iranian, not Yemeni, and that any bet on the Houthis regaining their awareness and a minimum sense of national identity is misplaced. That was merely a waste of time.

In recent years, particularly since the Saudi-Iranian agreement brokered by China in March 2023, the Houthis maintained a degree of restraint, feigning neutrality. They sought to continue dialogue with Riyadh, free from any form of provocation. This included exchanges with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia aimed at establishing a coexistence formula between the two sides.

Suddenly, following the decision by the “Islamic Republic” in Iran, or more accurately, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to escalate militarily, the Houthis, through their leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, revealed a stance showing that they cannot act as anything other than an Iranian instrument. The Houthis decided to become part of the Iranian offensive against the Gulf Arab states and Jordan, an offensive that reflects an Iranian bankruptcy with no depth left. The Houthis have shown that they are nothing more than another brigade of the IRGC, much like Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Admittedly, the Houthis can create disruptions to shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, utilizing Somali pirates who can be hired to carry out specific missions. However, this does not mean the Houthis have the capacity to close the Bab al-Mandab, the mandatory entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. This is due to a very simple reason: the Houthis do not control the Yemeni port of Al-Mukha, which commands traffic at the Bab al-Mandab. The Houthis lost Al-Mukha in the autumn of 2014, when Yemeni forces decided to expel them from southern Yemen, including the port of Al-Mukha.

Sooner or later, there will be a need for an international and regional return to Yemen, which holds exceptional strategic importance, for at least two reasons. The first is that Yemeni territory is suitable as a corridor for oil pipelines, helping to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. The second reason is that, in the absence of the ability to lay oil pipelines through Yemeni territory to the Red Sea or the Arabian Sea, regional and global powers will not be able to tolerate Iran’s presence in Yemen. In clearer terms, it is unacceptable for Iran to disrupt navigation in the Red Sea from Yemen.

It is no secret that the “Islamic Republic,” through the Houthis, is determined to remain in Yemen and use it to close the Bab al-Mandab strait and attack ships transiting the strait en route to the Suez Canal. This is the Houthis’ intention, but their loss of control over the port of Al-Mukha prevents them from executing their threats.

It is worth recalling in this context that the Houthis have controlled Sana’a and a significant portion of Yemeni territory since September 21, 2014. Nothing better illustrates Iran’s determination to maintain its presence in Yemen than its insistence on recently violating the ban on flights to Sana’a airport. Iran dispatched a civilian aircraft to Sana’a under the pretext of transporting a Yemeni delegation to attend the funeral of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Not content with that, the Houthis suddenly launched a campaign against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, including threats. This campaign came after a prolonged period of calm and tit-for-tat exchanges between the Houthis and Riyadh.

The question posed in our times will remain a two-pronged one. The first prong concerns the Houthis’ ability to carry out their threats against Saudi Arabia and maritime navigation in the Red Sea, while the second relates to Iran’s bankruptcy. Regarding the first prong, the Houthis will be able to target ships and tankers crossing the Red Sea, particularly given their control over the strategically vital port of Hodeidah, which overlooks this sea. As for Iran itself, it has chosen to attack Arab Gulf states and Jordan, avoiding direct confrontation with the United States or Israel. Iran targets Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and the Sultanate of Oman, while tasking the Houthis with attacking Saudi Arabia. Conversely, it does not dare to target any American warship sailing in the Gulf!

Ultimately, the Houthi threats are nothing more than an expression of Iran’s utter bankruptcy. These threats, which come at the expense of Yemen and its people, reveal that the end of the Iranian regime is inevitable. It is merely a matter of time, now that the Houthis have exposed the weakness and profound bankruptcy of the “Islamic Republic”... as well as its role in undermining regional stability. This is a role it has never abandoned since Khomeini raised the slogan of “exporting the revolution.”