The Gulf at the Center of the War.. Not on Its Periphery

Wars may begin with specific, declared objectives, but they can gradually drift away from those goals as battles evolve and circumstances change. For instance, the overthrow of four empires or the redrawing of the Middle East were not among the objectives of World War I, at least not among its declared aims at the time. Nor was the enhancement of Iran’s regime influence an objective of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Similarly, the Soviet Union did not invade Afghanistan in 1979 with the aim of igniting a protracted, exhausting war of attrition that would become one of the causes of its collapse and disintegration. There are always unintended consequences of wars, which may be no less significant in their impact than the intended initial outcomes.

Just half an hour after a US-Israeli attack targeted Iran on February 28, the Gulf states came under missile and drone attacks by the Iranian regime. This month, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has faced attacks targeting vital and civilian facilities. This has transformed a conflict that began with a specific US-Israeli objective—preventing the Iranian regime from acquiring a nuclear weapon—into a regional war that places Gulf states at its center, rather than on its periphery.

World War I remains the greatest example of how wars can alter their initial objectives. The conflict, which started as a political crisis following the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian crown prince, escalated into a ferocious European war marked by intensifying combat and heavy losses. Over time, its goals expanded and changed, underscoring a historical reality: the continuation of war can create conditions that diminish the ability of the parties that ignited it to control or manage them. This applies to the US-Israeli war against the Iranian regime, which began with limited objectives, such as degrading the regime’s military and nuclear capabilities and potentially facilitating regime change, but has evolved into a war of attrition and a struggle over vital waterways, commercial crossings, and the incitement of sectarian and ethnic conflicts that may be difficult to extinguish.

Thus, the war that started with the specific goal of preventing the Iranian regime from obtaining a nuclear weapon has expanded to include the protection of Gulf states, securing navigation, keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and secure, ensuring navigation in the Red Sea, maintaining oil and gas supply lines, multiplying military and political alliances, drawing in international actors whose involvement was previously unforeseen, and generating economic and security repercussions affecting Europe and the United States, alongside a transformation in energy security that has turned it into a shared global security issue.

The inevitable question for Gulf states in the wake of this war, especially since they have become its focal point rather than peripheral actors, concerns the likelihood of changes in their post-war strategies, and whether this means emerging with a more heavily armed and security-prepared Gulf, rather than one focused on economic and technological superiority.

Since the beginning of the US-Israeli war against the Iranian regime, Gulf states have repeatedly rejected involvement in the conflict, declaring their non-participation. However, this has not prevented strikes, missiles, and drones from targeting them from the outset of the war. Gulf states can make a political decision to reject the war here, but they cannot change their geographical location or erase their proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. Geography sometimes dictates and influences outcomes, much like military and political decisions. This occurred with Belgium during World War I: although it declared neutrality, its geographical position between Germany and France made it part of German military calculations.

The Gulf will only be safeguarded through unity, and its sovereignty will only be preserved through a firm stance. This war may have taught us the necessity of not remaining vulnerable to regional balances of power, but rather becoming an active factor in shaping such balances, especially now that we are at the center of the war, not on its margins.

Suad Fahad Al-Moajel